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Disclaimer
This thesis was submitted for examination in the month prior to the 2005
general election. As a result of the election the parameters of the Working for
Families package have changed with the New Zealand Labour Party
proposal for extending assistance being implemented. This proposal was
modelled in this study as one of a number of possible adjustments to
Working for Families. However, unless otherwise stated the package
modelled and evaluated in this thesis is government policy prior to the
election. No changes have been made to the arguments or conclusions in
this thesis since submission.
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Abstract
ln 2004 the Labour-led government announced a series of tax-benefit
reforms (the Working for Families reforms) that will account for an estimated
$t.tZ billion per-annum of newspending when fully implemented by 1 April
2007. These reforms aim to both reduce rates of child poverty and improve
financial incentives for paid work at low wages, particularly for caregivers.
Changes to family and employment tax credits (the Family Assistance
programmes) are central to these reforms.
This study reviews methods for measuring the etfectiveness of family
and employment tax credits, evaluates the Working for Families reforms, and
considers possible improvements to Working for Families. Questions that this
study considers are:
' What roles should family and employment tax credits play in tax-benefit
systems?
. How should family and employment tax credits be designed? Should
eligibility for assistance reflect work etfort as opposed to family
structure?
. What lessons do historical and comparative perspectives on Working
for Families provide?
. Will New Zealand's Working for Families reforms achieve the optimal
design and role of family and employment tax credits?
. What improvements, if any, could be made to the Working for Families
reforms?
This study concludes that the Working for Families reforms represent
significant income redistribution towards families with children but little
change will be made to the overall design of the Family Assistance
programmes, some of which have remained largely unchanged since 1986.
Working for Families does not fully address the need to reform the Family
Assistance programmes in the light of important social and economic
changes that have taken place over the last two decades, such as the
breakdown of the breadwinner model of social arrangements and the
liberalisation of the labour market. This study thus considers a number of
improvements to Working for Families, ranging from simplifying the structure
of the Family Assistance Tax Credits to a more radical redesign of these
programmes. This study concludes that more clearly established policy
priorities and a greater understanding of the relative etfectiveness of different
tax-benefit instruments are required if New Zealand is to develop a tax-
benefit system that achieves a desired level of redistribution to families with
children at least economic cost.
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1 General Introduction
1.1 Introduction
In 2004 the Labour-led government announced a series of tax-benefit
reforms (the Working for Families reforms) that will account for an estimated
$1.17 billion per-annum of new spending when fully implemented by 1 April
2007. These reforms aim to both reduce rates of child poverly and improve
financial incentives for paid work at low wages, particularly for caregivers.
Changes to family and employment tax credits (the Family Assistance
programmes) are central to these reforms.
This study reviews methods for measuring the effectiveness of family
and employment tax credits, evaluates the Working for Families reforms, and
considers possible improvements to Working for Families. Questions that this
study considers are:
. What roles should family and employment tax credits play in tax-benefit
systems?
. How should family and employment tax credits be designed? Should
eligibility for assistance reflect work effort as opposed to family
structure?
. What lessons do historical and comparative perspectives on Working
for Families provide?
. Will New Zealand's Working for Families reforms achieve the optimal
design and role of family and employment tax credits?
. What improvements, if any, could be made to the Working for Families
reforms?
This chapter introduces the policy problem that the Working for Families
reforms aim to address, defines the research topic and scope, and explains
the study's structure. In section two this chapter discusses the policy settings
and assumptions regarding family structures that underpinned the early
development of New Zealand's tax-benefit system. Changes to these settings
and patterns of family structures over the last two decades are then
discussed. In section three this chapter defines the research topic and scope.
Following this the structure of the study and the key research questions by
chapter are explained.
1.2 The Policy Problem and Context
A number of policy settings and assumptions regarding family structures
underpinned the development of New Zealand's tax-benefit system. The
development of New Zealand's tax-benefit system following World War Two
was in an economic and social environment of low and generally short-term
unemployment and where couples with children and a single male
breadwinner were the most common family type. The social assistance
system developed alongside policies that aimed to attain full employment and
to ensure adequate market incomes for male breadwinners in families. Social
assistance programmes were funded with progressive taxation and were
generally provided on an income tested basis. Key exceptions to this income
testing were the provision of the universal Family Benefit and universal
pensions.
Beveridge's Dilemma
ln New Zealand the provision of the universal Family Benefit reflected
previous experience with income testing of family allowances, which was
seen to limit the expansion of production during World War Two through
discouraging increased work etfort, and the movement towards universal
provision of family allowances in Britain following the Beveridge report
[McClure, 1998, pp. 97-98]. Yet in the preparation of his report Beveridge
was confronted with the dilemma of reconciling a tax-benefit system ensuring
income adequacy with a competitive labour market. Competitive labour
markets did not generally adjust wages (paid to individuals) according to the
number of children in a worke/s family. However, in order to ensure families
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have adequate incomes, tax-benefit systems targeted assistance according
to family size. Consequently when wages were low and family sizes were
large the income from work could fail to provide an adequate family Income
and be less than the income from government transfers when not working
[Mendelson, 2001, p. 1]. As a consequence of this dilemma the design of tax-
benefit systems needed to balance the goals of encouraging the supply of
labour and ensuring adequate incomes. This balance had to be found within
a constraint of limited government funds.
In 1946 in the United Kingdom Beveridge's eventual solution was to pay
family allowances to mothers with two or more children as he believed
husbands' market wages were adequate for raising one child [Mendelson,
2005, p. 1; Millar,2001, p. 1921. At this time in New Zealand the more
generous universal Family Benefit was paid to mothers for every child in the
family. These early efforts to reconcile Beveridge's dilemma reflected an
economic and social environment of low and generally short-term
unemployment and where couples with children and a single male
breadwinner were the most common family type. lt was assumed that men
had dependents and women did not and that married women rarely worked
in paid employment [Beaglehole, 1993, p. 2]. The costs of childrearing were
seen as an important consideration in assessing families' need for financial
assistance and a relatively high value was placed upon caregivers' time
outside the labour market. Family allowances were thus provided to address
families' financial needs, promote increased birth rates, and reinforce
women's maternal roles in society [Beaglehole, 1993, p.2].
I ncreasi ng Population Heterogeneity and Tax-Benefit Reform
These initial efforts to resolve Beveridge's dilemma seemed increasingly out
of place in the light of important changes taking place in patterns of family
structures, labour market outcomes, and policy settings, particularly in the
two decades since 1984. Following the 1984 election of the fourth Labour
government there was an ideological shift favouring retrenchment of the
welfare state in New Zealand [Boston, 1999a, p. 9]. A feature of this
retrenchment was a shift in social assistance expenditure towards targeted
and residual assistance for working-aged people on low-incomes, particularly
the unemployed and sole-parents, and which reflected attempts to respond to
new and emerging economic conditions, such as the decline of full
employment (for male breadwinners in families) and the greater role of
market-based setting of wage rates.
Over the last two decades there has also been a shift towards a broad
based and low rate tax system and a tax-mix shift away from income taxes
towards consumption taxes [Stephens, 1993, p. 45; McLeod, Chatterjee, et
al, 2001b, p. 111. The shift towards flatter personal income tax scales, in
conjunction with greater targeting of social assistance expenditure, changed
the roles of taxation and social assistance programmes with targeted
spending becoming the primary vehicle for redistribution lStephens, 1997, p.
4731. Further, although policies have emphasised a broad based and low rate
approach to income taxation, the combination of income taxes and
abatement of targeted social assistance has led to poverty traps at lower
income levels [St John and Rankin,2002, p. 2; Nolan, 2004c, p. 4]. Poverty
traps occur when people receive little or no increase in income in the hand
when they increase their hours of work and have implications for a wide
range of policy issues, including the labour supply of primary and secondary
earners, the demand for childcare assistance, and the formation and stability
of family structures [Nolan, 2003, p. 4].
As with many other OECD countries New Zealand has experienced
significant changes in family structures over the last two decades. These
changes have included the breakdown of the breadwinner model of social
arrangements, increasing numbers of sole-parent families, and increasing
numbers of dual-income families. For instance, between 1976 and 2001 the
percentage of two-parent families in New Zealand decreased from 62 to 42
percent of families (excluding single-person families). There were
corresponding increases in the proportions of couples without children from
29 to 39 percent and sole-parentfamilies from 9 to 19 percent [Statistics New
Zealand, 2OO2b, pp. 9-1 01.
lmportant changes in the labour market have also taken place over the
last 20 years. Liberalisation of the labour market has been associated with
increasing part-time and casualwork, variations in weekly hours of work, and
variations in wage rates. There has been a decline in employment among
prime working-aged men, particularly low-skilled workers, and an increase in
women's employment rates and representation in managerial and
professional occupations [Singley and Callister, 2003, p. 3]. Changes in
family structures and labour markets have influenced the polarisation of work,
with a growth in both work-rich families, including dual-earner couples, and
work-poor families, including couples where neither partner is in paid work
[Singley and Callister, 2003, p. 1]. Along with changes in participation in work
the distributions of weekly hours of work have also changed, with a 2004
study estimating that New Zealand has relatively high proportions of its
population working 50 or more hours per-week [Messenger, 2004].
Changes in family structures (especially the growth in sole-parent
families and older families without children), changes in employment
outcomes, changes in the distribution of wages and salaries (which comprise
approximately 80 percent of market income), and a growing proportion of
workers in their prime eaming years and with higher educational
qualifications were reflected in an increase in income inequality in New
Zeafand from 1983 to 1998 [O'Dea, 2000, pp.25-32]. Concerns were also
increasingly expressed regarding the need to alleviate child poverty.
Research by the New Zealand Povefi Measurement Project concluded that
the incidence of poverty (the proportion of the family type below the poverty
line) increased with the number of children in the family. Further, although the
incidence of poverty was low among working families a significant proportion
(almost 30 percent in 1998) of the families below a poverty threshold of 60
percent of equivalised disposable family income were working families
[Stephens and Waldegrave, 2001].
These changes, particularly the increasing heterogeneity in family
structures and increasing incidence of part-time and part-year work, have
increased the complexity of designing tax-benefit programmes. lncreasing
variations in hours of weekly work have, for instance, made it increasingly
ditficult to design hours-based thresholds to encourage people to move from
part-time to full-time employment. Increased numbers of social assistance
recipients have also increased fiscal costs associated with increasing levels
of main welfare benefits to respond to changes in the level and incidence of
poverty. Consequently additional demands have been placed upon
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supplementary assistance and private charity to address areas of emerging
needs [Stephens, 1999, p. 251J. These additional demands upon
supplementary assistance have themselves led to increased complexity in
the tax-benefit system, due to the administration and compliance issues
associated with these programmes.
The social assistance and income tax systems were largely devised as
separate systems. However, changes in family structures, employment
outcomes, and the designs of tax-benefit programmes, such as the taxation
of main welfare benefits and the provision of supplementary assistance to
non-beneficiaries, have meant that large proportions of the population are
now atfected by both systems simultaneously [Stephens, 1997, p.  71).
Further, over the last 20 years the income tax system has taken an
increasingly prominent role in the provision of social assistance payments.
Thus while total expenditure through the tax system fell from 1980-81 to
1999-2000, social assistance expenditure through the tax system accounted
for a relatively stable proportion of GDP and the proportion of total social
assistance expenditure provided through the tax system increased. This
social policy role of the income tax system will expand further following the
Working for Families reforms (of which reform to the Family Assistance Tax
Credits is central) in New Zealand. The Working for Families reforms are
forecast to account for an estimated $1 .17 billion per-annum of new spending
when fully implemented by 1 April 2007. Of this total the Family Assistance
reforms are forecast to account for $1.19 billion per-annum of new spending
and part of their cost 
- 
along with the costs of changes to accommodation
and childcare assistance 
- 
will be otfset by reductions in the levels of main
welfare benefits.
New Zealand is not unusual in turning to reform of family and
employment tax credits in efforts to reduce child poverty, improve financial
incentives for caregivers' labour supply, and modernise tax-benefit systems.
Reform to these programmes has been central to tax-benefit reforms
throughout the Anglo-American world [Mendelson, 2005; Bradbury, 2OO4;
Nofan, 2004a, forthcomingl. In the United States, for instance, by 2004
federal expenditure on the Earned Income Tax Credit and Child Tax Credit
was almost equal to the combined expenditure on Food Stamps and
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families [United States Treasury, 2005].
Family and employment tax credits are able to provide tax relief on a more
targeted basis than changes to personal income tax scales and, as they are
generally provided through personal income tax systems, are seen to more
strongly reinforce work effort than traditional welfare programmes [Alstott,
1995; Nolan and Fairbrother, 20051. This use of family and employment tax
credits is often part of a reform strategy emphasising active labour market
policies [Adler, 2004, p. 88].
1.3 The Research Topic and Structure of the
Study
Research Topic and Scope
This study reviews methods for measuring the effectiveness of family and
employment tax credits, evaluates the Working for Families reforms, and
considers possible improvements to Working for Families. Changes to family
and employment tax credits (the Family Assistance programmes) are central
to these reforms. Family tax credits are refundable tax rebates generally paid
to families with dependent children irrespective of workforce status.
Employment tax credits are refundable tax rebates paid to families who
satisfy work-based criteria. Employment tax credits may also be based on
family structure. Family and employment tax credits are generally income
tested on the basis of gross joint caregiver income. Refundable tax rebates
are added to caregivers' incomes net of personal income taxes and social
assistance abatement. The level of assistance provided to a family by a
refundable tax rebate is not limited to the family's tax liability.
New Zealand has a unitary Westminster political system with social
security largely funded, purchased, and provided at the central government
level. Local governments have a limited role in the social security system,
with the major exception being the direct provision of some subsidised
housing at local-government level. While there has been some devolution of
purchasing and provision of various social services to quasi-governmental
organisations and private charitable groups since the mid-1980s, the funding,
purchasing, and provision of social security largely remains the role of central
government. There are few contributory social security programmes, with the
major exception being the system of levy-funded accident insurance (the
Accident Compensation Gorporation scheme) [St John, 1999, p. 1741. Non-
contributory social assistance has three tiers:
. First tier assistance (main benefits) providing basic income support.
. Second-tier assistance (non-discretionary supplementary assistance)
providing additional assistance to cover circumstances in which needs
are considered to be higher than those covered by main benefits alone.
. Third-tierassistance (discretionarysupplementaryassistance) providing
further and discretionary assistance for a limited set of circumstances
[Stephens, 1 999, p. ?aO].
The Ministry of Social Development and the Inland Revenue Department
administer the major social assistance programmes. (A summary of the
major programmes in New Zealand's tax-benefit system can be found in
Nolan [2003, pp. 45-52].)
This study focuses on the provision of family and employment tax
credits to families with children. There are a wide range of important policy
instruments other than family and employment tax credits, such as the
provision of childcare assistance and access to paid parental leave. As well
as their design, the full impact of family and employment tax credits reflects
thelr interaction with these other policy instruments. However, in this study
family and employments tax credits are given emphasis due to the
prominence of these programmes in recent and ongoing tax-benefit reforms
and the lack of their previous research. Further, there are a number of
reasons for the focus of this study on families with children.
Firstly, families with children make up a large proportion of the New
Zealand population. The 2001 Census, for example, identified that of
the 967,614 families (excluding the 307,635 one-person families) in
New Zealand the most common was a couple with children (accounting
tor 42 percent (407,793) of families). A further 19 percent (182,919) of
families were sole-parent families [Statistics New Zealand, 2002b, p. 1].
Secondly, although families without dependent children were the largest
single family-type in pove$ in 1998, the incidence of poverty (the
proportion of the family Wpe below the poverty line) and the problems
associated with poverty tended to increase with the presence of
chifdren in the family [Stephens and Waldegrave, 2001, pp. 90-93].
Thirdly, financial incentives for labour supply facing families with
children are of particular interest for policymakers due to differences in
the cost structures of families with and without children and the
interaction of family-based income transfer programmes, joint caregiver-
based income transfer programmes, individual-based personal income
tax programmes, and individual-based market incomes. Increasing
emphasis is also being placed upon increasing the labour supply of
sole-parents and secondary earners in families with children in order to:
o ensure families have access to adequate financial resources and
address child poverty;
o address any fall in labour supply due to the long-term shrinking of
working age populations;
o help caregivers maintain employment-related skills;
provide caregivers with sources of financial independence;
support progress towards gender equity; and
increase the income tax base and GDP IOECD, 2001a, pp. 129-
130; Bryant, Jacobsen, Bell, and Garrett, 2004, p. 81.
Structure of the Study
The structure of and key questions addressed in this study are shown in table
1.1. There are four core parts to this study. Following the general introduction
to issues facing the tax-benefit system in the current chapter, in part one the
study considers frameworks for evaluating tax-benefit programmes and then,
based on this discussion, develops the criteria and methodology for
evaluating these programmes. In part two the study describes the evolution
and operation of New Zealand's tax-benefit system and Fami[ Assistance
programmes. Part two also contains a comparison of the tax-benefit systems
in New Zealand and other Anglo-American countries, which illustrates
similarities and differences in the designs and roles of family and
employment tax credits in these countries. The criteria and methodology
developed in part one and the policy context identified in part two are used to
o
o
o
evaluate the tax-benefit system in part three of this study. Following this the
Working for Families and a number of alternative reforms are evaluated in
part four of the study. Part four concludes with discussion of future directions
for reform and evaluation and a summary of the study's findings.
Table 1.1: Research Ouestions by Chapter
Part One Chapter Two: Frameworks for Evaluating Tax-Benefit Programmes
. What principles underpinned universal provision of social assistance
and progressive tax scales?
. What principles underpinned the move towards targeted provision and
broad based and low rate taxes?
. What are the implications of attributing ditferent values to domestic
production for these principles?
. What are the implications of relaxing the analyticalseparation between
taxation and expenditure decisions for these principles?
Chapter Three: Criteria for Evaluating Tax-Benefit Programmes
' How should poverty thresholds be set? What is the appropriate income
sharing unit? How should variations in families'cost structures be
taken into account? What poverty measures should be used?
. How can financial incentives to supply labour be evaluated? What role
do uncertainty and administrative incentives play in labour supply?
What empirical evidence is there on tax-benefit programmes'effects
on labour supply? How are labour supply and poverty outcomes
related? What is the relationship between labour supply and excess
burden?
. What criteria can be used to evaluate administration of and compliance
with tax-benefit programmes? What are the relative strengths and
weaknesses of tax-based and welfare-based assistance?
Chapter Four: Methodology for Evaluating Tax Benefit Programmes
. What are the implications of evidence based policy and New Zealand's
public management framework for research on the tax-benefit system?
. How can the etfects of reforms on individualfamilies be estimated?
What assumptions should be made regarding the characteristics of
hypotheticalfamilies (e.9., wage rates, numbers of children, and
degree of sharing of resources)?
. How can the effects of reforms on the population as a whole be
estimated? What roles can arithmetic and behavioural microsimulation
modelling play? What are the respective strengths and weaknesses of
administrative and survey data?
. How should family and employment tax credits be modelled? How
should differences in purchasing power be taken into account?
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Table 1.1: Research Ouestions by Chapter
Part Two Chapter Five: New Zealand's Tax-Benefit System
. What were the early policy settings of the tax-benefit system? What
underpinned these settings?
. What were the neo-liberal policy settings? How were neo-liberal policy
settings reflected in social assistance expenditure?
' What changes in policy settings have taken place since the election of
Labour-led governments after 1 999?
Chapter Six: New Zealand's Family Assistance Tax Credits
. What were the antecedents to the Family Assistance Tax Credits?
What policy objectives did these programmes pursue?
' How have the designs and objectives of the Family Assistance
programmes changed since their establishment in 1986? What use
has been made of work etfort and age of children as criteria for
targeting?
. What agencies are responsible lor administering the Family Assistance
programmes to different client groups (such as people in and people
out of work)? How do recipients register for assistance?
. How is Family Assistance entitlement calculated? In particular, what is
the unit of assessment, how is a primary caregiver defined, and what is
the period of assessment? What incidence is there of over-payments
and under-payments? What are programmes'rates of take up?
Chapter Seven: Anglo-American Tax-Benefit Systems
. How do the five Anglo-American tax-benefit systems differ? What
emphasis do they place on spending on family cash benefits and
spending on active labour market programmes?
How are family and employment tax credits designed? ls emphasis
placed on providing tax relief to breadwinners or to caregivers? What
structure and levelof assistance is provided to representative families?
Part Three Chapter Eight: Income Adequacy
. What broad changes in the income distribution have taken place since
1984? Do Ginicoefficients indicate an increasing income inequality in
New Zealand? What have the key drivers of income inequality been?
What other evidence is there on income changes in New Zealand
since 1984?
. Within these broad changes, how have the incidence and depth of
poverty changed from 1984 to 200'l? How has the poverty reduction
etfectiveness of the tar<-benefit sptem changed? Who are the key
population groups in pover$fi How do New Zealand's poverty rates
compare with those internationally?
. Are data on poverty rates consistent with data on living standards?
Who are the population groups with low living standards?
. What is the relationship between income adequacy outcomes and
financial incentives to supply labour?
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Table 1.1: Research Questions by Chapter
Ghapter Nine: Financial Incentives to Supply Labour
. What is the dishibution of EMTRs from main benefits and the Family
Assistance programmes among the population as a whole?
. What family types face the most serious poverty traps? What budget
constraints and EMTR profiles do representative families face? What
impact does other assistance, such as accommodation assistance and
childcare subsidies, have?
. How do the financial incentives for labour supply in New Zealand
compare with those in other Anglo-American countries?
Part Four Chapter Ten: Evaluating the Current Direction of Reform
. What impact willWorking for Families have on child poverty? How will
the static financial gains from Working for Families be distributed?
' What impact willWorking for Families have on the distribution of
EMTRs over the population as a whole? What impact will Working lor
Families have on EMTR profiles and budget constraints of
representative families? What impact willWorking for Families have on
the labour supply of different demographic groups?
. How willWorking for Families impact on the relative generosity of New
Zealand's family and employment tax credits?
. What impact willWorking for Families have on the administration and
costs of complying with of the ta,r-benefit system?
' What further reforms could be recommended?
Chapter Eleven: Conclusion
. What are the key findings of the study?
. What future directions should reform and evaluation take?
1,4 Conclusion
A number of policy settings and assumptions regarding family structures
underpinned the origins of New Zealand's tax-benefit system. Following the
1984 election of the fourth Labour government there was an ideological shift
favouring retrenchment of the welfare state. This retrenchment included a
shift towards targeted social assistance expenditure on the working-aged,
which reflected the increasing market-based setting of wage rates and the
decline of full employment. This greater targeting of assistance has resulted
in increasing povefi traps facing low-wage families with children. Although
the social assistance and income tax systems were largely devised as
separate systems large proportions of the population are now affected by
both systems simultaneously.
The origins of New Zealand's social assistance system were in an
economic and social environment of low and generally short-term
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unemployment and where couples with children and a single male
breadwinner were the most common family type. Over the past two decades
work patterns and family structures have changed significantly. New Zealand
has had one of the highest rates of increase in income inequality in the world
over the last two decades and concerns have increasingly been expressed
regarding the need to alleviate child poverty. Yet increasing population
heterogeneity and the growth in part-time and part-year work are making
redesigning the tax-benefit system to respond to povefi more complex.
Many jurisdictions have responded to such issues through establishing or
redesigning family and employment tax credits and such reforms are now
underway in New Zealand with the Working for Families reforms. Expanding
the social policy role of the income tax system in this way will further increase
the degree to which the social assistance and income tax systems
simultaneously affect the same people.
This study reviews methods for measuring the effectiveness of family
and employment tax credits, evaluates the Working for Families reforms, and
considers possible improvements to Working for Families. The focus of this
study is on the effect of tax-benefit programmes on families with children.
There are a wide range of policies that governments use to influence policy
outcomes. The focus in this study is on the main tax-benefit programmes in
general and family and employment tax credits in particular.
Part one of this study considers frameworks for evaluating tax-benefit
programmes and then, based on this discussion, develops the criteria and
methodology for evaluating these programmes. Part two of this study
discusses the changing policy settings in New Zealand's tax-benefit system.
Part two also contains a comparison of the tax-benefit systems in New
Zealand and other Anglo-American countries, which illustrates similarities
and ditferences in the designs and roles of family and employment tax credits
in these countries. The criteria and methodology developed in part one and
the policy context identified in part two are then used to evaluate the tax-
benefit system, the Working for Families reforms, and a number of changes
to these reforms in parts three and four of this study.
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2 Frameworks for Evaluating Tax-
Benefit Programmes
2.1 Introduction
The following three chapters evaluate frameworks for evaluating tax-benefit
programmes and then, based on this discussion, develop the criteria and
methodology for evaluating these programmes. These criteria and
methodology are used to evaluate the New Zealand tax-benefit system and
the Working for Families reforms in parts three and four of this study.
This chapter considers frameworks for evaluating tax-benefit
programmes. Emphasis is given to illustrating the interaction between policy
frameworks, policy settings, and policy problems. In section two of this
chapter the horizontal equity and vertical equity principles, which
underpinned universal provision and progressive tax scales, are discussed.
These principles emphasise income as a proxy for utility and treat the
taxation and expenditure sides of government budgets as largely separate.
However, following increasing unemployment and governments'fiscal deficits
emphasis increasingly shifted towards the greater targeting of social
assistance and the development of broad based and low rate tax policies. As
a corollary of this shift in policy direction greater emphasis was placed upon
the optimal design of a tax-benefit system and upon theories integrating the
taxation and expenditure sides of government budgets.
Optimal tax theory, which emphasises utility not income, explicitly
considers trade-offs in the design of tax-benefit systems between behavioural
responses to taxation and social disutility from inequality in individuals' utility.
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In section three of this chapter the key findings of optimal income tax (both
non-linear and linear) models are discussed. Reflecting the increasing
concern with alleviating child poverty and increasing caregivers' labour
supply, the chapter then discusses implications for tax-benefit design of
changing the assumed policy objective in these models (from welfarist to
poverty reduction models) and of shifting from a labour-leisure model to a
labour-domestic production model (attributing greater value to time outside of
the labour market). The implications of two perspectives that integrate the
taxation and expenditure sides of government budgets (the benefit principle
and public choice theory) for tax-benefit design are then considered.
2.2 Horizontal Equity and Vertical Equity
Before discussing horizontal equity and vertical equity it is necessary to first
define progressivity of the tax-benefit system. Progressivity indicates the
degree to which income taxes paid and transfers received vary by income. In
practice a range of tax-benefit programmes influence the progressivity of the
tax-benefit system. However, for illustrative purposes progressivity is
discussed in relation to only income tax systems in the section below. Income
tax systems may be progressive, proportionate, or regressive. Progressive
income tax systems are those where average tax rates increase over all
income ranges. The average tax rate is the total tax paid as a proportion of
the taxpaye/s total tax base, such as taxable income. With progressive
taxation income taxes take a higher proportion of higher incomes than they
do from lower incomes. Taxes may take more in absolute terms from higher
incomes than they do from lower incomes and still not be progressive if they
do not take a higher proportion of higher incomes. Proportional tax systems
are those where the marginal tax rate is equal to the average tax rate. The
marginal tax rate is the rate of taxation on the additional unit of the taxpaye/s
taxable income. Thus proportionaltaxes take the same proportion of incomes
however large or small they are. Regressive tax systems are those where the
marginal tax rate is less than the average tax rate. Regressive taxes take a
higher proportion of low-incomes than they do from higher incomes. Taxes
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may still be regressive even if they take more in an absolute sense from
taxpayers on higher incomes [Creedy, 1999, pp. 411-412].
Until the early 1980s emphasis in New Zealand was placed upon
funding the provision of social security and social assistance through
progressive tax scales, which reflected the prominence of the vertical equity
principle [Boston, 1999b, p. 211. Further, although social assistance was
generally provided on an income tested basis in New Zealand, until the early-
1980s much social security and some social assistance (including family
benefits) were provided on a universal basis, which reflected the prominence
of the horizontal equity principle. These principles of horizontal equity and
vertical equity are discussed below.
Horizontal Equity and Families' Cost Structures
The classical definition of horizontal equity is that people with equal ability to
pay taxes or grounds for receiving assistance should face the same tax
burden or should receive the same level of public assistance [Musgrave,
1976, p.4; Feldstein, in Kaplow, 1985, p.5l.A second and widely used
definition of horizontal equity is based on the ranking of the income
distribution and argues that horizontal equity requires the tax-benefit system
to leave the ranking of individuals on the basis of pre-tax income unaltered
[Duclos, Jalbert, and Araar, 2000, p. 1]. Conceptually, ability to pay
(underpinning the classical definition of horizontal equity) differs from the
distribution of income (underpinning the re-ranking criterion). Ability to pay is,
however, often defined in terms of annual monetary income.
A comprehensive base for assessing an individual's ability to pay would
be all resources over which the individual has control. Resources could
include monetary income, non-monetary income, such as the imputed
income from domestic production and assets such as housing, consumption,
and endowments, including financial and human capital endowments. These
resources could be measured over an individual's lifetime, so that at any
point in time taxes would reflect the net present value of lifetime resources.
Ditferences in individuals' abilities to smooth resources over time could also
be taken into account.
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Unfortunately it is not possible to quantity many forms of income,
consumption, and endowments. For example, the Haig-Simon measure of
annual income, which is the annual change in the family's wealth plus the
market value of consumption over the year, requires information on flows of
income, stocks of assets, and uncertain or one-off events, such as
inheritances. Even where resources can be quantified there may be
difficulties in collecting and evaluating data. These difficulties intensify when
the period for assessment increases to greater than a year. Difficulties in
quantifying ability to pay also arise due to variations in the income definitions
and time periods for assessment and entitlement employed in ditferent tax-
benefit programmes, with income taxes based on annual income and social
assistance generally based on more immediate income needs [Stephens,
1997, p. a831.
Assuming income is regarded as the measure of ability to pay then
under the horizontal equity principle two families with the same income
should pay the same amount of tax or receive the same amount of
assistance. Further, families' ability to pay not only reflects income but also
reflects their cost structures, with, for example, families with children facing
additional costs to families without children. Differences in cost structures
facing families with and without children have been central to many
arguments underpinning the provision of family benefits. Given these
additional costs families with children have lower ability to pay taxes then
families without children and consequently should face relatively lower tax
burdens or receive higher levels of assistance (assuming that the benefits to
these families from having children do not outweigh these costs (this is
discussed in greater detail in the discussion on equivalence scales in chapter
three)). The provision of family benefits to all families with children
irrespective of their incomes reflects a horizontal equity goal of accounting for
the greater income needs of families with children relative to families without
children.
There is wide support for the principle of horizontal equity or the equal
treatment of equals [Auerbach and Hassett, 1999, p. 1]. Yet while this
principle sounds straightforward it can be ditficult to apply in practice. A
workable definition of horizontal equity has been elusive. Auerbach and
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Hassett [1999, pp. 1-2] identity three key issues that have arisen in the
construction of measures of horizontal equity. The first issue is establishing
whether there is a need for an independent horizontal equity criterion or
whether horizontal equity can be implied in the assumed aversion to
inequality in the income distribution. Horizontal equity may simply represent a
component of the overall measure of welfare. A second issue is justifying the
criteria for horizontal equity if an independent horizontal equity criterion is
required. For instance, one measure of horizontal equity is the assessment of
whether re-ranking in the income distribution occurs. This criterion has,
however, been criticised as giving undue weight to the status quo income
distribution.
A third issue in defining a measure of horizontal equity is establishing
the characteristics of the groups of people that are to be treated as equals
(i.e., the extent that family's cost structures should be taken into account),
what equal treatment entails, and how deviations are to be evaluated. As
Musgrave has argued:
The basic meaning of 'equal position' must be that people enjoy equal
levels of welfare, somehow defined; and that of 'equal treatment' that
people in equal pre-tax positions should also be left in post-tax equality.
But this is only a statement of the problem, not its solution. As a first
step, operational meaning must be give to the concept of equal position
[Musgrave, 1 976, pp. 4-5].
Thus under a progressive personal income tax system that bases tax liability
on the basis of individual incomes a two-income couple will generally pay
less in personal income taxes than a single-income couple with the same
total income. There is thus a disparity between the taxes faced by partnered
families. Yet introducing tax relief to reduce disparities in the taxation of
partnered families would, for example, create new disparities between
partnered and single workers, with single workers facing higher tax burdens
than partnered workers. Disparities would also be created between families
of simihr sizes, as some single workers have dependents while some
partnered workers do not. With increasing population heterogeneig
(particularly the breakdown of the breadwinner model of social
arrangements) these ditficulties in designing policies to achieve horizontal
equity have increased.
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Vertical Equity and Tax Scale Progressivity
Horizontal equity is a prerequisite for the achievement of vertical equity.
Vertical equity is the principle that those with higher ability to pay should pay
more than those with lower ability to pay. Vertical equity deals with the
treatment of unequal individuals and thus requires differentiation between
people who have first been grouped on horizontal equity grounds [Musgrave,
1976, p.4; Kaplow, 1985, p. 61.
Edgework undertook an early analysis of the optimal degree of
progressivity of the tax system using utilitarian principles [Boskin, 2000, p.
15]. Edgeworth assumed that the objective in designing the tax system was
to maximlse a utilitarian social welfare function, which was the sum of
individual utilities. The marginal utility of income was assumed to decline with
income and be interpersonally comparable [Boskin, 2000, p. 15]. lt was
argued that individuals should pay taxes or receive transfers so as to result in
their marginal utilities of income being equalised (this is the equal marginal
sacrifice condition). When all incomes are reduced to the point where the
marginal utility of income is equalfor everyone the last dollar of income given
in taxes and abatement by each person involves the same level of sacrifice.
When tax payments are set so that that individuals' marginal sacrifices are
equal the total sacrifice (society's total loss of utility) due to tax payments
would be minimised, as it would not be possible to reallocate the existing tax
burden from one person to another person with identical preferences without
the increase in one person's sacrifice in terms of utility exceeding the
decrease in the sacrifice in terms of utility of the other person [Pigou, 1929, p.
91; Marshall, 1949 (1920), F. 16; Mill, in Musgrave, 1985, p. 18l.The tax
system was therefore required to transfer income from a high-income
individual with a low marginal utility of income to a low-income individual with
a high marginal utility of income.
Thus, totally ignoring incentives effects, the Edgeworth solution to the
optimal degree of progression was the tax and transfer system, which
equalised incomes. Except in the unlikely case of everyone having the
same pre-tax incomes, this implied a 100 percent rate of taxation for
incomes above the average and using the proceeds to transfer incomes
' Horizontal equrty is also often a prerequisite lor etficiency objectives through ensuring
neutral treatment of similar economic resources.
to those below the average, with everyone winding up with the average
post-tax income [Boskin, 2000, p. 15].
Yet (again reflecting increasing population heterogeneity) the
assumption of objectively measurable, comparable, and similar utility
functions became increasingly contested [Musgrave, 1976, p. 15]. Further,
the prescriptions for the degree of progression in the tax scale prescribed by
sacrifice theory were shown to depend on the assumed marginal utility of
income function and the definition of equal sacrifice [Musgrave, 1976, pp. 14-
151. For example, as Brown and Jackson [1982, p.64] argue, two other
possible meanings of the concept of equal sacrifice other than equal marginal
sacrifice are:
. equal absolute sacrifice, which occurs when each person sacrifices the
same amount of total welfare (each individual experiences the same
loss in total utility) in taxes and abatement; and
equal proportionate sacrifice, which occurs when each person sacrifices
the same proportion of total welfare (the ratio of utility lost to total utility
is equal for each individual) in taxes and abatement.
Different concepts of equality of sacrifice have implications for the degree to
which the tax schedule should tax those people with a higher ability to pay at
a higher rate. As discussed above, the equal marginal sacrifice condition
implies the equalising of all incomes through progressive taxation. The equal
absolute sacrifice and equal proportionate sacrifice notions imply that the
absolute level of taxes should rise as income increases. However, neither the
equal absolute nor the equal proportionate conditions are definitive on
whether the resulting schedule of taxation should be progressive,
proportional, or regressive, as this would vary depending on the assumed
marginal utility of income function [Brown and Jackson, 1982, p. 66].
Two other limitations to the arguments for progressive taxation also
became apparent. First, the assumption that progressivity could be defined in
terms of the formal structure of the tax-benefit system (or legal incidence)
became increasingly contested. Defining progressivity in terms of legal
incidence would be likely to provide a misleading view on the actual
redistributive effect of the tax-benefit system as "this ignores tax incidence
effects whereby increased marginaltax rates on higher incomes are offset by
21
even larger salaries, or tax avoidance activities, to maintain the real value of
after-tax income" [Stephens, 1997, p. 4841. Second, it also became more
ditficult to assume that progressive taxation would have no incentive effects,
particularly on labour supply [Musgrave, 1976, p. 13]. As levels of
unemployment increased policymakers and academic researchers
increasingly placed attention on labour supply and the incentives for
unemployment from tax-benefit programmes lAtkinson and Micklewright,
1991, p. 1679; Bradbury, 2004, pp. 305-3061. Attention thus increasingly
turned to theories that could evaluate both value judgements regarding the
income distribution and the behavioural responses to taxation.
2.3 Optimal Tax Theory
Optimal tax theory evaluates the conditions for maximising a social welfare
function reflecting value judgements regarding the income distribution while
taking into account behavioural responses to financial incentives from tax-
benefit systems and levying a level of government tax revenue [Mirrlees,
19711. Optimal tax theory is based on the concept of utility defined as a
function of consumption and leisure. Heady [1993, p. 271 argues that there
are three reasons for using utility and not income. First, if people increase
their work effort in response to a tax change their income may not change but
their overall utility may due to the disutility from change in work effort.
Second, utility inequality is likely to be less than income inequality as some
people may choose to have low incomes. Third, when consumption goods
are taxed relative prices and consumer preferences, which are represented
by a utility function, will change.
An important tradition in welfare economics is the judging of the
allocation of resources in an economy against the two fundamental theorems
of welfare economics. The first fundamental theorem of welfare economics
states that a perfectly competitive market economy leads to a Pareto
optimum, where it is impossible to improve the position of one person without
worsening the position of another [Rosen, 1998, p. 471. The second
fundamental theorem states that any Pareto efficient allocation may be
achieved by a suitable choice of lump sum transfers. However, in optimal tax
theory lump-sum taxes, where tax liability is independent of economic
behaviour, are often ruled out, governments lack information on ability, and
important goods, such as leisure, are outside the tax base. Consequently
optimal tax theory is concerned with the second-best nature of optimal tax
systems [Slemrod, 1 990, pp. 73-741.
Structure of OptimalTax Models
The optimal structure of a tax-benefit system is one that would minimise the
excess burden associated with levying a level of government revenue and
achieving a desired redistribution of income [Cullis and Jones, 1999, p. a26].
Optimal income taxation models involve a dual decision process. The
government observes wage incomes but not the potential wages of
individuals and levies taxes and provides transfers based on these obserued
incomes [Bradbury, 1999b, p. 13]. Taxation and grant levels are set subject
to a government budget constraint or revenue requirement, which reflects
individuals' behavioural responses to taxation and the provision and
abatement of the grant. Individuals choose the combination of income and
leisure that maximises their utility subject to their budget constraints, which
depend on taxation and the provision and abatement of the grant [Creedy,
2001, p. 1931. As well as the government revenue requirement, assumptions
are made regarding the economy's production structure (e.9., whether taxes
affect pre-tax wages) [Bradbury, 1999b, p. 15]. Assumptions are also made
regarding the social welfare function, the distribution of endowment, which is
assumed to determine the income distribution, and the behavioural response
functlon [Slemrod, 1993, p. 362]. These three later assumptions of optimal
income tax models have been a prominent focus of the optimal tax literature
and are discussed below.
The first stage in specifying the social welfare function is to determine
individual utility functions. Utility functions are generally taken to be identical
Lump sum taxes are often ruled out due to their regressive nature. This was, for example,
one argument made against the British poll tax (community charge levied on all adults living
in a jurisdiction) that replaced a residential property tax to finance local government in
Scotland in 1989 and England and Wales in 1990. Backlash against the poll tax was
instrumental in ending Margaret Thatcheds leadership of the Conservative Pafi in 1990
[Smith, 1991, p.431].
over all individuals. Thus individuals are assumed to have identical
preferences for income and labour supply. This assumption eliminates
problems of defining horizontal equity as there is no need to group individuals
into identical categories [Musgrave, 1976, p. 15].The second stage is then to
aggregate the individual utility functions to form the social welfare function
[Heady, 1993, p. 28]. Utilitarian social welfare functions define social welfare
as the sum of each individual's utility and aim to maximise the total sum of
utility through equalising marginal sacrifice irrespective of its distribution.
Utilitarian social welfare functions are unconcerned with inequalities in
individuals' total utilities [Heady, 1993, p. 29]. However, if a goal of the tax-
benefit system is to reduce utility inequality then the social welfare function
should put greater weight on the utility gains of low income people than on
the gains of high income people. As the strength of the preference for utility
equality approaches infinity only the utility of the worst-off person in society
has any weight in the social welfare function. This is Rawls's maxi-min
criterion [Heady, 1993, p. 29]. The maxi-min criterion is based on the
principle that if rational individuals were to make decisions regarding a
particular income distribution behind a 'veil of ignorance', so that they do not
know what position they would have in the final income distribution, they
would have a preference for, depending on their risk aversion, improving the
situation of the worst off individual due to a risk that those circumstances
could apply to them [Brown and Jackson, 1982, p. 20]. With a more
egalitarian social welfare function the more progressive is the optimal income
tax system [Slemrod, 1993, pp. 362-363].
While individuals are assumed to have identical preferences they are
also assumed to ditfer in their abilities. Wage rates are assumed to be
proportional to ability. As it is also assumed that the only source of income is
labour income more able individuals attain higher levels of wellbeing than
less able individuals. Thus in the absence of a tax-benefit system the
distribution of ability determines the distribution of welfare. With a more
unequal distribution of ability the potential social welfare gain from a
redistributive tax system is greater [Slemrod, 1993, pp. 362-363]. Thus if
income inequality increases then the social welfare gain from reducing
poverty also increases.
The elasticity of labour supply plays an important role in the
determination of the optimal marginal income tax rate because this elasticity
helps determine welfare losses lOullis and Jones, 1999, p. a30]. The greater
the labour supply response to taxation the greater the efficiency cost per-
dollar of revenue raised. The greater efficiency cost will imply a less
redistributive optimal tax system [Slemrod, 1993, pp. 362-363]. lf it is
assumed that tax changes are revenue neutral, so that an increase in the tax
rate is otfset by an increase in the grant, the average taxpayer continues to
pay the same amount of tax. This revenue neutrality assumption means the
substitution etfect dominates the income effect and that compensated
elasticities of supply and demand are emphasised [Heady, 1993, pp. 31-32].
Key Results from Optimal Income Tax Theory
Optimal income tax theory evaluates the designs of hypothetical tax-benefit
systems given variations in the assumptions discussed above. Key findings
of these optimal tax models for the optimal design of tax-benefit systems are
discussed below. This discussion first considers the literature on optimal non-
linear income taxation before discussing linear models of optimal income
taxation.
Mirrlees [1971] investigated the design of an optimal non-linear income
tax (with a marginal tax rate that can vary with income) given various
assumptions about the social welfare function, the distribution of
endowments, and the behavioural response function. As Akerloff has written:
However complicated the equations or the mathematics, the basic trade-
off in the choice of an optimal Mirrlees-Fair style income tax can be
explained as follows. As taxes are raised and incomes are redistributed,
there is a gain in welfare, because income is distributed to those who
have a greater need of it (higher marginal utility). But this gain must be
balanced against a loss: as tax rates rise in relatively productive jobs
and as subsidies rise in relatively unproductive jobs, workers are less
willing to take the productive (and more willing to take the unproduclive)
jobs. Such switching, per se, results in a loss of [the utility of the
populationl because each worker is choosing the amount of work, or
kind of job, which maximises his private utility rather than the amount of
work or kind of job which maximises social utility. ln general, the
redistributive gains versus the losses caused by taltransfer induced
switching is the major tradeotf in the theory of optimal income taxes and
welfare payments [Akerloff, 1978, p. 11].
25
Mirrlees [1971] illustrated this trade-off between the gain in welfare from
redistribution and the loss of welfare from tax-induced switching with a non-
linear income tax. With a non-linear income tax it would be possible for the
tax to have an effect over a short range of incomes only. People whose
incomes remain below the range of a tax increase would, for example, be
unaffected by the change. People with incomes within the range would
experience an income effect from higher taxes encouraging labour supply
and a substitution etfect discouraging labour supply. (lncome and substitution
effects are discussed in greater detail in chapter three.) People with incomes
above the range would experience an income effect only, encouraging their
labour supply. As Heady [1993, p. 36] argues the Mirrlees model
demonstrated that overallthe net etfect on social welfare would depend on:
. "The compensated elasticity of labour supply: a high elasticity will mean
that the net revenue gain is either small or negative, so the tax increase
is less likely to increase social welfare" [Heady, 1993, p. 36].
. "The degree of concern for inequality [....] The higher the [concern for
inequalityl the smaller is the relative weight placed on the utility losses
of the losers from the tax increase, and so the tax increase is more
likely to increase social welfare" [Heady, 1993, p. 36].
"The degree of income inequality: a high level of inequality implies a
greater income difference between the (relatively poor) gainers and the
(relatively rich) losers from the tax change, implying that a greater
weight should be attached to the gains, and that the tax increase is
more likely to increase social welfare" [Heady, 1993, p. 36].
"The proportion of the population above the range of the tax increase:
the higher is this proportion, the greater is the amount of gain to the
poorest, and so the tax increase is more likely to increase social
welfare" [Heady, 1993, p. 36].
An implication of these factors is that marginal tax rates at the lowest
levels of income should be low in order to encourage participation in the
labour market. However, for a fixed revenue requirement the reduction in
marginal tax rates facing low-income people to encourage their participation
in the labour market creates a revenue loss requiring an increase in the
marginal tax rates facing higher-income people. These higher marginal tax
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rates facing higher-income people have associated economic costs. Further,
in these models the utility that low-income people receive from leisure (non-
work) is given a positive weight. For both of these reasons it is thus optimal
to have some low-income people choosing not to work.
As Heady [1993, p. 36] argues an implication of a higher proportion of
the population above the range of a tax increase leading to greater social
welfare from this increase is that the marginal tax rate at the top of the
income scale should be zero. This result is drawn from Sadka [1976, in Cullis
and Jones, 1999, pp. 431-4921and reflects the ability to reduce the marginal
tax rate of the highest income earner to zero without a decrease (and
possibly an increase) in tax revenue. Taxing the very top income of the
highest income earner would discourage them from earning an additional unit
of income. This taxation distorts their labour supply but raises no tax
revenue. Removing the tax on this additional income would encourage the
top income earner to increase their work effort while paying no less in
taxation [Slemrod, 1993, p. 363]. The practical significance of this result is
limited as the zero marginal tax rate should apply only at the very top of the
income scale. Yet this result highlights the possibility that egalitarian social
goals may be best served by tax systems that are less levelling than intuition
suggests [Slemrod, 1993, p. 363].
The principles that emerge 
- 
that marginal tax rates should be low at
both the highest and lowest levels of income 
- 
contrast sharply with
what most people have previously believed. t....1 But the arguments that
lie behind them are in fact rather familiar [....] High marginaltax rates on
the largest incomes bring in very little revenue, and are not worth
pursuing if they have adverse consequences. Measures of support for
low income families achieve rather less than nothing if their receipts are
recouped by marginal rates of tax [Kay and King, in Cullis and Jones,
1999, p.4311.
These prescriptions also contrast with the function of current etfective
marginal tax rates to income, which would appear U-shaped with high
effective marginal tax rates at both the top and the bottom of the income
distribution [Cullis and Jones, 1999, p.431].
Mirrlees's [1971] study also found that the optimal non-linear income tax
system could be approximated by a linear optimal income tax rate structure
with a single marginal tax rate and a demogrant to low-income individuals.
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This demogrant "can either be a lump-sum grant of money to each individual,
in which case it provides a guaranteed income to each individual, or a lump
sum tax" [Gentry, 1999, p. 308]. Mirrlees's conclusion allowed the optimal tax
literature to focus on analysing the simpler and linear forms of optimal
income taxes [Heady, 1993, p. 38]. Stern [1976, in Heady, 1993, p. 38]
investigated the optimal linear income tax rates that correspond to a range of
values for the compensated elasticity of labour supply, the aversion to
income inequality; and the government's revenue requirement. Stern's
estimates showed that the optimal linear tax rate was higher the lower the
compensated elasticity of labour demand, the higher the aversion to income
inequality, the greater the inequality in pre{ax wages, and the higher the
government revenue requirement [Stern, 1976, in Heady, 1993, p. 39].Thus
ditferences in the aversion to income inequality can generate a range of
optimal tax rates.
Optimal tax models are, however, subject to a number of limitations.
Optimal tax models are normative models and, as Gentry has argued, the
"degree of abstraction in models of optimal nonlinear income taxes has
limited the policy relevance of their results" [Gentry, 1999, p. 307]. For
instance, the finding that the marginal tax rate applying to the top income
earner should be zero provides no information about the optimal marginal tax
rate immediately below the top of the income distribution [Gentry, 1999, p.
3071. Further, optimal tax models generally assume simple population
heterogeneity, model hypotheticaltax-benefit systems, and pay little attention
to the interaction of the demand and supply sides of the labour market.
These models also generally assume that the government's revenue
requirement is set optimally. Yet in actual tax-benefit systems greater
allowance has to be made for variations in administration of different tax-
benefit systems and administrators would be likely to lack the knowledge of
factors such as individual's utility functions and the distribution of skill levels
that would be required for calculating optimal income tax rates [Cullis and
Jones, 1999, p. 4371. Policymakers also often face issues in the design of
actual tax-benefit systems that optimal tax models do not address [Slemrod,
1990, p. 157; Bradbury, 1999a, F. 30; Creedy, 2001, p. 1931. In particular:
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Political considerations ensure that policy makers take a more holistic
perspective on policy objectives than conventional economic literature.
Policy makers are also aware of transitional costs, which means that
consideration is given to tax reform (i.e., improving an existing tax
system) rather than tax design (or achieving an optimal tax system,
starting de novo) [Stephens, 1997, p.47n.
2.4 Non-Welfarist Models and the Valuation of
Labour
The discussion of optimal income taxes above was based on the assumption
that social welfare is a function of individuals'welfare, which depends on their
preferences for income and leisure. More recent optimal income tax research
has replaced this welfarist objective with an objective of poverty minimisation
(expressed in terms of the poverty gap) [Bradbury, 1999b, p. 23]. As
Bradbury [1999b, p. 231 argues this poverty minimisation objective differs
from the welfarist objective in two ways. First, as poverty is a function of
income no value is assigned to the consumption of leisure by the poor. (ln
some cases a negative value can be assigned to this leisure.) Second, a
poverty minimisation objective involves a tighter focus on individuals at the
bottom of the income distribution. Consequently this poverty minimisation
objective can be seen as being relatively consistent with values often
expressed in policy discourse.
Poverty Alleviation Optimal Tax Models
Poverty alleviation (non-welfarist) optimal tax models treat poverty alleviation
and time in paid employment as intrinsically important public policy outcomes
and thus attribute little importance to the foregone utility from foregone
leisure time [Bradbury, 1999a, pp. 14-15, 20-231. As a corollary of this
objective these poverty alleviation models are more likely than welfare
models to view unemployment as being involuntary rather than voluntary. lf
leisure has a low value, as a non-welfarist model would be likely to assume,
then unemployment would be more likely to be due to factors external to the
individual rather than being due to the individual's utility for leisure exceeding
that for employment. This assumption appears consistent with research on
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unemployment in New Zealand and overseas. In New Zealand qualitative
research on sole-parents has found that sole-parents out of work would often
like to work but are discouraged from doing do by financial penalties
contained in the tax-benefit system [Gerritsen, 2004, p. 66]. In Britain
research has estimated that only one-tenth of unemployment in a sample of
the British Family Panel Survey was unambiguously voluntary and a further
one-tenth was indeterminate [Burchardt and Le Grand, 2A02, pp.23-241.
The shift from a welfarist to a poverty alleviation objective has
implications for the prescriptions generated by optimal income tax models.
Overall the pattern of optimal marginal tax rates in a non-welfarist optimal tax
model is similar to the optimal pattern in a welfarist model. However, the
lower value of leisure in non-welfarist optimal tax models tends to support
optimal marginal tax rates higher than those in welfarist optimal tax models
(particularly at the bottom of the income distribution) due to the increased
emphasis upon focusing resources on individuals below the poverty line
[Bradbury, 1999a, p. 28].
. lf incentive effects are ignored, minimising the poverty gap requires a
guaranteed minimum income with 100 percent etfective marginal tax
rate on income up to the poverty threshold (lifting all poor to the povefi
threshold with no spill-over to the poor or non-poor).
. lf labour supply etfects are considered then there is a case for relatively
lower marginal tax rates on the poor to encourage them to increase
their earnings. However, as there is no social benefit from the leisure
the poor consume there is a greater need for grants to the poor to
redistribute social welfare. This increase in grants creates a revenue
effect requiring higher marginal tax rates. These higher marginal tax
rates will discourage some individuals from working. lt thus remains
optimal to have some low-income people not working.
Consequently non-welfarist optimal income tax models tend to lead to higher
optimal marginal tax rates than welfarist models. The higher the poverty line
the higher these optimal marginal tax rates. Often these higher marginal tax
rates are supported by mandatory work schemes or labour demand policies
[Bradbury, 1 999b, pp. 2a-251.
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Domestic Production and Optimal Tax Models
A further alternative variation to standard optimal income tax models would
be to place a relatively high value on the utility received from leisure time
(such as in domestic production models). In a traditional labour-leisure model
of labour supply an individual's labour supply behaviour reflects a trade-off
between income from work and leisure time. Thus if an unemployed or non-
participating worker undertakes employment and this does not reduce output
or employment elsewhere in the economy all that is foregone when this
person enters employment is some of the leisure that he or she was
consuming [Rosen, 1988, p. 243]. Yet this time spent outside the labour
market not only includes time spent in unemployment or leisure activities but
also time spent in domestic production, education and training, voluntary
work, and retirement and incapacity [Atkinson and Micklewright, 1991, pp.
1681-1682; Wibon, 1996, p. Tl.While optimal tax theory, particularly in
relation to optimal commodity taxes, has systematically evaluated the
implications of leisure being excluded from the tax base [Cullis and Jones,
1992, p. 4171, less emphasis has been placed upon the exclusion of
domestic production from the tax base [Apps and Rees, 1999, p. 14].
In the labour-leisure framework the efficiency of tax changes reflects
the labour supply elasticities for primary and secondary workers. Labour
supply elasticities are relatively low for primary workers and relatively high for
secondary workers. Taxing the more elastic labour supply at a lower rate
reduces efficiency costs. Yet as well as distorting the labour-leisure trade-off,
tax-benefit programmes also distort the labour4omestic production trade-off.
Labour is taxed while domestic production is untaxed. Under individual
Key features of a labour-leisure framework are as follows. The extent to which income from
a ta,x-benefit programme compensates for lost or potential market wages is the replacement
rate [Brosnan, Wilson, and Wong, 1989, p. 19]. The wage that the individual will not supply
labour below is the reservation wage. lncreasing the level of assistance of a tax-benefit
programme increases the replacement rate and this in turn increases the reservation wage
of those receiving assistance. As well as the gross wage rate the replacement rate is
influenced by the taxation and the abatement of social security programmes. In a labour-
leisure modelthese financial incentives influence people's decisions to enter employment or
remain employed and the duration of benefit receipt [Brosnan, Wilson, and Wong, 1989, p.
191. When financial incentives lead to tax-benefit programmes' recipients placing themselves
in positions of greater need than would have been the case in the absence of assistance
moral hazard is said to have occurred.
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taxation in a progressive tax system primary and secondary earners tend to
face different tax rates on labour supply. This variation creates a welfare loss
by distorting the cost of labour inputs into domestic production relative to
labour [Piggot and Whalley, 1996, p.410]. Apps and Rees [1999] argue that
progressive tax systems that tax secondary earners at lower rates achieve a
more efficient EMTR structure as the tax ditference between domestic and
market consumption is reduced relative to regressive tax systems. However,
social assistance programmes are often assessed on the basis of the joint
incomes of both caregivers in a partnered family. In comparison to individual
assessment, under a system of joint income assessment the etfective
marginaltax rates of secondary earners are raised and the etfective marginal
tax rates of primary earners are lowered. The combination of individual based
income taxes and jointly assessed social assistance programmes means
primary earners tend to face higher effective marginal tax rates than
secondary earners but secondary earners face higher etfective marginal tax
rates at lower hours of work.
Gottfried and Richter [1999, p. a08] argue the size of the distortion to
domestic production not only reflects the tax induced distortion but also the
ability of families to substitute primary and secondary earners' labour inputs
into domestic production.
. lf the two labour inputs into domestic production can be easily
substituted, there is little distortion to domestic production even if there
is a large dispersion between primary and secondary tax rates. The
distortion to domestic production when a secondary earner is
encouraged to enter the labour market is reduced if the primary earner
can increase his or her supply of domestic production and the primary
earne/s domestic production is equivalent to that of the secondary
earner.
. In contrast, if it is assumed that secondary earners have a particular
advantage in domestic production, reducing the dispersion of tax rates
will reduce the distortion to domestic production [Gottfried and Richeter,
1999, p.4081.
Gottfried and Richeter [1999, p. 408] also argue that because domestic
production uses marketed inputs as well as primary and secondary labour,
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the size of the distortion to family production also reflects the ability to
substitute technological inputs for domestic production. Thus implications of
domestic production models for tax-benefit systems depend on the labour
supply elasticities of primary and secondary earners and the distribution of
effective marginal tax rates between primary and secondary earners. The
size of the distortion to domestic production from excluding this production
from the income tax base also depends on the ability to substitute primary
domestic production for secondary domestic production and technology for
domestic production.
2.5 Integrating Taxation and Expenditure
Decisions
The models discussed above largely assumed that the government's
revenue requirement was set optimally. Thus when determining the optimal
degree of progressivity of the tax scale, for example, it was assumed that
"sensible spending decisions were being made perhaps optimally by some
other part of the government, or at least it was exogenous to the tax problem"
[Boskin, 2000, p. 16]. This assumption was underpinned by further assuming
that the taxation and expenditure sides ol the government budget were
largely separate. This separation between the two sides of government
budgets was consistent with the development of taxation theory, which
largely developed in isolation from expenditure theory [Musgrave, 1985, p.
161. The following section discusses two approaches to integrating taxation
and spending and tax decisions. The first relates to the benefit principle
(achieving the optimal level of public spending through assigning tax prices to
achieve the revelation of preferences). The second draws from public choice
theory and relates to the relationship between taxes and incentives for the
growth of government [Boskin, 2000, p. 16].
The Benefit Prlnciple
The benefit principle is derived from the idea of fairness in exchange. This
principle links the tax and expenditure sides of a government's budget and
argues that people who benefit from the use of a particular good or service
should pay for it. The development of the benefit principle reflected the
development of the general theory of value by Menger and Jevons and of the
economic theory of public goods [Musgrave, 1985, p. 8]. In relation to private
goods it is often assumed that individuals adjust their consumption until their
marginal benefit from or willingness to pay for consumption equals their
marginal cost from consumption. lt is also often assumed that (also assuming
that markets are perfectly competitive) for private goods this allocation will
lead to an outcome that is both etficient and fair, since consumers of the
goods will pay a price that reflects the goods' economic costs. The benefit
principle treats government expenditure as analogous to private goods
through basing tax liability on willingness to pay for government expenditure
[Wicksell, in Musgrave, 1985, p.9].
Given the preferences of individuals, welfare is maximised by having
each equate marginal utility with price. This basic efficiency rule applies
to both public and private goods. To be sure, there is a ditference: In the
private good case, goods are sold at a uniform price, with individual
consumers equating price and marginal utility by quantity adjustment. In
the case of public goods the critical feature of indivisibility [...] requires
the same quantity to be available to all consumers. Since the marginal
utility of the same quantity differs among them, the equating process
calls for differential prices to be charged. Thus benefit taxation 
- 
greatly
broadened from its Hobbesian origin as payment for protection -
becomes the supreme law of fiscal economy [Musgrave, 1985, pp. 8-9].
The benefit principle can also reflect concerns with inter-generational equity.
A contributory social insurance system, for instance, "can be seen as a
mechanism that provides a life cycle redistribution from periods of work to
periods of retirement as well as one that allows individuals to otfset the risks
and contingencies of unemployment and sickness" [Stephens, 1997, p. 485].
However, there are a number of limitations to the application of the
benefit principle to the design of tax-benefit systems. In particular, two
concerns expressed regarding the use of this principle are the ditficulty of
determining and valuing an individual's consumption of a public good and the
justice of its application [Musgrave, 1985, p. 9; Stephens, 1997, p. 4711.
Applying the benefit principle to public or merit goods is less
straightforward than applying the principle to private goods [Hines, 2000, p.
4831. Public goods are goods that are non-rival and non-excludable, such as
national defence. Merit goods are goods that, although not public goods,
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ought to be provided even though members of society may not demand them
[Rosen, 1998, p. 55]. For public and merit goods it is not always possible to
establish a direct link between the benefits a person receives from them and
the contributions they should pay due to information asymmetries and
transaction costs [Stephens, 1997, p. 486]. People may also excessively
discount the future costs of their actions. There are many public and merit
goods and the benefits derived from them vary from person to person. These
variations may be unobservable by the tax-benefit system. ln such cases it is
difficult to calculate taxes based on the individual benefits that each taxpayer
derives.
Given these problems one way to determine and value an individual's
consumption of a public or merit good would be to discover what that person
would be willing to pay for that good given their income and preferences
[Musgrave, 1985, p. 17].Willingness to pay is often seen as the basis for
market transactions. The application of this approach is, however,
constrained by the difficulty of getting individuals to accurately reveal their
willingness to pay for a public or merit good (the free-rider problem). With
large numbers of consumers of a public or merit good the offer made by any
one individual would have no significant etfect on the total supply of the good.
An individual would thus have an incentive to understate the benefits they
receive from a public or merit good in order to reduce their tax liability
[Musgrave, 1985, pp. 10-11]. Further, a person's willingness to pay may not
reflect the true value of a public or merit good because this willingness may
not necessarily accurately reflect what is in the person's best interests. A
person may, for instance, excessively discount the value to them from a
public or merit good if there is an inter-temporal separation of tax payments
from the receipt of the benefit.
An alternative to willingness to pay would be to determine and value the
benefit to an individual from a public or merit good according to the fiscal cost
of the good provided to them [Musgrave, 1985, p. 17].|t could, for instance,
be possible to impose a user charge or a tax that is closely related to the
benefits individuals derive from the use of some public or merit good.
However, such an approach may overlook a number of economic costs (i.e.,
induced changes to behaviours) associated with receipt that may affect
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recipients' utility. In applying the benefit principle in this way it would be
necessary to establish that fiscal cost is an appropriate proxy for the total
benefit from a public good that an individual receives.
The benefit principle provides little guidance on the desirable degree of
progressivity of tax-benefit systems. Under this principle the desirable degree
of progressivity reflects the income elasticity of demand. lt is often assumed
that an individual's utility increases with income but by less with each
successive dollar. In the case of normal goods the quantity of the good
demanded by an individual does not fall as income increases. Consequently
the price that a person would be willing to pay for a public or a merit good
would rise as their income increases. Thus if a public or merit good is a
normal good a higher income person should contribute more than a lower
income person to the cost of providing this good. Yet the benefit principle
otfers no precise guidance on the extent of this extra contribution. The benefit
principle also gives little weight to distributional concerns. Under this principle
contributions made to the funding of public or merit goods would reflect
willingness to pay for these goods. This willingness to pay and subsequent
allocation of goods would be likely to reflect the initial distribution of
endowments. Objectives for redistribution aside from smoothing income and
consumption over the lifecycle would not be taken into account.
The benefit principle largely limits the scope of government intervention
to allocating the duties that ensure a system of natural liberty according to
people's previous contributions. Thus this notion of justice in taxation
presupposes justice in the existing distribution of endowments [Wicksell, in
Musgrave, 1985, p. 91. Justice in taxation as payment for the cost of public
services can thus be separated from distributive justice [Musgrave, 1985, p.
91. This separation is consistent with Musgrave's [1959] distinction between
allocative and distributive functions of government intervention. The
allocative function of government intervention includes the satisfaction of
public desires not met by markets alone and contains greater scope for the
use of the benefit principle to guide public policy [Musgrave, 1959]. Thus
where markets have failed to reach an optimal equilibrium government
intervention could improve social welfare, unless the utility loss from this
market failure is exceeded by the utility loss from any government or
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intervention failure. The distributive function of government intervention
includes the redistribution of income and wealth to achieve distributive
justice. The allocative function of government intervention provides little
guidance for the distributive function. Reaching a view on progressivity thus
requires reaching a view on the government's distributive function, which
cannot be guided solely by the benefit principle.
Public Choice Theory
As discussed above welfare economics and optimal tax theory largely
developed in isolation from the theory on the expenditure side of government
budgets [Musgrave, 1985, p. 16]. These theories assume that the level of
taxation is largely exogenous of the tax system [Holcombe and Mills, 1994, p.
651. This assumption has been challenged by public choice theorists such as
Brennan and Buchanan [in Holcombe and Mills, 1994, p. 65]. Public choice
theory arose out of a concern with persistent fiscal deficits [Buchholz, 1990,
p.2411. Public choice theory applies rational choice behavioural assumptions
to voters, interest groups, and politicians [Le Grand, 1997, p. 149]. This
theory is sceptical of the motivations of these actors and prescribes a
reduced role for the state, the decoupling of different functions of government
(particularly the provision of policy advice and the purchasing of services),
and reducing barriers to contestability of these functions. A broad base of
support for social assistance programmes is not seen as desirable under this
theory.
Early work in the area of public choice theory saw each tax base as a
space over which the state could exercise its power to tax. The broader the
tax base the more the state would use its power to tax.
The conventional wisdom notes that a given amount of revenue can be
raised at a lower cost with a broader tax base that allows lower tax rates
and therefore a lower excess burden. But Brennan and Buchanan argue
that the total amount of tax revenue will be a function of the tax base,
and that a broader tax base will allow more revenue to be collected.
Their argument is based on a revenue-maximizing government that is
not etfectively constrained by electoral competition as such [Holcombe
and Mllls, 1994, pp 6$711.
Thus imposing taxes on narrow bases would restrict the growth of
government and ensure greater etficiency.
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However, more recent work in public choice theory has emphasised
that a system of general taxation, i.e., general uniform rates, would minimise
the capture of cash concessions and their proceeds to interest groups.
The reason why general taxation is constitutionally preferred to
differential or discriminatory taxation in political democracy is that the
very structure through which political decisions are made prevents any
attainment, even approximately, of the type of tax differentiation that
might be defined to be 'optimal' or 'ideal' in a stylised setting of
benevolence. That is to say, majoritarian decision processes cannot, by
their nature, be expected to generate patterns of outcomes that embody
the tax discrimination among persons and groups or over goods that
corresponds to that which might be yielded through some economists'
exercise of protfering advice to a despot [Buchanan, in Sautet, 2000, p.
el.
Thus broad based taxes are seen as enhancing efficiency. Sautet argues this
change in conclusion is due to change in a view of the policy process from "a
revenue maximising Leviathan" model to a model of majoritarian politics, "in
which the majority determines the outcome of policy irrespective of whether
its actions maximise revenue" [Sautet, 2000, p. 12].
As well as the setting of levels of taxation the principles of public choice
theory can also be applied to governments' expenditure decisions. The
degree of targeting of an expenditure programme can, for example, impact
on the programme's support and consequently the volume of public
resources for which it accounts lSaunders, 1994, pp.26-27]. For instance, as
Boston and St John have argued:
People are often more willing to pay taxes to fund programmes that
benefit them personally than those that assist only the poor. Politically, it
is much more difficult to reduce expenditure on social programmes that
benefit a large proportion of the population, particularly if the
beneficiaries are well equipped to defend their interests [Boston and St
John, 1999, p. 961.
Yet taxation and expenditure decisions may also enjoy public support for
reasons other than the distribution of their financial benefits. lf targeting
increases the legitimacy of a programme (possibly by increasing the extent
that the direct financial benefit goes to the needy) it could also lead to
sustainable or expanding expenditures, as was seen with the expansion of
the Earned Income Tax Credit in the United States due to its support for work
activity. Further, as well as narrow concerns for the distribution of public
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largesse citizens are also often concerned with broader issues, such as
population growth and the changing structures of families. Concerns with
fertility and population growth were, for instance, influential in the early
growth in expenditure on the universal Family Benefit in New Zealand
[McClure, 1998, p. 100]. Thus the implications of public choice theory for the
optimal design of a tax-benefit system largely depend on assumptions made
about the operation of the government sector (e.9., whether government
maximises tax revenue or votes).
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter illustrated the interaction between policy frameworks, policy
settings, and policy problems. Although social assistance was generally
provided on an income tested basis in New Zealand, until the early-1980s
much social security and some social assistance (particularly family benefits)
were provided on a universal basis. This provision was funded through
progressive tax scales [Boston, 1999b, p. 21]. Emphasis in the social security
system until the early-1980s was also on the desirability of a broad base of
support for programmes [McOlure, 1998, pp.238-239; Boston and St John,
1999, pp. 95-961. These policy settings reflected a strong emphasis upon the
horizontal equity and vertical equity principles. The expenditure and taxation
sides of the government budget were also largely seen as separate.
In section two of this chapter the horizontal equity and vertical equity
principles, which underpinned universal provision and progressive tax scales,
were discussed. These principles emphasise income as a proxy for utility and
treat the taxation and expenditure sides of government budgets as separate.
Following important social and economic changes (particularly increasing
unemployment and governments' fiscal deficits) emphasis increasingly
shifted towards the greater targeting of social assistance and the
development of broad based and low rate tax policies. Concern over the
behavioural etfects of progressive taxation and social assistance
programmes increased. Concern over increasing and persistent government
fiscal deficits also increased. As a corollary of this shift in policy direction
greater emphasis was placed upon the optimal design of a tax-benefit system
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and upon theories integrating the taxation and expenditure sides of
government budgets.
Optimal tax theory, which emphasises utility not income, explicitly
considers trade-offs between behavioural responses to taxation and social
disutility from inequality in individuals' utility, Optimal tax models generally
assume simple population heterogeneity, model hypothetical tax-benefit
systems, and pay little attention to the administrative features of tax-benefit
systems and to the interaction of the demand and supply sides of the labour
market. Further, as Gentry argues, this "degree of abstraction in models of
optimal nonlinear income taxes has limited the policy relevance of their
results" [Gentry, 1999, p. 304. Yet these models can nevertheless help to
identify the key elements for evaluating real-world tax-benefit systems.
lf not an answer, what can we expect to glean from the academic
literature? Generally speaking, we might hope to understand how the
optimal tax system depends on the assumptions of the analytic model.
[....] Once the relationship between the model and the resulting optimal
tax system is understood, we can, for any particular policy question,
hope to isolate the key elements on which the debate ought to focus
[Slemrod, 1993, p. 361].
Optimal income tax models prescribe a broadly linear personal income
tax scale with rates lower at the top and bottom of the income distribution.
Optimal income tax arguments for reduced marginal tax rates at high
incomes have, however, been more influential than the arguments for
reducing marginal rates at low incomes. The implications for tax-benefit
design of changing the assumed policy objective in these models (from
welfarist to poverty reduction models) were then considered. Povefi
reduction (or non-welfarist) optimal tax models generally prescribe higher
marginal tax rates than welfarist optimal tax models. As a contrast to poverty
reduction models other models have attributed greater value to time outside
of the labour market and in domestic production. Domestic production
models emphasise lower tax rates on low incomes (as these are the rates
most likely to face secondary income earners).
The chapter then evaluated the implications of theories integrating the
taxation and expenditure sides of government budgets. The benefit principle
treats public and merit goods as analogous to market goods and argues that
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taxes should reflect the benefit that individuals receive from these goods.
Ditficulties in identifying the benefits received by individuals mean that this
principle is of limited value for the design of a tax-benefit system. Further,
reaching a view on tax-benefit progressivity requires reaching a view on the
government's distributive function, which cannot be guided solely by the
benefit principle. Public choice theory illustrated the implications of the
structure of tax-benefit systems for the growth of government. However, the
implications of these theories for the optimal design of a tax-benefit system
largely depend on assumptions made about the operation of the government
sector (e.9., whether government maximises tax revenue or votes). Public
choice issues are not directly addressed in this study.
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3 Criteria for Evaluating Tax-Benefit
Programmes
3.1 lntroduction
Chapter two analysed a number of frameworks for evaluating tax-benefit
programmes. This chapter develops criteria for evaluating tax-benefit
programmes based on this discussion. The first of these criteria, income
adequacy, is considered in section two of this chapter. This section includes
discussions on the poverty threshold, equivalising family incomes, and a
range of poverly measures. Section three of this chapter then discusses the
criteria that could be used to evaluate financial incentives for labour supply.
This section includes discussions on income and substitution effects,
uncertainty and administrative incentives, and, in order to assess the
significance of these effects, empirical studies of labour supply behavioural
responses to tax-benefit programmes. The relationships between labour
supply and poverty reduction and excess burden are then discussed. Section
four of this chapter discusses administration of and compliance with tax-
benefit programmes. This section includes discussions on take-up rates and
the interaction and coordination of tax-based and social welfare-based
programmes.
3,2 Income Adequacy
Povefi can be seen as a lack of adequate command over resources.
Resources may include monetary income, non-monetary income, such as the
imputed income from domestic production and assets such as housing,
consumption, and endowments, including financial and human capital
endowments. Ditferent population groups may also have varying abilities to
smooth income over time. Unfortunately it is not possible to quantify many
forms of income, consumption, and endowments. For example, as discussed
in chapter two, the Haig-Simon measure of annual income requires
information on flows of income, stocks of assets, and uncertain or one-off
events, such as inheritances. Even where resources can be quantified there
may be difficulties in collecting and evaluating data. Consequently poverty
measures often focus on a Iack of monetary income. These are input
measures.
This use of income measures contrasts with living standards (output)
measures [Stephens and Waldegrave, 2001, p. 80]. Living standard
measures can illustrate which demographic groups forego consumption of
certain items because of their costs. (Living standard measures are
discussed in greater detail in chapter eight.) There are significant
mismatches in the groups that income and living standards measures identify
as experiencing inadequate outcomes [Perry, 2002, p. 101]. Living standards
measures can, however, be used to verify analysis based on income
measures. An advantage of income measures is that they are relatively easy
to measure, are the metric used for income taxes, and illustrate a major
policy variable (the level of government financial assistance to families)
[Stephens and Waldegrave, 2001, p. 80]. The emphasis in this study is thus
on income measures.
The Poverty Threshold
A poverly threshold defines the level below which a monetary income is
deemed inadequate. Ditferent levels of inadequacy are reflected in different
income thresholds. The income threshold chosen can make a significant
difference to measured poverty [Perry, 2004, p. 26]. A relative (distributional)
poverty threshold terms people poor if their incomes are judged inadequate
in relation to those of other people in society. Relative poverty thresholds
indicate the extent that people "are, in effect, excluded from ordinary living
patterns, customs and activities" [Hagenaars, in Stephens, 1989, p. 8]. An
absolute (nominal) poverty threshold terms people poor if their incomes are
below the level necessary to maintain a minimum standard of living that does
not change over time [Stephens, 1989, p. 8]. Unless an absolute (nominal)
poverty threshold is adjusted for economic growth a decreasing proportion of
the population will fall below this threshold over time. Economic growth would
not lead to a decrease in measured incidence of poverly with a relative
poverty threshold, unless economic growth is also associated with a change
in income inequality Uensen and Krishnan, 2001, p. 1331.
Stephens, Waldegrave, and Frater [1995, p. 88] argued that a poverty
threshold should be both relative to current standards of living and policy
parameters and absolute in the sense of representing a standard of living
that families should not fall below. They argued [1995, p. 89] that, for
example, by the mid-1990s poverty measures based on the Benefit Datum
Level, which was initially based on research by the 1972 Royal Commission
on Social Security, was no longer related to its original relative
conceptualisation due to social, economic, and policy changes since the
early 1970s, such as changing family structures and labour market
participation rates.
To develop a poverty threshold Stephens, Waldegrave, and Frater
[1995] used focus groups to determine an income level that would provide an
adequate minimum level of family expenditure that'\rvould enable the family
to pay for its own food, clothing, utilities and rent, without either going into
debt or taking out special benefits or food parcels" [Stephens and
Waldegrave, 2001, p. 801. These micro studies of families' minimum income
requirements were then used to derive a macro poverty measure based on a
percentage of median disposable income. Basing the poverty measure on
these micro foundations ensured that the measure reflected the experiences
of people on low incomes [Stephens, Waldegrave, and Frater, 1995, pp. 89-
901. The focus group average minimum adequate family expenditure gave a
base poverty measure of 60 percent of median equivalent family disposable
income. A lower povefi measure of 50 percent of median equivalent family
disposable income was also developed to indicate a more modest level of
expenditure [Stephens, Waldegrave, and Frater, 1995, p. 99]. This research
provided empirical support for the wide international use of the povefi
measures of 60 percent and 50 percent of equivalised median family
disposable income.
Policy is often evaluated on the basis of annual income. Yet annual
income may provide both too long and too short a perspective on control over
resources. The use of an annual income measure may fail to illustrate the
etfectiveness of the tax-benefit system in responding to urgent need due to
fluctuations in job status, hours worked, and family status. An annual
measure may also fail to illustrate the degree to which the tax-benefit system
smoothes resources over people's lifecycles. A proportion of the population
identified as being below a poverty threshold may only be poor for a relatively
short period due to income mobility in the population and changes in the
costs they face over time. Lifetime incomes are often more equally distributed
than annual incomes. An annual measure may also fail to illustrate factors
such as variations in costs due to the need to replace consumer durables
and the erosion In the ability to earn income due to long-term unemployment
[Wilson, 1996, p.2; Creedy, 1999, p. 411]. Decisions on the time period for
analysis are also linked with decisions on the income-sharing unit, as the
composition of these units will change over time (when, for example, children
age and become economically independent).
The Income-Sharing Unit
People deemed poor on the basis of their individual incomes may reside in
and have access to the incomes of other family members. Income may also
flow across family boundaries. Measured poverty thus reflects the income-
sharing unit used in defining the poverty threshold, e.9., individuals, families,
or households [Perry, 2004, p. 24}These three ways of defining income-
sharing units are discussed in greater detail below:
. Family units: single adults with no dependents or multiple people
related to each other by blood, registered marriage, common law, or
adoption. A family unit can include dependent children and elder
dependents. Family units may include people who are related to each
other but do not share resources, such as an absent parent.
. Statistical households: single adults living alone or multiple people who
usually reside together and share facilities, e.9., eating facilities,
cooking facilities, bathroom and toilet facilities, living areas [Perry, 2004,
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p. 24l.This is the Statistics New Zealand definition for the Household
Economic Survey and the Census.
. Economic family units: single adults or multiple people who usually
reside together, share facilities, and are financially interdependent.
Children are dependent while aged under 15 or while aged 15 to 18 and
neither employed full-time nor on a benefit. Children older than 18 are
defined as separate economic family units irrespective of their income
or employment status. The economic family unit is generally the unit of
eligibility for income-tested social welfare benefits in New Zealand
[Jensen and Krishnan, 2001 , p. 131].
As many statistical households contain more than one economic family
unit a population based on economic family units is larger than a population
of statistical households. Perry l2OO4, p. 451 estimated that, based on the
2001 Household Economic Survey, the 1.4 million statistical households in
New Zealand were equivalent to 1.8 million economic family units. This
population increase included a 500,000 (1,500 percent) increase in single
economic family units, who were mostly income-poor 18 to 25 year olds
residing in households with higher incomes. Further, as 70 percent of single
economic family units had incomes below the household median this change
in the composition of the population also lowered the median income [Perry,
2004, p. 461. The choice of income-sharing unit thus has implications for the
use of statistical measures based on population means, such as relative
poverty lines.
Jensen and Krishnan [2001, p. 130] argue that historically statistical
households have been used as the base units for analysis as their members
could be "assumed to have commingled their financial affairs to function as
an economic unit whose members have a common standard of living".
However, as they go on to argue, this assumption has become increasingly
doubtful with the increasing heterogenei$ in the composition of statistical
New Zealand's tax-benefit system employs a range of income sharing units for
assessment. Personal income taxes are levied on an individual basis. Family Assistance Tax
Credits are assessed on the basis of joint (caregiver) income. Main social welfare benefits
are assessed on measures more closely reflecting economic family unit income and assets.
Student support is assessed on the basis of family income for students up to the age of 25.
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households [Jensen and Krishnan, 2001, pp. 130-131]. The economic family
unit is also the unit of assessment for the majority of social assistance
programmes in New Zealand.
Equivalising Household Income
As well as in their sharing of resources families also ditfer in their relative
income needs (their cost functions). Families in different circumstances
require different incomes to achieve similar standards of living. Failing to
account for these differences when evaluating tax-benefit policies would be
likely to lead to a misleading picture of the nature of policy problems and the
effectiveness of government responses. Yet many standard measures of
policy outcomes, such as those relating to income inequality, e.9., Gini
coetficients and Lorenz curves, are designed for homogeneous populations
[Creedy and Scuttella, 2003, p. 3]. To use these measures it is therefore
necessary to conveft the actual heterogeneous population into a hypothetical
homogenous population. This conversion needs to capture forms of income
sharing as well as economies of scale derived from sharing resources and
durable goods. Otherwise, for instance, if people who share resources and
economies of scale are categorised as single-person families they may
appear as less well-off than they really are [Smeeding and Weinberg, 2001,
p.21.
Variations in families' costs structures can be accounted for by basing
policy evaluation on families' hypothetical equivalised incomes, which are
families' actual incomes scaled to reflect their different cost functions. lt is
often assumed that the costs of childrearing are an important consideration in
assessing families' ability to pay taxes or need for assistance [Bradbury,
2003b, p.7711. However, equivalence scales differ in the ways in which they
treat the presence of children in the family. Conditional equivalence scales
measure the costs of children but not their benefits. Conditional equivalence
scales assume that demographic structures are fixed (so that fertility
decisions are exogenous). Unconditlonal scales take full account of choice of
family formation and assume that people choose to have children when the
benefits to them of doing so outweigh the costs [Bradbury, 2003b, p.7711.
Thus, for instance, "if a family chooses to have three children and $12,000
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when it could have two children and $12,000, then a revealed preference
argument implies that the family prefers the alternative it chose" [Pollack and
Wales, in Bradbury,2003b, p.7701.
Unconditional equivalence scales are based solely on adults'
preferences towards their children whereas conditional scales directly include
the welfare of children [Bojer and Nelson, 1999, p. 531]. In comparison to a
conditional scale an unconditional equivalence scale would under-
compensate families for the costs of childrearing and produce a lower
estimate of the number of children in poverty [Boier and Nelson, 1999, p.
5321. Yet as Bradbury has argued:
From the perspective of children, however, the revealed preference
issues considered above are not relevant. A child's living standard is
related to that of its parents but children do not experience the 'Joys of
parenthood". Since the living standards of the children can only be
compared with that of their parents in the context of the family, the
conditional equivalence scale is thus the relevant scale to use when
comparing the welfare of children with that of adults [Bradbury, 2003b, p.
7841.
It could also be argued that compensation to parents for the costs of their
children could breach horizontal equity, which Atkinson and Stiglitz defined
as requiring taste differences to not be taken into account when formulating
policy so that taxes and transfers would only be based on the opportunity
sets facing ditferent individuals and not their behaviour [Bradbury, 2003b, p.
7731. However, to the degree that opportunity sets ditfer between families
with and without children, conditional equivalence scales would not be
inconsistent with a concern for horizontal equity [Bradbury, 2003b, p.773].
A further important consideration in the use of equivalence scales is
whether or not these scales should take housing costs into account. Jensen
and Krishnan [2001, p. 127] compared the findings of an equivalence scale
that takes housing costs into account with one that does not. Both
equivalence scales displayed similar trends in New Zealand data on living
standards between 1988 and 1999, although equivalised income taking
housing costs into account showed less year-to-year fluctuation. Equivalised
income taking housing costs into account also showed a larger impact of
economic changes on the living standards of children Uensen and Krishnan,
2001, p. 124. The authors thus reached a provisional conclusion that the
approach of measuring equivalent incomes after removing housing costs was
preferred. They also concluded, however, that further research would be
required before a preference for such an approach could be authoritatively
supported [Jensen and Krishnan, 2001, pp. 146-148].
Equivalence scales effectively re-rank the income distribution [van de
Ven and Creedy, 2003, p.21. These scales often increase the cost functions
of families with multiple children and shift them to lower levels in the
hypothetical equivalised income distribution. Thus, when evaluating
assistance that varies by the numbers of children in families, the measures of
poverty reduction and targeting efficiency based on an equivalised poverty
threshold would partly reflect this downwards re-ranking of families with
multiple children.
The equivalence scale used in this study is the Whiteford Geometric
Scale. This scale is widely used and understood and is the scale used by the
New Zealand Treasury. This scale provides similar results to the revised
Jensen scale used by the Ministry of Social Development Uohnson, 2005, p.
491. The Whiteford scale accounts for the number of adults and children in
the family and for the ages of the children. The scale is constructed so that a
two-adult family has a rating of one. Families with fewer members have a
rating of less than one and families with more members have a rating of more
than one. The scale also accounts for the fact that children are likely to
require less income than adults to achieve a similar standard of living. The
scale does not account for the age of children or for housing costs.
Poverty Measures
The simplest poverty measures are headcount measures, which state the
number or proportion of families below the poverty threshold. However, these
measures ignore the actual incomes of the poor. They are only concerned
with the fact that these incomes fall below the poverty line. Yet two societies
may have the same headcount poverty rate but the total cost of bringing all
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the poor up to the poverty line may differ in each society [Creedy, 1998, pp.
82-831. A poverty measure reflecting the actual incomes of the poor is the
povefi gap, which measures the difference between families' incomes and
the poverty threshold. The extent to which families fall below the poverty
threshold is the poverty depth. Further, povefi reduction effectiveness is the
ratio of benefits going to the pre-transfer poor to the total benefits needed by
that group and targeting etficiency is the extent that expenditure goes to the
poor [Creedy, 1998, p. 83; Stephens and Waldegrave, 2001, pp. 83-85].
Figure 3.1: Hypothetical Pre-Transfer and Post-Transfer Income Distributions
Chsng€ in Spilloverto Pre POSt-TranS{er
Transisr Nm-Pod (Shtic) Posl-Transfer(Behavioural)
Pre-Transter
Equivalised
Household lncome
Changp in Spillovor
Trandor Poa
Numberof Households
Source: Based on Creedy, '1996, p. 103
Poverty reduction effectiveness, headcount poverty rates, and targeting
efficiency are illustrated with hypothetical income distributions in figure 3.1.
The ordinate of the figure expresses equivalised family incomes and the
abscissa expresses numbers of families. lllustrated in the figure are
hypothetical post-transfer income distributions both without (static) and with
(behavioural) labour supply effects and a pre-transfer income distribution.
The weights used in this equivalence scale are: one adult, 0.64; one adult one child, 0.9;
one adult two children, 1.1; one adult three or more children, 1.31;two adults, 1; two adults
one child, 1.2; two adults two children, 1.38; two adults three children, 1.59; two adults four
or more children, 1.74; three adults, 1.22; three or more adults plus children, 1.75; and four
or more adults no children, 1.65.
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The comparisons between the pre-transfer and post-transfer distributions are
for the same calendar year. vo is the poverty threshold. yH is a hypothetical
point at which a particular transfer is fully exhausted, creating a notch in the
behavioural post-transfer line at this point. The lines remain apart due to the
likely behavioural responses from other income tax and welfare programmes
in operation.
Poverty reduction etfectiveness is the ratio of benefits going to the pre-
transfer poor to the total benefits needed by that group [Stephens and
Waldegrave, 2001, p. 85]. The total benefits needed by the poor are the area
bounded by the poverg threshold, the pre-transfer income distribution, and
the ordinate (the sred abc in the figure). The benefits that go to the pre-
transfer poor are the area bounded by the poverty threshold, the pre-transfer
income distribution, the ordinate, and the post-transfer income distribution (in
the static case the dr€6 ebcd). Pre-transfer headcount povefi is the number
of families at the point where the poverty threshold and the pre-transfer
income distribution intersect (r.ro). Post-transfer headcount poverty is the
number of families at the point where the poverty threshold and the post-
transfer income distribution intersect (in the static case N,). Targeting
efficiency indicates the extent that expenditure goes to the poor. Targeting
etficiency is reduced by spill-over. Spill-over to the pre-transfer non-poor
occurs when families with pre-transfer incomes above the poverty line
receive some financial assistance. Spill-over to the pre-transfer poor occurs
when the transfers received by the pre-transfer poor are greater than those
needed to lift their incomes to the poverly threshold [Creedy, 1996, pp. 102,
104; Stephens and Waldegrave, 2001 , p. 851.
3.3 Labour Supply and Excess Burden
As Blundell [1992, p. 16] argues labour supply can be difficult to define. The
impact of tax-benefit programmes on labour supply is often seen in terms of
transitions between employment and unemployment. The labour force
participation rate is the proportion of the population willing to work (the
employed and unemployed). The rate of work effort (the number of hours
worked each week and the number of weeks worked per year) is narrower
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than participation in the labour force. The labour force participation rate is
thus an indicator of potential labour supply while the rate of work effort is an
indicator of actual labour supply [Brosnan, Wibon, and Wong, 1989, p. 19].
However, the full impact of tax-benefit programmes also depends upon
transitions between employment and unemployment and the third labour
market state of non-participation. The state of non-participation includes
people undertaking education and training, domestic and voluntary work,
leisure, retirement, and facing discouragement and incapacity lAtkinson and
Micklewright, 1991, pp. 1681-1682; Wilson, 1996, p. 71. A significant
proportion of the people who enter employment do so from the state of non-
participation.
Each of these labour market states can be measured in a number of
ways. Measures of unemployment can, for example, be based upon
administrative conditions, such as the registration for or receipt of assistance,
or upon observed or reported labour market behaviour, such as job search
activity [Atkinson and Micklewright, 1991, p. 1683]. All measures are likely to
contain some degree of inaccuracy, however. For instance, measures based
upon numbers of people receiving assistance would fail to measure those
people seeking work but not eligible for or receiving a benefit. Fufther,
measures of the numbers of people receiving assistance would include a
number of people not actively seeking work [Atkinson and Micklewright,
1991, p. 16831. There is also significant heterogeneity within each of the
three labour market states. Within the unemployed there are discouraged
workers (who have ended their search for employment), those who have
already secured a future job, part-time workers, and temporary lay-otf
workers (who intend to return to their previous employer). Within the
employed there are the self-employed, wage and salary earners, full-time
workers, part-time workers, those in permanent jobs, and those in temporary
jobs. Within the non-participants there are people sick or disabled, caring for
children and other dependents, engaged in unpaid work, retired, and
engaged in education and training [Atkinson and Micklewright, 1991 , pp.
1684-16861.
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lncome and Substitution Effects
Transitions between labour market states are influenced by financial
incentives to supply labour. These financial incentives occur on two margins.
The extensive margln relates to choices about labour-force participation and
the intensive margin relates to choices about hours or weeks of work
[Blundell, 1992, p. 16; Heckman, 1993, p. 1 16]. The strength of incentives on
the extensive margin reflects the income etfect of the tax-benefit system. The
income effect is the income available for consumption that is independent of
the labour supply decision itself. The strength of incentives on the intensive
margin reflects the impact of the tax-benefit system on the net hourly wage
rate [Blundell, 1992, p. 20]. Budget constraints show the net income after
taxation and the payment of abated assistance that is received at different
levefs of time in paid employment [Prebble and Rebstock (eds.), '1992, p. 11].
Net income when out of work is the height of the budget constraint at zero
hours of work. The height of the budget constraint illustrates the income
effect. The slope of the budget constraint is equal to the marginal rate of
substitution between time in paid employment and time in other activities.
The slope of the budget constraint illustrates the substitution effect. Whether
these two etfects reinforce or otfset each other depends on the case at hand
and requires empirical analysis [Blundell, 1992, p.2O; Heady, 1993, p. 31].
Income and substitution effects are illustrated with stylised budget
constraints and indifference curves for an individual in figure 3.2. The
abscissa of the figure is expressed in hours of leisure time, which is time in
activities other than paid employment. The line vae is the individual's pre-tax
budget constraint. lt is assumed that a small amount of income is unearned
income (such as a demogrant). The individual's utility is illustrated with
indifference curves, which show ditferent combinations of the ways that they
could spend their time that they would be inditferent between. The slopes of
these curves reflect factors such as in-work costs and the availability of
childcare and thus vary between different family types. The further from the
origin the indifference curve the greater the individual's utility. The slope of
the inditference curve is equal to the marginal utility from one additional unit
of paid employment.
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In figure 3.2 the indifference curve Uo is the individual's pre-tax
indifference curve. The time in paid employment that would maximise a
person's utility is that where the additional utility from an additional hour in
work is equal to the rate at which this person could substitute this hour of
work for an hour in other activities [Creedy, 2003, p. 3]. People are at this
point when they have an indifference curve that just touches their budget
constraint. lf the inditference curve was within the budget constraint then the
person would not be maximising their utility and an indifference curve above
the budget constraint would be unobtainable. The point of tangency between
the indifference curve and budget constraint is at r' in figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2: Income and Substitution Etfests with Stylised Inditlerencc Curves and
Budget Constraints
Income
Leisure Time
lf an income tax is only imposed on earned income the individual's
budget constraint pivots and falls to yce. The new optimal position along this
budget constraint is the new tangency with the highest attainable indifference
curve. The new budget constraint is tangential to the inditference curye u' at
point r., which indicates that this person consumes more leisure and has a
lower income as a result of the tax. The hypothetical budget constraint yoe
illustrates the point at which the individual receives the same utility as the
post-tax position but at the pre-tax prices. The shift from rr to rs illustrates the
income etfect and the shift from Fg to Fz the substitution effect. There is thus a
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reduction in the individual's welfare as a result of the move to the lower
inditference curve. Not all people face the same income and substitution
efiects from this tax change. People with incomes below the change would
be unatfected. People with incomes within the range of the change would
face a fall in income encouraging work etfort and a change in the relative
financial return from work discouraging work etfort. Whichever effect would
dominate is an empirical question. People with incomes above the range
over which the change applies would face an income effect and no
substitution effect and thus would be encouraged to work more.
The overall effect of the change would therefore be to (a) reduce the
labour supply of people facing the higher tax rate and (b) increase the labour
supply of people above the range of the change. lf the reduction in labour
supply from group (a) exceeds the increase in labour supply from group (b)
then the total effect on labour supply would be negative. Likewise, if the
increase from group (b) exceeds the reduction from group (a) then the total
effect on labour supply would be positive. The sizes of the responses of the
two groups depend on the uncompensated elasticity of labour supply and the
numbers of people in the groups. Thus when the uncompensated elasticity of
labour supply (the concern is with uncompensated elasticity as both income
and substitution effects are in operation) is high and the number of people
above the abatement increase is low, the total labour supply would be likely
to fall from an increase in a tax rate.
The discussion above was based on stylised budget constraints and
inditference curves. In practise budget constraints are usually highly
complex, reflecting the complexity of the interaction of personal income tax
policies, main welfare benefits, and supplementary welfare assistance such
as the Family Assistance Tax Credits. A consequence of this complexity is
that marginal tax rates will often vary by hours of work, so that individuals
with the same gross income (reflecting both gross wage rates and hours of
work) may face different labour supply incentives. Ditferences in labour
In some cases a decrease in an individual's ta,r may encourage a decrease in work effort.
For example, a'Uecrease in work etfoil in [the case of a tax reduction] is commonly referred
to as 'backward-bending' labour supply and is explained by the income effect (from the extra
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supply responses may thus reflect differences in individuals' preferences or
ditferences in the marginal tax rates that individuals face [Blundell, 1992, p.
241. Modelling changes in budget constraints by hours of work for fixed gross
wage rates can isolate the impact of marginaltax rates on financial incentives
for labour supply decisions.
As Blundell [1992, p. 22] has argued, if "individuals can exert some
degree of choice over their labour supply, the characteristics of a tax and
benefit system should have implications for observed labour supply
behaviour. For instance, if the tax and benefit system does not lead to a
proportional tax, in which the etfective marginal tax rate is constant, we
should observe bunching in the hours distribution." This bunching will tend to
take place where there is a discontinuity or notch in an individual's budget
constraint. Choice theory suggests that if the notch is moved then the hours
at which bunching occurs would also change. Nolan [2003] illustrated that
bunching in the distribution of hours of work in New Zealand for various
family types could be explained by discontinuities in these family types'
budget constraints. This bunching reflects both increases and decreases in
hours of work.
Binder and Rosen [1985] analysed the consequences of notches for a
number of issues, including welfare reform. They emphasised that while
linear taxes impose relatively small excess burdens on everyone a notch
imposes a relatively large excess burden on a smaller number of people. The
aggregate excess burden thus depends on the distribution of individual tastes
and endowments [Binder and Rosen, 1985, p. 738].
Unlike linear incentives, notch schemes do not distort the behaviour of
every person. Rather, if properly designed, they induce individuals to self
select so that those who are most willing to change their behaviour are
the ones who receive the subsidy (or avoid the tax) [Binder and Rosen,
1985, p.7a5l.
This requires, however, notches to be located in the correct position in the
distribution of hours of work, which is likely to be ditficult to identify and
income) working against the positive incentive etfect of the marginaltax reduction" [Blundell,
1992, p.231.
implement given the degree of population heterogeneity and the difficulty in
accurately establishing the distribution of individual tastes and endowments.
The Role of Uncertainty and Administrative lncentives
People's decisions to supply labour are influenced by more than the financial
incentives associated with the tax-benefit system. As well as these financial
incentives, changes in people's labour supply also reflect the tax-benefit
system's administrative incentives (such as work tests and stand-down
provisions), uncertainty people may feel about the level or stability of their
likely work or tax-benefit income, and any non-financial considerations for
entering or remaining in the work force, including self-esteem and fear of
damage to future employment prospects [Barr, 1999, p. 13; Wilson, 1996, pp
13-151.
Financial incentives and administrative incentives should be seen in
conjunction. A weakening of administrative incentives for encouraging labour
supply could, for instance, increase the significance of financial incentives for
encouraging labour supply. For example, when administrative incentives
increase the compliance costs facing beneficiaries or when they increase the
expected income from work by, for example, assisting an individual to find
higher paying work, they increase the relative return from work. However,
when they provide services or opportunities to beneficiaries that are not
available to people in work they reduce the relative return from work and thus
can weaken financial incentives.
Uncertainty and non-financial considerations can also interact with
financial incentives to influence labour supply [Wilson, 1996, pp 13-15]. For
instance, while a stand-down period for eligibility for an unemployment
benefit could make employment more attractive by reducing expected net
income on unemployment, for some beneficiaries who face uncertain
incomes in work this stand-down period may also increase the perceived
costs of re-entering the welfare system in the future and thus create some
reluctance to initially leave welfare. Responses to financial incentives may
also reflect the timing of payments or abatement, as people may not be
aware or may discount the impact of financial incentives when making
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decisions that, for instance, effect entitlements paid on an annual rather than
a more frequent basis, such as fortnightly [Barr, 1999, p. 18].
Empirical Studies of Labour Supply Effects
ln order to assess the significance of financial incentives to supply labour the
following section considers the results of empirical studies of labour supply
behavioural responses to tax-benefit programmes. The section below thus
first discusses New Zealand studies of the labour supply behavioural
responses. This is then followed by discussion of the results of international
studies, with an emphasis on studies evaluating the labour supply etfects of
fami[ and employment tax credits.
Maani [1989] examined the etfect of the Unemployment Benefit on the
reservation wage (the wage that the individual will not supply labour below),
the probability of reemployment, and the post-benefit wage of the
unemployed job seekers. The paper found that the unemployment benefit
decreased the probability of re-employment during a given period but, for
those who became reemployed, was also associated with a higher post-
employment wage. lt was estimated that a 10 percent increase in the benefit
replacement ratio was associated with a mean probability of re-employment
4.3 percent lower but a ratio of post-unemployment wage to last market wage
4.6 percent higher [Maani, 1989, p. 14].
Brosnan, Wilson, and Wong [1988] reviewed empirical evidence on the
relationship between labour supply decisions and the level, duration, and
eligibility requirements of income support provisions such as the
Unemployment Benefit and Domestic Purposes Benefit. They argued that in
general empirical links between disincentives to work in the social assistance
system and labour supply behavioural responses were not substantial.
However, they did identify that labour force participation and work activity of
prime aged men was least sensitive to benefit provision. Teenage men were
the most sensitive to the level of benefits and the duration of eligibility and
that the labour supply of women was sensitive to the supply of family income
assistance.
Chiao and Walker [1992, p. 1a5] presented econometric estimation of
the labour force participation of prime age (16 to 59) individuals and used
these estimates to simulate labour supply effects of changes in the personal
income tax scale in 1988 and the 1991 benefit reductions. They estimated an
overall market wage labour supply elasticity at 0.38, a wage elasticity for
females at 0.64, and a wage elasticity for males at0.22. They also estimated
that changes in the tax scale in 1988-89 increased labour market
participation by non-beneficiaries by 1.2 percent and beneficiaries by 0.64
percent. The 1991 benefit reductions were estimated to increase labour
participation of beneficiaries by 2.2 percent and non-beneficiaries by 0.9
percent [Chiao and Walke r, 1992, pp. 1 65, 173-174]. Stephens [1 999, p. 2421
argues that these estimates of labour supply elasticity are very high by
international standards and they seem contrary to the earlier findings of
Brosnan, Wilson, and Wong [1988]. Further, a review of Chiao and Walker
[1992] by Stroombergen and O'Brien [2003, p. 3] argued that the
econometric approach taken was likely to have introduced large
measurement errors and the estimates were unlikely to be robust.
Maloney [1997, in Stephens, 1999, p. 242;2000, pp. 447-448] found
that reforms to social welfare programmes between 1990 and 1995
increased labour force participation and the supply of weekly hours of labour.
The demographic group that experienced the largest increase in labour
supply was people aged 60 to 64, reflecting the gradual increase in the age
of eligibility for New Zealand Superannuation to 65. The rise in age of
eligibility for the Unemployment Benefit and Domestic Purposes Benefit
decreased labour force participation but increased participation in
educational among those aged 16 or lT.Overall Maloney [2000, pp.M7-
4481 estimated the benefit reforms increased aggregate labour force
participation by 1.57 percentage points, with a slightly smaller effect for hours
of labour supplied and a slightly larger etfect for participation in either the
labour force or education.
Stroombergen and O'Brien [2003, p. 1] demonstrated the importance of
factors such as age, ethnicity, and the presence of dependent children in the
family in influencing labour supply. They found a high degree of explanatory
power for these non-monetary variables in determining whether an individual
was in or out of the workforce. Financial variables, such as wage rates, non-
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labour income, and social assistance income, were statistically significant but
their contribution to explaining labour market status was relatively small
International literature on the employment rate of sole-parents also
indicates the limited influence of financial incentives on labour supply.
Bradshaw et al [1996, in Stephens, 1999, p. 250] found that replacement
rates did not appear to influence sole-parent's employment rates. There was
little correlation between low replacement rates and high sole-parent labour
participation rates. They concluded that the most important factor in
influencing sole-parents' labour participation was the availability of good
quality childcare. Labour market conditions, the level of incomes and
benefits, and cultural attitudes towards mothers in employment were also
important [Bradshaw et al, 1996, in Stephens, 1999, p. 250].
In contrast, however, evidence on employment tax credits in the United
States and United Kingdom indicates that the financial incentives associated
with these programmes have led to an overall increase in employment. This
research has differed from that of Bradshaw et al [1996, in Stephens, 1999,
p. 250] as rather than looking for a relationship between financial incentives
and employment outcomes over different jurisdictions this research has
compared employment outcomes within jurisdictions before and after policy
changes. Within the overall increase in employment from employment tax
credits there have been notable increases in employment of sole-parents,
smaller increases in employment of males in partnered families, and
decreases in employment among women in couples [Ellwood, 2000; Blundell,
Brewer, and Shephard, 20Q4; Eissa and Hoynes, 20041. This decrease for
women in couples reflects the use of joint income as the basis for assessing
entitlement. With the exception of the Family Tax Benefit Part B in Australia
(which abates against secondary earners' incomes only), all Anglo-American
family and employment tax credits are assessed on joint income. Assessing
entitlement on joint income encourages some secondary earners to drop out
of the labour market, rather than working or registering for unemployment
assistance, and leads to some families choosing to reduce their earned
incomes. Basing entitlement on joint income means secondary earners
generally face higher etfective marginal tax rates from their first dollar of
income than primary earners and when secondary earners reduce their
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earned incomes there is little reduction (or an increase) in joint income
[Stephens, 1997, p. a80]. Some secondary earners are etfectively subsidised
to stay at home [Eissa and Hoynes, 2004].
Similar behavioural responses have been estimated for the Working for
Families reforms in New Zealand (discussed in greater detail in chapter 10
below). Using a newly-developed behavioural component (TaxMod-B) of the
Treasury's microsimulation model of the tax-benefit system (TaxMod-A),
Kalb, Cai, and Tuckwell [2005] estimated that the changes to the Family
Assistance programmes as part of the Working for Families reforms will
increase the labour supply of sole-parents by on average 0.71 hours per-
week and decrease the labour supply of partnered men by 0.09 hours and
women by 0.18 hours per-week. The Accommodation Supplement changes
in the Working for Families reforms were estimated to have a small negative
etfect on the labour supply of single men and women, although limitations in
the modelling of the Accommodation Supplement in TaxMod-A mean this
component of the change was not modelled well [Kalb, Cai, and Tuckwell,
20051. Overall sole-parents were identified as the population group most
likely to have the strongest increase in labour market participation and hours
of work and married women with and without children were identified as the
population group who would be likely to have the strongest reduction in
labour market participation and hours of work as a result of the Working for
Families reforms. These findings were consistent with the international
evidence on employment tax credits.
Labour Supply Behavioural Responses and Poverty Reduction
Financial incentives to supply labour have implications for income adequacy
outcomes. Previous behavioural responses, such as changes in hours of
work and family structures, to government assistance will be reflected in
poverty measures based on historical data. However, forecast poverty
measures based on estimated data often do not consider future behavioural
responses. To illustrate this relationship between labour supply behavioural
responses and poverty reduction the effects of behavioural responses to a
tax-benefit policy change on headcount poverty rates are discussed below.
The impact of behavioural responses on poverty reduction and targeting
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efficiency can be illustrated with the case of increasing labour supply of sole-
parent families and decreasing labour supply of secondary earners. In order
to simplity discussion this section of the study uses headcount poverty as a
proxy for poverty reduction effectiveness. This assumption does not affect
the conclusions of the section.
In figure 3.1 the reduction in the headcount rate of poverty without
taking behavioural responses into account is a movement from ruo to rur. lf
sole-parents are concentrated at lower levels of family incomes, reflecting
their relatively low median wages and hours of work, even after these family
incomes are equivalised, their labour supply responses would reduce the
numbers of families at low incomes. This behavioural response would mean
that the reduction in the headcount rate of poverty would be the larger shift
from ruo to ruz in figure 3.1. lf secondary income earners are concentrated in
families at higher levels of family incomes, even atter these family incomes
are equivalised, their labour supply responses would reduce the numbers of
families at higher incomes. The spill-over of assistance to the pre-transfer
poor both increases and decreases. For those pre-transfer poor families who
increase their labour supply the spill-over increases if their post-transfer static
incomes are above the povefi threshold or if behavioural changes lift them
from below to above the poverty threshold. For those pre-transfer poor
families whose labour supply decreases the spill-over decreases. The overall
change in spill-over to the pre-transfer poor would thus depend on the size
and responsiveness of labour supply of the ditferent groups. Spill-over to the
pre-transfer non-poor unambiguously decreases when behavioural
considerations are taken into account.
Labour Supply and Excess Burden
As well as income adequacy outcomes, changes in labour supply also have
an impact on the excess burden of the tax-benefit system. Excess burden
arises as when:
choosing to work less on average, workers will have lower incomes and
thus will pay less taxes. Thus a change that would have been revenue-
neutral for a fixed level of labour supply will, as a result of the reduction
in work, produce a revenue loss. lt is this revenue loss that represents
the 'excess burden' of taxation [Heady, 1993, p. 32].
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The excess burden results from the higher taxes required to otfset the
reduced tax revenue from reductions in labour supply. Any gain in social
welfare from redistribution would be reduced by the etficiency costs created
by this need to increase tax rates [Heady, 1993, p. 32; Slemrod, 1993, p.
362; Creedy, 2003, p. 31. Excess burden is a cost that is additional to the
government revenue generated by taxation (which is a resource transfer) and
reflects the extent to which individuals are made worse off in terms of utility
through distortions in their decision-making [Hines, 1999, p. 175].
Excess burden can be illustrated with the fall in utility from a tax
increase illustrated in figure 3.2. This figure illustrated the fall in an
individual's welfare (moving the individual to a lower indifference curve) as a
result of the imposition of a tax on labour. However, the difference between
the indifference curves:
does not provide a useful measure of welfare change because utility is
regarded as an ordinal concept: the utility levels themselves are entirely
arbitrary, and the utility function provides simply a preference ordering of
alternative bundles with standard properties (such as transitivity and
decreasing marginal rates of substitution) [Creedy, 2003, p. 4].
The excess burden can instead be illustrated with the equivalent variation.
Equivalent variation holds utility at the post-tax level [Hines, 1999, p. 172].
To explain the equivalent variation, in figure 3.2 the utility level u' could be
attained at the pre-tax prices if the individual faced budget line oe, which was
parallel to ne. The point where the highest obtainable indifference curve was
tangential to this hypothetical budget constraint wds Fg. The individual would
be indifferent between this variation in their budget at the old prices and the
tax. This equivalent variation is measured in terms of a quantity of income by
yoyo, which is the vertical distance between the two budget lines vee and voe
[Creedy,2003, p.5].
The excess burden is approximated by one half of the Hicksian
elasticity, multiplied by the initial expenditure, and multiplied by the square of
the proportionaltax-inclusive rate of tax. Thus, for example, a doubling of the
tax rate approximately quadruples the excess burden [Creedy, 2003, pp. 1 1-
121. This result is consistent with the results of research on the marginal
In contrast, compensating variation holds utility at the pre-tax level [Hines, 1999, p. 172].
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excess burden of taxation in New Zealand, which have illustrated that the
marginal welfare costs of labour taxes increase with labour supply elasticities
and with marginal tax rates [Diewert and Lawrence, 1994; McKeown and
Woodfield, 19951. Diewert and Lawrence [1994], for example, estimated that
the marginal excess burden of labour taxation rose from five to 18 percent
over the 20 years to 1991 although in this period the average tax rate on
labour less than doubled. The authors attribute the more than proportionate
growth in the marginal excess burden to the increasing flexibility of factors in
the New Zealand economy [Diewert and Lawrence, 1994, p. 78].
3.4 Administration and Compliance
Income taxes, family and employment tax credits, and main welfare benefits
can be seen as ditferent components of a unified tax-benefit system.
However, dlfferences between tax-based and welfare-based programmes in
relation to administration and compliance limit potential integration of the
taxation and social welfare systems and the practical application of concepts
such as a negative income tax [Alstott, 1994, p. 609; Alstoil, 1995, P. 564;
Stephens, 1997, p. 491-5011. The design of income tax programmes reflects
the primary objective of the taxation system to raise tax revenue with
minimum economic cost while meeting equity objectives. The design of social
welfare programmes reflects the primary objective of the social welfare
system to ensure a minimum adequate living standard while incurring
minimum economic and fiscal costs. The design of tax-based social
assistance programmes needs to strike a balance between the primary
objectives of the taxation and social welfare systems.
Administration costs are the costs that the government incurs in
administering tax-benefit programmes. Total administration costs are all the
fiscal costs incurred by the government when delivering a tax-benefit
programme. The targeting administration costs are the costs incurred during
the process of screening which people should receive assistance [Grosh,
1995, pp. 454-4581. Compliance costs are the costs incurred by taxpayers or
third parties in complying with the tax-benefit system over and above the
revenue paid and the economic costs of the system [Sandford, in Tan, 1995,
g
p. 3; Alexander, Bell, and Knowles, 2004, p. 1]. Compliance costs include
monetary, time, and psychic costs associated with complying with the tax-
benefit system [Stephens, 1997, p. 489]. Administration and compliance
costs reflect factors such as the administrative agency's capacity for
assessing need or income streams and current contact with or information on
the client group. Administration and compliance costs can be segmented into
start-up costs, ongoing costs, and change costs [Stephens, 1997, p. 490].
Compliance costs are treated differently in the taxation and welfare
systems. Emphasis in the taxation system is on minimising such costs, while
in the welfare system compliance costs may be a feature of the targeting of
entitlement. In some cases high compliance costs for recipients may be
justified by the benefits these costs provide. For example, high compliance
costs may be required when the programme requires intensive contact with
recipients, so that these recipients receive support (case management) and
the information that makes them aware of their entitlement. The taxation
system (which emphasises telephone-based support) provides less
administrative contact than the welfare system (which emphasises face-to-
face contact).
As well as their direct costs, administration and compliance issues also
influence other policy objectives (such as the ability to etfectively target
assistance). For instance, a tax deduction (i.e., a reduction in taxable income
by some proportion of a claimed expense) reduces a person's taxable
income, so the assistance they receive depends on their marginal tax rate. A
tax credit or rebate (i.e., a reduction in tax paid by some proportion of a
claimed expense) helps all eligible taxpayers equally, regardless of their
income level and exposure to targeting of tax-benefit programmes. The level
of a non-refundable tax credit is constrained by the amount of tax that the
recipients pay. Tax assistance can be used to provide income assistance to
low-income individuals when it is provided as a direct outlay (a refundable tax
credit). Otherwise it tends to be ditficult to use the tax system to target
assistance to low-income individuals as these recipients usually pay little tax
and the level of a (non-refundable) tax credit is constrained by the amount of
tax that the recipients pay. Further, in comparison to tax rebates, tax
deductions tend to benefit higher income earners under a progressive
personal income tax scale (as higher income earners receive a greater
reduction in their tax liability from the reduction in their assessable income)
[Pallot, 1993, p. 127; Nolan and Fairbrother, 2005]. In the discussion below
the emphasis is on refundable tax rebates (often referred to as tax credits).
Unit and Period of Assessment
The ability of different tax-benefit programmes to effectively target assistance
reflects the different units of assessment (e.9., individual, family, or family),
periods of assessment (e.9., weekly, monthly, or annually), and definitions of
income and treatment of assets in use [Whitehouse, 1996, p. 137]. The ability
to utilise a comprehensive income definition in income tax and social
assistance programmes is limited by etficiency objectives, equity objectives,
and objectives for reducing administration and compliance costs. As a result,
and reflecting differences in different programmes' objectives, ditferent
definitions of income are used for determining liability for personal income
taxes, entitlement to social welfare benefits, and entitlement to Family
Assistance programmes in New Zealand. Ditferences in the definitions of
income arise in relation to the unit of and time period for assessment, the
treatment of assets, and the treatment of different sources of income.
Income tax liability is assessed on the basis of annual individual taxable
income. Social welfare benefits are assessed on the basis of an economic
family unit definition of income. This definition of income includes wealth
indicators, which indicate potential income, as well as actual income received
[Stephens, 1997, p. 491]. The definition of income for Family Assistance
purposes is a compromise between taxable income and the social welfare
definition of income and is based on annual taxable income but using joint
incomes of the caregivers rather than individual income as the unit of
assessment. There are also a number of income adjustments that apply to
the Family Assistance income definition that do not apply to taxable income,
such as for child support payments.
The ditferent units of assessment and definitions of income create a
number of anomalies in the treatment of different family types. For individuals
without children and sole-parents the interaction of income taxes, welfare
programmes, and family and employment tax credits is relatively
straightforward. The integration of these programmes for partnered people is
more complex and can create high effective marginal tax rates, particularly
for secondary earners, and financial disincentives for entering into or
remaining in a partnered relationship. However, using individuals as the unit
of assessment for all tax-benefit programmes would increase fiscal costs
through increasing the number of eligible recipients, particularly income-poor
individuals with wealthy spouses, unless the generosity of assistance was
reduced [Whitehouse, 1996, p. 137], Using individuals as the unit of
assessment for all programmes would also increase administration and
compliance costs (as both partners in a couple would be required to apply for
assistance) and would be likely to lead to moral hazard (through partnered
families reallocating incomes and assets within the couple to minimise taxes
or maximise assistance) [Stephens, 1997, pp.492-493]. LeUying taxes on an
individual rather than joint basis also increases the personal income tax base
and allows personal income tax rates to be reduced (shifts towards individual
income tax bases partly funded reductions in personal income tax rates in a
number of OECD countries during the 1980s and 1990s [OECD, 2001a, p.
1421).
In partnered families it is also necessary to allocate child-based
assistance to either the primary income earner or the primary caregiver or to
split entitlement between the caregivers. Providing assistance to primary
caregivers can emphasise that payments are assistance to compensate
families for the costs of children, rather than a contribution to the general
family budget, and provide an independent source of income for caregivers.
Providing assistance to the primary earner can emphasise assistance as a
financial reward for their increased work effort. When separated caregivers
share responsibility for the care of a child it is also necessary to allocate
assistance between these caregivers. In such cases it is necessary to define
how and under what circumstances assistance should be split between these
caregivers and what treatment should apply to income transferred between
the separated caregivers, such as whether assistance should be reduced by
payments of formal and informal child support by non-custodial parents
[Stephens, 1997, p. 496].
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Programmes based on annual periods may be appropriate for people
with regular incomes or long-term beneficiaries. However, these programmes
may not be appropriate for those people whose circumstances fluctuate (for
example, due to changes in job status, hours worked, and family status).
Responsiveness to fluctuations in need is influenced by the interval for the
measurement of income. Tax-based assistance, which is based on annual
income, is less responsive than social welfare programmes, which employ
definitions of income based on a shorter time period. Consequently the
failure to adjust tax-based assistance during the year may lead to recipients
experiencing periods of hardship. Advance-payment schemes (that pay
assistance during the year) may increase the ability of tax-based assistance
to respond to changing needs. However, administrative and compliance
issues, particularly gaps in awareness of entitlement and potential recipients'
aversion to incurring debts from overpayments, may reduce the effectiveness
of advance-payment schemes (which generally have low levels of take-up in
the United States and United Kingdom but not New Zealand). Under an
advance payment scheme with a year-end square-up, over-payments or
under-payments may arise if incomes fluctuate during the income tax year
and the level of assistance does not adjust. To minimise the problems of
people incurring tax-debts some small levels of debt could be waived and
small levels of income changes could be disregarded in the year-end square-
up process. Basing entitlement on income at time of application and
disregarding future changes in income during the income tax year could
avoid these ditficulties. This approach could, however, lead to moral hazard
through encouraging recipients to suppress their income around time of
application through altering the timing of income streams.
Participation and Gompl iance
Administration and compliance issues may also be reflected in non-take up of
assistance, take-up of assistance by ineligible recipients, and overpayments
of assistance. Non-take-up occurs when, for a number of people, the amount
they receive from programmes is less than the amount they are entitled to
receive. An individual will often take-up assistance if over the expected length
of eligibility the gain in utility from receiving the income transfer exceeds the
costs of participation [Riphahn, 2001, pp. 381-382]. Consequently take-up
tends to increase as the proportion of total net income that could be received
as a transfer and expected duration of receipt increase. Yet potential
recipients may choose not to claim assistance because there are costs as
well as benefits associated with receiving assistance. These costs of
participation include any perceived stigma or loss of dignity associated with
the application for and receipt of assistance, which may, for instance, harm
future employment prospects and wage rates [Atkinson, 1989a, p. 192;
Wilson, 1996, pp. 13-15; Creedy, 2002, pp. 1511. Potential recipients may
also fail to take-up assistance if they are unaware or uncertain of the extent
of benefits and qualifying conditions or because of administrative error
[Atkinson, 1989a, p. 1921, Creedy, 2002, p. 151]. For any tax-benefit
programme there are likely to be people who deliberately receive assistance
that they are not entitled to receive. lt is also likely that there will be other
people who engage in opportunistic behaviour due to scope for moral hazard
and alter their circumstances in ways viewed as undesirable by
policymakers, i.e., by putting themselves in positions of greater need than
would have been the case in the absence of assistance in order to be eligible
for assistance for which they would have otherwise been ineligible [Sen,
1995, p. 111.
Reflecting the different approaches to compliance, tax-based and
welfare based programmes differ in their ability to evaluate criteria tor
entitlement, monitor and enforce these criteria, and review entitlement. The
taxation system uses annual taxable income and straightforward criteria
(e.9., number and ages of children). The welfare system uses a shorter time
period and ditferent definition of income and can base eligibility on more
complex criteria (like behaviour and family composition) that have greater
discretion over how they are applied. Due to the relatively higher
administrative intensity involved in applying for welfare programmes, the
welfare system is more able to make entitlement conditional on certain types
of behaviour (like job search effort). Yet there is less stigma associated with
applying for tax-based assistance. The taxation system reviews entitlement
less often than the social welfare system and this is generally done ex post
while the social welfare system tends to review entitlement ex ante. Due to
the relatively large reliance upon voluntary compliance in the income tax
system, programmes provided through the tax system are particularly prone
to fraud and non-compliance. Research on the Earned Income Tax Credit in
the United States has estimated that in 1999 trom27.0 to 31.7 percent of
claims paid should not have been finland Revenue Service, 2002, p. 3].
The take-up rate is the number of actual recipients divided by the total
entitled population [Atkinson, 1989a, p. 197]. There are a number of
ditficulties in calculating take-up rates [Scholz, 1994, p. 64]. Applications for
assistance may be received and paid after the period of eligibility and
payments may be contained in administrative data for later years. Where
payments are made to more than one member of a family during an income
tax year the number of recipients may include some double counting. When
estimating the total entitled population (families who would receive the benefit
if they were to claim) it is often necessary to use survey data, which may not
contain accurate income data. There may be cases where people have
recorded receipt but are calculated as being not eligible. Further, the
complexity of administrative rules for programmes is reflected in the
complexity of modelling take-up, with changes in take-up rates potentially
being influenced by changes in modelling assumptions and differences
between administrators' and modellers' views on who is eligible for
assistance.
As well as the overall level of take-up, also significant are the
characteristics of recipients failing to receive their full entitlement, changes in
take-up over time, changes in amounts not claimed, and significance of
ditferent reasons for non-participation [Atkinson, 1989a, p. 194]. Take-up
rates show the proportion of the eligible population who receive assistance;
they do not show the proportion of the financial entitlement that is received.
There may be less reason to be concerned with low take-up rates if the dollar
amount that eligible families miss out on is low or if families choose not to
take-up assistance for rational reasons, such as high-income earners not
wanting to risk triggering tax audits by applying for tax-based assistance.
Scholz [1994, p. 79] estimated that, for example, in 1990 the take-up of the
Earned Income Tax Credit in the United States was in the range of 80 to 86
percent. lt was also estimated that factors correlated with non-take-up were
consistent with rational or voluntary explanations for non-participation, such
as being eligible for a small level of assistance, having a greater proportion of
self-employed income, working in states without state income taxes at low
income levels, working in family service occupations, and having higher
levels of education. Research on the Family Credit in the United Kingdom
has produced much lower estimates of take-up. Yet these estimates have
also shown that non-take up tends to be correlated with voluntary
explanations for non-take-up, such as being eligible for a small amount of
assistance, having self-employed status, and being in a partnered family
[Clark and McOrae,2OO1, p. 19].
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter discussed criteria for evaluating tax-benefit programmes. The
first key criterion for evaluating these programmes discussed was their effect
on povefi. Poverty thresholds can be defined both relative to current
standards of living and policy parameters and absolute in the sense of
representing a standard of living that families should not fall below. Poverty
thresholds can also be based on a number of income sharing units (e.9.,
statistical families and economic family units), income levels (e.9., 60 percent
or 50 percent of equivalised disposable family income), and equivalence
scales, which can be used to adjust joint incomes to reflect variations in their
cost structures. Success in achieving objectives for poverty relief can be
measured in terms of headcount poverty measures and other measures such
as the poverty gap and poverty reduction effectiveness.
A second key criterion for evaluating tax-benefit programmes is
financial incentives for labour supply. The effect of a tax-benefit reform on
financial incentives for labour supply reflects the income and substitution
effects that the reform creates. These etfects can be illustrated with changes
in families' budget constraints. In practise budget constraints are complex
and non-linear. As well as income and substitution effects people's labour
supply decisions also reflect uncertainty and administrative incentives.
Empirical studies of the labour supply effects of tax-benefit programmes
illustrate that caregivers are relatively responsive to financial incentives to
work. These studies, however, provide ditfering views on the strength of
caregivers' responses to financial incentives to supply labour. International
evidence on the relationship between replacement rates and sole-parents'
labour supply showed little correlation between the two. However, more
recent evidence on the labour supply response to employment tax credits in
the United Kingdom and the United States has shown that sole-parents have
increased their labour supply and secondary earners have decreased their
labour supply in response to these programmes. Preliminary findings on New
Zealand's Working for Families reforms have produced similar results. The
impact of tax-benefit programmes on caregivers' financial incentives for
labour supply is thus a key criterion for evaluation.
The poverty reduction and financial incentives for labour supply criteria
should not be seen in isolation as labour supply responses to tax-benefit
programmes have implications for poverly reduction etfectiveness. lmproving
financial incentives to supply labour can improve the opportunities for low-
wage groups, such as sole-parents, to participate and belong in society.
These labour supply etfects also have implications for a third criterion, the
excess burden of the tax-benefit system, through atfecting the size of the tax
base. This excess burden results from the higher taxes required to offset the
reduced tax revenue from reductions in labour supply.
Section four of this chapter discussed criteria for evaluating tax-benefit
programmes relating to administration and compliance issues. Tax-based
and welfare-based programmes ditfer in the degree to which they can
accurately assess entitlement, respond to recipients' changing
circumstances, and ensure compliance and participation in programmes.
Non-take-up occurs when, for a number of people, the amount they receive
from programmes is less than the amount they are entitled to. Growing
international support for tax-based programmes reflects the belief that
assistance provided through the tax system avoids some of the limitations of
traditional social welfare programmes. There are, however, a number of
limitations to the use of tax-based social assistance, such as the relatively
low flexibility in responding to recipients' changing circumstances, the
requirement for relatively narrow definitions of income and the income
sharing unit, the requirement for relatively clear-cut and non-discretionary
eligibility criteria, and the vulnerability to taxpayer fraud. These are all factors
against which tax-benefit programmes could be evaluated.
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4 Methodology for Evaluating Tax-
Benefit Programmes
4.1 Introduction
This chapter develops a methodology for evaluating tax-benefit programmes.
There is a large literature on income inequality, poverty, and living standards
in New Zealand. The approach taken in this study is thus to review and
synthesise this literature. In comparison to research on income inequality,
poverty, and living standards, since the release of Prebble and Rebstock
(eds.) [1992] there has been little comprehensive non-government research
undertaken on the financial incentives to work contained in New Zealand's
tax-benefit system (with the exceptions of St John [1996], Maloney [1997,
20001, St John and Rankin [2002], and Nolan 120031). This lacuna reflects the
complexity of the financial incentives for labour supply created by the
interaction of tax-benefit programmes and a lack of independent
microsimulation modelling resources. This study aims to help address this
lacuna and consequently issues relating to measuring the labour supply
financial incentives of tax-benefit programmes are given emphasis in this
study and chapter. Further, although reforms to family and employment tax
credits have been at the heart of tax-benefit reforms throughout the Anglo-
American world there has been relatively little comparative public policy
research on these prominent programmes. Consequently this study and
chapter also emphasise issues relating to comparing the design and
generosity of family and employment tax credits in ditferent jurisdictions.
Section two of this chapter discusses evidence based policy in New
Zealand. Section three explains the method for calculating average tax rates
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and effective marginal tax rates. In section four the chapter then discusses
how the effects of tax-benefit reforms on individual families can be estimated
and what characteristics these families should be assumed to have.
Approaches for estimating the etfects of reform on the population as a whole
are then discussed in section five. This section includes discussion of
arithmetic and behavioural microsimulation modelling and the use and
integration of administrative and survey data. Comparative policy analysis is
discussed in section six.
4.2 Evidence Based Policy
Evidence on what works to achieve desirable social outcomes is increasingly
being demanded as an input into policy processes [Lunt and Davidson, 2002,
p. 2).Such evidence can identity, measure, and compare the outcomes (the
impacts on the community) of alternative policies [Sefton, 2000, p. 3; Nutley,
Walter, and Davies, 2002, p. 2l.This process can inform decisions regarding
policy priorities and the best use of resources in a number of ways.
Evaluation can feed directly into decision-making and lead to changes to
behaviour and practise. While this direct and instrumental use of evaluation is
undoubtedly important, evaluation can also have a broader conceptual
influence through changing levels of knowledge, understanding, and attitudes
[Nutley, Walter, and Davies, 2002, p. 4]. Both the instrumental and
conceptual roles of evaluation require the development of partnerships and
understanding between researchers, policymakers, and the broader public
[Atkinson, 1989b, pp. 1-2; Lunt,2001, p. 199; Nutley, Walter, and Davies,
2002, p. 101.
The demand for instrumental and conceptual research has increased in
New Zealand over the last decade. Following a binding referendum in 1993
New Zealand underwent reform to its electoral system with the change from
a First Past the Post (FPP) to a Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral
system. This change institutionalised proportional representation, increased
the probability of coalition and/or minority governments, and consequently
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reduced the power of the political executive. As a result this change also
increased the potential role of independent evaluation as a tool for mobilising
pof itical support or as an instrument of persuasion [Mulgan , 1997, pp. 265-
2711.
Further, following the Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994, which established
the principles for formulating fiscal policy in New Zealand, governments have
been required to regularly publish their short-term and long-term fiscal
intentions [Boston, Martin, et al, 1996, p.263; Treasury, 1996, p. 11]. This
legislation increased the transparency of and accountability for fiscal policy
outcomes. In the budget documents, for example, refundable tax rebates are
listed with social welfare expenditure rather than as reduced tax revenue
figures.
The transparency of fiscal outcomes also reflects the development of
the Generic Tax Policy Process after 1995, which aims to provide
opportunities for substantial external input and increased transparency in the
development of tax policy.t Although the Generic Tax Policy Process has
largely been a success [Oliver, 1999, p. 1], the 2001 Ministerial lnquiry into
the Tax System (the McLeod report) identified three areas for improvement.
These were to introduce greater transparency into measuring the success of
tax policy, establish forums for independent policy analysis, and to increase
participation of stakeholders [McLeod, Chatterjee, et al, 2001a, p. 18].
Following the recommendations of the 2001 Ministerial Inquiry into the Tax
System the Public Finance Amendment Act 2004 established further
requirements for further reporting of tax expenditures. New Zealand last
published such a statement as part of the opening of the books in 1988
[McLeod, Chatterjee, et al, 2001a, p. 19]. However, aside from fiscal
The first general election under the MMP electoral system was held in 1996 [Boston,
Levine, McLeay, and Roberts, 1996, pp.20-231.t The Generic Tax Policy Process has strategic, tactical, operational, legislative, and
implementation and review phases. The Treasury is primarily responsible for the earlier
stages and the lnland Revenue Department is primarily responsible for later stages. Broad
objectives are set and priorities are established with a three-year revenue strategy.
Departments and Ministers determine where comparative advantage lies and allocate roles
and responsibilities accordingly. Ministers develop protocols establishing their respective
policy roles [Oliver, 1999].
outcomes there is still little transparent measurement of tax policy outcomes,
such as the impact of the tax-benefit system on labour supply.
Following the 1991 benefit reductions issues of poverty measurement
became the focus of academic, political, and media scrutiny in New Zealand
[Stephens, 1999, p. 2521. Initially a number of community-based studies of
poverly were produced. These studies were discredited by politicians
because of their limited statistical basis. The New Zealand Poverty
Measurement Project then developed independent estimates of the incidence
and severity of poverty based on the Household Economic Survey
[Stephens, 1999, p. 251]. There is, however, no equivalent to the Fiscal
Responsibility Act 1994 that would require governments to report on social
policy outcomes [Boston, Dalziel, and St John, 1999, p. 315]. This led
commentators to argue that a strengthening of the government's reporting
and monitoring responsibilities in relation to social policy outcomes is
required [Boston, St John, and Stephens, 1996; Boston, Dalziel, and St John,
1999, p.3151.
In recent years there has been greater emphasis placed on government
reporting on social outcomes. The Ministry of Social Development now issue
the Social Report, increased funding has been made available for
independent social policy research, and the Social Policy Evaluation and
Research committee has been established to align the purchase of social
policy research with the governmenfs social policy priorities. The Ministry of
Social Development has also developed Knowledge Theme Areas and Key
Knowledge Questions to enhance the production and dissemination of
knowledge underpinning social policy by encouraging research that takes a
cross-sector focus rather than simply reflecting government social sector
domains [Hong, 2001, pp. 9-14].
However, the focus and utility of this social reporting and research in
New Zealand has been increasingly questioned. The transparency of
outcomes in the social development policy domain remains limited by the
lack of tax and transfer microsimulation models independent from the
government of the day and restricted access of researchers to administrative
data. These limitations reduce the supply and variety of tax-benefit modelling,
77
public scrutiny on modelling, and understanding of the constraints upon
policy [Creedy, Duncan, et al,2OO2, pp. 6-7].
lAlthough] government departments will probably wish to develop some
internal modelling capacity, there is a major role for independent tax
modellers, or researchers who are independent of government or
special-interest groups. However, in view of the high costs of model
building, it is likely that they need strong financial support from research
grants or government departments. A strong advantage is that
independent modellers are obliged to publish full details of models. This
public knovMedge can help to stimulate a wider assessment of
approaches as well as imposing a constraint on the inappropriate use of
models. Indeed a strong case can be made for the support of several
models so that the benefits of alternative strategies are obtained and the
abuse of a single model can be controlled [Creedy, Duncan, et al, 2002,
pp.6-71.
The social development policy process, particularly the role of evidence
in policy development, also lacks transparency. Some commentators have
argued that the social development policy domain would benefit from a
generic policy process such as that used in the tax domain [Shaw and
Eichbaum, 20051. The social development policy process also lacks a formal
requirement for identitying policy objectives, identifying trade-offs between
policy objectives, and evaluating alternative policy instruments, although
formal requirements of this kind are present in other policy domains in New
Zealand, such as the requirement to prepare regulatory impact statements
for regulatory proposals that increase business compliance costs under the
oversight of New Zealand's Regulatory lmpact Analysis Unit.
4.3 Average and Effective Marginal Tax Rates
This chapter develops a methodology for evaluating tax-benefit programmes.
A key feature of this methodology relates to financial incentives to supply
labour, particularly average tax rates and effective marginal tax rates.
Average tax rates (ATRs) illustrate the change in the income available for
consumption and are reflected in the height of the budget constraint. ATRs
show the ratio of taxes paid and benefits received to income [Creedy, 1999,
p. 4111. Etfective marginal tax rates (EMTRS) show the proportion by which a
dollar increase in gross income is reduced by income taxes and the
abatement of welfare transfers. An EMTR is one minus the change in net
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income after taxation and abatement of income transfers resulting from
earning an additional gross dollar [Prebble and Rebstock (eds.), 1992, pp.7'
13; Nolan, 2003, p. 531. EMTRs are reflected in the slope of the budget
constraint.
Whether changes to ATRs and EMTRs reinforce or offset each other
depends on the case at hand and requires empirical analysis [Blundell, 1992,
p. 16; Heady, 1993, p.31l.The size of the responses of different groups
depends on the uncompensated elasticity of labour supply and the numbers
of people in the groups. Further, ditferent families with the same gross wage
may face ditferent ATRs and EMTRs [Blundell, 1992, p. 24).ATRs and
EMTRs reflect the complex interaction of income tax and welfare
programmes. Different programmes use ditferent entitlement and abatement
schedules, eligibility criteria, definitions of what counts as income, income-
sharing units (individual, family, or family), income periods (weekly,
fortnightly, or annually), and implementation agencies (the Inland Revenue
Department or the Ministry of Social Development). ATRs and EMTRs thus
ditfer among people with ditferent characteristics, depending on factors such
as hours of work, wage rates received, marital status, numbers and ages of
children, availability of childcare, accommodation needs, and receipt of other
assistance.
With real-world tax-benefit systems the calculation of ATRs and EMTRs
can be complex. For example, in New Zealand EMTRs cannot always simply
be calculated as the sum of the personal income tax rate, the Low Income
Earner Rebate, ACC earner levy, net benefit abatement rate, and the Family
Assistance abatement rate. This is because net welfare benefits abate
against increases in gross income and the personal income tax rate applying
to benefit income may ditfer from the rate applying to non-benefit income.
Also complicating the calculation of EMTRs is that while personal income
taxes are levied on individual income, social welfare benefits and the Family
Assistance Tax Credits abate against joint income. The EMTRs in this study
are calculated for adults in single and partnered families. When calculating
the EMTRs of a person in a partnered family, his or her partner's income is
assumed to remain constant.
79
The calculation of EMTRs can be illustrated with the following algebraic
approach, which was developed by lvan Tuckwell and Matthew Bell of the
New Zealand Treasury fl-reasury, 1999; Nolan, 20O2, pp. 17-21; Nolan
20031. The net social welfare benefit is abated against gross non-benefit
earnings. Thus when a family earns an extra dollar in gross non-benefit
earnings the total gross income (which includes the gross benefit) does not
rise by the full dollar because of the benefit abatement. The gross benefit
abatement (ro) equals the net benefit abatement (re) divided by one minus the
marginaltax rate on benefit income (ts).
tn= tel (1 
- 
te) (6.1)
In this study the change in the tax on gross non-benefit earnings is
calculated as the marginal personal income tax rate on earnings (t) multiplied
by the change in gross income. While, in practise beneficiaries' non-benefit
earnings are generally taxed under the Secondary tax regime at 21 percent,
this tax is a withholding tax and so excessive tax withheld during the year is
returned when taxes are reconciled at the end of the income tax year.
Further, the tax on the gross abated benefit and the non-benefit earnings are
calculated separately as the tax rate applying to the benefit income may differ
from the tax rate applying to non-benefit earnings. In a couple, an individual's
total gross income is the total of their gross non-benefit income and one half
of the family's gross benefit income.
The change in gross income (vn) is one minus the gross benefit
abatement.
Aye=1-ru (6.2)
The change in disposable income (vo) is the change in gross income
multiplied by the changes in tax liability (t) and Family Assistance abatement
(rp) minus the ACC earner account levy.
Ayo=Aye (1 
-t-rp)-Acc (6.3)
The EMTR is one minus the change in the disposable income.
EMTR=1-Ayo (6.4)
When people are faced with a decision on whether or not to make
relatively small changes in income, 
€.g., from working a few extra hours,
EMTRs are likely to illustrate the financial incentives applying to their
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decisions. Yet when people are considering relatively large changes in
income, e.9., whether to work part-time or full-time, or when they are
constrained in the degree to which they can change their hours of work, e.9.,
when they have employment contracts containing fixed hours, EMTRs are
less likely to illustrate the financial incentives applying to their decisions.
Also, the hourly wage rate that a person can earn influences the number of
hours of work over which they face particular ATRs or EMTRS. lf, for
example, a benefit recipienfs hourly wage rate fell from $1S to $10 the
numbers of hours of work over which they may face EMTRs created by the
abatement of welfare programmes would increase.
Estimating ATRs and EMTRs of people in partnered families pose
particular ditficulties. In partnered families labour supply decisions are
generally joint decisions. In these families when either the primary or
secondary earner changes his or her labour supply total joint income
changes. As social welfare benefits and Family Assistance programmes
abate against total joint income the individual incentives facing primary and
secondary earners are thus influenced by the earnings of their partners.
However, due to the ditficulty of modelling joint decisions, in this study
changes in joint income are modelled as individual decisions where only one
person makes a labour supply decision and the rest of the labour supply
decisions in the family are held constant [Prebble and Rebstock (eds.), 1992,
pp.37-381.
There are limits to the usefulness of ATRs and EMTRS. First, as well as
financial incentives, labour supply reflects the uncertainty that people feel
about the level of their likely work or tax-benefit income, non-financial
considerations for entering or remaining in the work force (including self-
esteem and fear of damage to future employment prospects), and tax-benefit
programmes'administrative incentives (such as work tests) [Wilson, 1996, pp
13-15; Barr, 1999, p. 131. Further, although people may appear to not face
particular financial incentives, e.9., people located above or below the
income levels at which incentives occur, they may still be affected by these
incentives when making decisions, e.9., by being discouraged from locating
at income levels associated with high disincentives to supply labour.
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4.4 Model-Family Approach
lllustrating financial incentives for labour supply from changes to tax-benefit
programmes requires illustrating the etfects of these changes on net wages.
These effects can be shown through calculating EMTR profiles and budget
constraints for fixed wage rates by hours of work. As budget constraints
facing individuals are likely to be non-linear the effective net hourly wage rate
facing individuals will be likely to vary with hours of work [Blundell, 1992, p.
24).
In this study financial incentives to supply labour are modelled by hours
of work with fixed gross wage rates and not by incomes in order to separate
the distribution of hours of work from the distribution of wage rates. Although
thresholds contained in tax-benefit programmes are often expressed in terms
of gross incomes, modelling financial incentives against gross incomes could
be misleading as the same level of income can be achieved through different
combinations of hours and wage rates. Consequently two individuals with
identical gross incomes may face different financial incentives. A high-wage
part{ime worker could, for example, face lower EMTRs when increasing their
hours of work than a low-wage worker with the same income (as with a
higher wage the abatement of social assistance programmes occurs over a
shorter range of hours of work). Further, modelling financial incentives by
hours of work can illustrate which tinancial incentives are most likely to atfect
individuals of interest. For example, given the relatively low median wage of
sole-parents, financial incentives to supply labour that apply at very high
incomes are not likely to atfect these people (as reaching these incomes
could require working for an unlikely number of hours per-week) unless they
have an unusually high gross wage rate for this family type.
This study focuses on the provision of social assistance to families with
children. A model capable of producing accurate budget constraints and
EMTRs profiles has been developed to model the impact of tax benefit
programmes on scenario family types. A model capable of modelling the
levels of assistance provided by family and employment tax credits in five
Anglo-American countries (in New Zealand dollars) by hours of work for
scenario family types has also been developed. The provision of assistance
has been illustrated for three family types. The first family consisted of a sole-
parent earning an hourly gross wage rate of $10.00 and with two children
aged three and five. The second family consisted of a partnered person
earning an hourly gross wage rate of $15.00 and with a non-working spouse
and two children aged three and five. The third family consisted of a
partnered person earning an hourly gross wage rate of $15.00 and with a
working spouse and two children aged three and five. The working spouse
was assumed to earn a fixed income of $0OO gross per-week (at a wage rate
of $15.00 per-hour and 40 hours of work per-week). Families were assumed
to have two children as this is a relatively common structure for partnered
families and, although sole-parents tend to be in single-child families, the
incidence of poverty and significance of poverty traps increase with the
number of children in the fami[. These wage rates have been chosen as
they closely approximate the median wage rates for these family types.
Nolan [2004c, p. 8] contained Treasury estimates of median gross wage
rates for ditferent family types for 2003-04. To calculate wage rates
individuals' income data were divided by their reported hours of work
contained in the Household Economic Survey and these rates were then
aggregated to give a median for the family type by TaxMod-A. The Treasury
estimates were:
. Partnered people with working spouses and multiple children, $18.18;
' Partnered workers with non-working spouses and multiple children,
$17.65;
. Single workers with children, $12.67;
' Dual-income and single-income partnered people without children,
$17.34; and
. Single people without children, $15.78.
A key finding from this modelling was thus that workers in sole-parent
families tended to have lower median wages than workers in partnered
Where one income earner eamed 80 percent or more of a household's private income the
household was categorised as having only one income earner. lf the household's private
income was less than half of the household's gross taxable income (e.9., the maiority of
household income was from an income tested social welfare benefit or from New Zealand
Superannuation) then the household was assumed to have no income eamers. This latter
assumption was necessary as people may work for less than the full income tax year.
families. Therefore in this study the assumed wage rates of sole-parent
families are lower than the assumed wage rates of partnered families.
This study also draws upon Treasury estimates of the distribution of
hours of work of different family types calculated with TaxMod-A and using
Household Economic Survey data. Estimates were calculated for a range of
family types [Nolan, 2004c, p. 8]. Because there were small numbers of
some family types in the Household Economic Survey data there were few
observations of these family types at certain wage rates. Thus in order to
provide a useful number of observations in this modelling it was necessary to
use wage bands of below and above median wages for ditferent family types
rather than single wage rates. Due to the small numbers of certain family
types in the sample this modelling was based upon, some distributions of
hours were not able to have data calculated for them. For the majority of
family types data on the distributions of hours of work (for above and below
the median wages) show a general pattern of around 25 to 30 percent of
those people earning below median wage working for less than 30 hours per-
week and around 15 percent of those people earning above median wage
working for less than 30 hours per-week. The key exception to this
distribution was the category of sole-parents, where much larger proportions
were estimated to work for less than 30 hours per-week (45 percent of the
group earning below the median wage and 25 percent earning above the
median). Thus for lower wage groups the distribution of hours of work was
more heavily skewed towards lower hours of work [Nolan, 2OO4c, p. 8].
4.5 TaxMod-A and the Household Economic
Survey
To model the interaction of the tax-benefit system with the income distribution
a large-scale tax-benefit microsimulation model is required. The construction
and maintenance of large-scale tax-benefit models requires teamwork and
significant data handling and computer programming requirements [Creedy,
2001, p. 196; Brown and Harding,2002, p.3; Creedyand Ka|b,2005, p.31.
The approach of this study has thus been to draw on an existing
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microsimulation model (Treasury's TaxMod-A) for modelling on the
interaction of the tax-benefit system with the income distribution.
TaxMod-A
The emphasis in TaxMod-A is on population heterogeneity and accurate
representation of the tax and transfer system. TaxMod-A calculates income
tax liabilities and social assistance entitlement based upon characteristics of
the population and rules regarding eligibility and abatement of income tax
and social assistance programmes [Smith and Euller, 1992, pp.29-44; Kalb,
Cai, and Tuckwell, 2005, pp. 35-361. A population of families is derived from
demographic, income, and expenditure data contained in the Household
Economic Survey. TaxMod-A allocates some people who may be classified
in fami$ relationships in the Household Economic Survey into separate
families if this is the treatment that applies under income tax and social
assistance rules. TaxMod-A calculates benefit receipt based on data on
benefit duration (not benefit income) contained in the Household Economic
Survey and assumes complete participation (100 percent take-up) in
programmes. The model contains incomplete information on wealth and does
not model entities such as companies or trusts or people's behavioural
responses to income tax and social assistance programmes. TaxMod-A is a
partial equilibrium model. Thus this model focuses on only one side of the
relevant market (tax and transfer payments and incomes of individuals and
families) [Creedy, 2001, p. 197].
As the Household Economic Survey needs to be weighted up to
estimate the entire New Zealand population, in TaxMod-A each surveyed
family is given a weighting representing the degree to which families of that
type occur in the total population. This re-weighting process has recently
undergone revision. In 2003 a comparison of administrative data on benefit
expenditures for a variety of demographic groups with TaxMod-A estimates
identified that these data differed substantially when Statistics New Zealand
weights were used. As a result revised population weights were developed
[Creedy and Tuckwell, 2003, p. 3]. TaxMod-A also re-weights the Household
Economic Survey sample to allow for changing rates of unemployment and
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adjusts income data for inflation, with separate inflators for wage, self-
employed, and interest income.
Microsimulation models are powerful tools. However, as Brown and
Harding l2OO2, p. iii] argue, the "key to effective modelling is to recognise
what type of model is required for a given task and to build a model that will
meet the purposes for which it is intended. The results then have to be
interpreted within the boundaries and limitations of the model." In particular
when modelling the etfects of a policy change it is important to recognise the
limitations of estimates of outcomes based on survey data with relatively
small sample sizes. This modelling risk was illustrated in New Zealand in the
case of the Parental Tax Credit, where estimates of the cost of the Parental
Tax Credit prepared during its establishment differed significantly from the
programme's actual expenditure due to the small number of eligible families
contained in the Household Economic Survey data used to prepare these
estimates [Smith, 1999, p. 2]. Initial estimates used during the development
of the Parental Tax Credit were based on 1995-96 Household Economic
Survey data, which contained 66 families potentially eligible for the proposed
programme. This sample was scaled up to give an estimate of an eligible
population of 26,000. In contrast, later estimates based on 1997-98
Household Economic Survey data contained a sample of 51 potentially
eligible families, which was scaled up to give an estimate of an eligible
population of 20,000 families [Smith, 1999, p. 11.
Arithmetic and Behavioural Microsimulation Modelling
TaxMod-A is a non-behavioural (arithmetic) model so no allowance is made
for the possible etfects of tax changes on individuals' consumption or labour
supply [Creedy, 2001, p. 197]. This makes the model relatively
straightforward to build, maintain, and use and as no econometric estimation
is required the model retains the full heterogeneity of the basic survey data
used [Creedy, 2001, p. 197]. In order to estimate financial incentives for the
2003-04-income year TaxMod-A takes data on observed hours of work from
the most recent Household Economic Survey (2000-01) and applies this data
to the 2003-04 tax-benefit system. However, these hours of work are likely to
reflect the tax-benefit system that was in existence in the year of the survey.
86
There may thus be some expected variation between the observed hours of
work and the hours that actually correspond to the 2003-04 system.
A behavioural component has recently been developed for TaxMod-A.
In contrast to a non-behavioural model a behavioural model would estimate
financial incentives to supply labour using a two-step procedure. First,
changes in the hours of work between the survey year and the year of the
policy change would be estimated. Second, the effects of a policy initiative
would then be modelled using these new estimated hours.
Behavioural microsimulation models generally treat family formation,
marriage, births, retirement, and labour training and higher education
decisions as exogenous. Interdependence between commodities and leisure
consumptions is assumed. Labour supply in just one job is examined and it is
assumed the individual does not work additional hours at a different wage
rate. The wage rate is calculated by dividing total earnings by the total
number of reported hours of work [Creedy, 2001 , p. 198]. For individuals who
do not work an imputed wage is calculated based on estimated wage
functions [Creedy and Kalb, 2005, p. 8]. The net income corresponding to
any given number of hours worked by each individual is calculated in order to
produce precise budget constraints relating net income to hours worked for
each individual. Fixed or child-related costs can then be factored into the
model [Creedy, Duncan, et al, 2002, p. 70].The model then evaluates which
part of each individual's budget constraint is optimal [Creedy, 2001, p. 198],
Behavioural microsimulation models have a lower degree of population
heterogeneity than non-behavioural models because economic estimation of
the important relationships involves the use of a limited range of categories
[Creedy,2001, p. 198]. Further, due to constraints on the Household
Economic Survey data and TaxMod-A some tax-benefit reforms are less
likely to be accurately modelled than other reforms. The underestimation of
Accommodation Supplement coverage based on Household Economic
Survey data by TaxMod-A [Kalb, Cai, and Tuckwell, 2005, p. 4], for example,
means that reforms involving this programme are less likely to be accurately
modelled by TaxMod-B. In contrast, due to the large proportion of people
paying personal income taxes issues of sample size are less likely to impact
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on income tax data based on the Household Economic Survey and so the
modelling of income tax reforms is likely to be relatively accurate.
The Household Economic Survey
Parts of this study draw on data from the Household Economic Survey, which
was established to measure the Consumers' Price Index [Gordon, 1997;
Talbut, 20041. The Household Economic Survey was conducted annually
from 1983-4 to 1997-98. The Household Economic Survey is now conducted
every three years and the last survey available for this study was completed
in June 2000-01.
Household Economic Survey data is cross-sectional and not
longitudinal as the sample for the survey ditfers each year [Mowbray,2OO1,
p. 11l.The Household Economic Survey collects demographic, income, and
expenditure data from approximately 3,000 families over the course of a year
[albut, 2OO4l.' Four questionnaires are used in the survey.
. Information on family composition and social and demographic
characteristics of each family member are collected in the family
questionnaire [Gordon, 1997, p. 6]. Blood relationships between people
in each family are recorded.
. Information on housing expenditure, home maintenance, family
operations, transport, holidays, health, and education is collected in the
expenditure questionnaire [Gordon, 1997, p. 6]. Each family is asked to
record all items of expenditure over $200 that occurred in the previous
twelve months. Both the location and cost of accommodation are
recorded. Some expenditure items (particularly alcohol and tobacco
consumption) tend to be inaccurately reported (understated).
In the income questionnaire each person aged 15 or above is asked to
record income from various sources received over the previous 12
months [Gordon, 1997, p. 6]. These income sources include up to three
current jobs, six jobs that ended in the previous 12 months, social
' ln comparison the Household Labour Force Survey has a sample size of approximately
15,000 households.
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assistance payments, interest income, dividends, and income from
other sources.
. Each member of the family aged over 15 is asked to keep an
expenditure diary recording all expenditure for two weeks. These
expenditures are multiplied by 26 to provide annual expenditure figures
[Gordon, 1997, p. 6].
Although the Household Economic Survey collects a large amount of
data from each family the survey is designed to measure CPI accurately and
so the sample design does not always provide accurate results on social
assistance entitlement. For example, in comparison to administrative data
collected by the Ministry of Social Development the Household Economic
Survey data consistently contains relatively low numbers of ex-beneficiaries
[Kalb, Cai, and Tuckwell, 2005, p. 36]. Consequently both Statistics New
Zealand and Treasury use integrated weighting, which adjusts the statistical
output of the survey to population benchmarks, on the Household Economic
Survey data [Statistics New Zealand, 2001 , p. 4; Creedy and Tuckwell,
20031.
Survey and Administrative Data
Ditficulties arise when using family surveys designed for other purposes to
model tax-benefit systems. For example, information on incomes may be
missing, the time period over which incomes are measured may not be
appropriate, and surveys may contain non-representative numbers of some
types of family so grossing up factors may need to be applied [Creedy, 2001,
p. 1961. lt may not be possible to fully replicate realistic tax-benefit systems.
Features of tax-benefit systems unable to be fully replicated include the
administration of means test and the discretion in their application by case
managers [Greedy, 2001, pp. 196].
One approach to address the limitations of survey data is to draw on a
combination of both survey and administrative data sources. Survey data and
administrative data both have their areas of relative strength [Atkinson,
1989a]. Administrative data on programmes contain little information on the
large number of people who do not participate in programmes but who may
nevertheless be atfected by a policy change. Administrative data on
recipients of programmes may also be incomplete. For instance, the Inland
Revenue Department has demographic information for only approximately
two thirds of total Family Assistance recipients, as approximately a third of
Family Assistance recipients are social welfare beneficiaries who do not
provide information to the department [Nolan, 2003, p. 56]. For these people
the only information that the Inland Revenue Department holds is the amount
of Family Assistance and the monthly social welfare benefits they receive.
Based on data on beneficiaries who do file with the department, the Inland
Revenue Department are able to develop assumptions regarding the
demographics of non-filing beneficiaries and then estimate characteristics of
these beneficiaries.
Detailed information on people not contained in administrative data
sources can be generated with estimates based on a general survey of
families. These estimates ffi€ly, however, not provide infOrmation on
recipients as accurately as the administrative data on these programmes,
although at times administrative data is limited in the degree to which the
characteristics of individuals (e.9., extent of work effort, level of investment
income) are recorded.
In New Zealand there have recently been efforts to integrate different
data sources [Dixon, 2002, pp. 26-30; Splttal, 20O2, pp. 198-201]. The
combination of administrative and survey data can introduce a number of
other problems, however. Differences may arise between receipt recorded in
administrative data, receipt recorded in survey data, and entitlement
estimated with survey data. These differences can occur because while
some eligibility conditions for programmes may be relatively straightforward
to check, i.e., number of children, some conditions may involve complicated
calculations or a degree of discretion in their application, e.9., whether two
people are cohabitating [Atkinson, 1989a, p. 194].
4.6 Comparative Policy Analysis
Comparative public policy research can be undertaken for a number of
reasons. Research comparing public policies in different jurisdictions can
allow a deeper understanding of options and constraints though identifying
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positive lessons (what to do) and negative lessons (what not to do),
identifying political and cultural assumptions (reflected in, for example, the
scope of programmes, uses of policy instruments, distributions of the benefits
and costs of programmes, and emphasis given to sanctions versus
incentives), and enhancing policy predictions and verifying theories [Bennett,
1991 , pp. 33-37; Rose, 1991, p. 221. Comparative policy research can also
satisfy political motivations, by helping to put an issue on the agenda,
mollifying political pressure (by finding a ready-made solution), or legitimising
conclusions already reached (using, perhaps selectively, the persuasive
power of foreign evidence) [Bennett, 1991, pp. 33-37].
Comparative social policy research often compares countries' overall
inputs, such as the percentage of spending on social programmes as a
proportion of GDP, and outputs, such as the etfect of this spending on
income inequality [Battle, Mendelson, et al, 2001, pp. 3-4]. However, as
Battle, Mendelson, et al [2001, pp. 3-4] argue, these comparison tell us
relatively little about programmes' objectives and design. Ditferences
between social security systems also mean that it is necessary to be cautious
when categorising social security systems in different jurisdictions into broad
categories. The coverage of social security systems may vary with the
characteristics of individual workers. Alternative programmes to which
recipients may apply, such as local charities, may vary from country to
country and region to region [Atkinson and Micklewright, pp. 1693-1694].
This study compares the objectives and designs of family and
employment tax credits in five Anglo-American countries. These countries
are New Zealand, Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. These countries share a common language and similar cultures,
histories, economic structures, and political institutions. They have also all
undertaken reform to their family and employment tax credits. Some of these
reforms, particularly those to the Earned Income Tax Credit in the United
States and the Child Tax Credit and Working Tax Gredit in the United
Kingdom, have influenced reforms in the other countries. This policy
transference has led to a view that there is an emerging international
consensus regarding the roles and designs of family and employment tax
credits [Duncan, 2002} To assess whether this view is correct this study
considers the degree to which the five countries have adopted similar
objectives and designs in their family and employment tax credits.
In five Anglo-American countries the levels of the family and
employment tax credits provided vary according to wage rates, family types,
and family sizes. Thus although entitlement and abatement schedules are
often expressed in terms of gross income this study models the financial
assistance available to families at different hours of work with a fixed gross
wage rate reflecting the median wage rate for these family types. Assistance
is modelled against hours of work in order to separate low-wage families from
higher-wage families who have low hours of work and thus low incomes.
Modelling assistance against gross income could create a misleading picture
of the financial assistance provided to families. While particular programmes
may appear relatively heavily targeted by income when modelled against
gross income this may not be the case when levels of financial assistance
are modelled against hours of work for families with relatively common wage
rates.
Table 4.1: OECD Purchasing Power Parity Rates (2004)
PPP (NZ$)
1.00
0.94
0.82
0.43
0.68
Source: OECD,2005b
All figures in this study are in New Zealand dollars adjusted using
OECD purchasing power parity rates tor 2004 IOECD, 2OO5b]. These rates
are shown in table 4.1. Purchasing power parity rates illustrate the
ditferences in the costs of a comparable basket of goods and services in
different countries. Converting assistance into New Zealand dollars based on
purchasing power parity rates illustrates the purchasing power that a family
' ln this study the modelled wage rate of sole-parents (of NZ$10 per-hour) is slightly below
minimum wage in Australia and the United Kingdom in purchasing power parity terms. This
wage rate is slightly above minimum wage in Canada, New Zealand, and the United States.
Nolan ftorthcoming] contains a comparison of family and employment ta( credits in five
Anglo-American countries based on a sole-parent wage above minimum wage in all five
countries.
New Zealand
Australia
Canada
United Kingdom
United States
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would have if the different programmes were in operation in New Zealand.
Purchasing power parity rates are used, rather than modelling assistance
provided to a family at a particular point in the income distribution (such as a
proportion of average production worker income), as modelling assistance at
a point in the income distribution reflects both the distribution of wage rates
and of hours of work. In this study assistance is modelled over a range of
hours of work for a family type at a fixed wage rate. This approach is taken to
illustrate how the structures of assistance and financial incentives to work
vary with hours of work. Further, in order to draw lessons for New Zealand
from overseas jurisdictions the approach taken emphasises the nature of
assistance available to family types as if the overseas programmes were in
operation in New Zealand. ln the modelling throughout the study it is
assumed that wage rates, hours of work, and family structures do not vary
during the year.
4.7 Conclusion
This chapter discussed the methodology for tax-benefit programmes. The
chapter began by discussing the increasing demand for research to
contribute to the evidence base for policy in New Zealand. The chapter then
explained the method for calculating average tax rates and effective marginal
tax rates. Following this the chapter discussed how the effects of tax-benefit
reforms on individual families could be estimated and what characteristics
these families should be assumed to have. A modelfamily approach is taken
in this study and, given the focus in this study on assistance to families with
children and caregivers' labour supply, the cases of a sole-parent and a
secondary earner are considered.
Approaches for estimating the etfects of reform on the population as a
whole were then discussed. This section included discussion on arithmetic
and behavioural microsimulation modelling and the use of administrative and
survey data. Microsimulation modelling based on survey data can be used to
model hypothetical reforms and can include groups not contained in
administrative data sources. Non-behavioural modelling allows for greater
population heterogeneity than behavioural modelling. However, non-
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behavioural models may be inaccurate when estimating labour supply
behavioural responses and consequently the fiscal costs (and tax rates
required) and poverty reduction etfectiveness and targeting etficiency of tax-
benefit reforms.
Comparative policy analysis was discussed in section six. The focus of
the comparative component of this study is on the objectives and design of
family and employment tax credits in five Anglo-American countries. In these
countries the levels of family and employment tax credits provided vary
according to wage rates, family types, and family sizes. Thus this study
models the financial assistance available to families at different hours of work
with a fixed wage rate reflecting the median wage rate in New Zealand for the
family types.
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5 New Zealand's Tax-Benefit System
5.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the evolution and operation of New Zealand's tax-
benefit system. The material in this chapter 
- 
along with that in the following
two chapters 
- 
forms the basis for the evaluation of the tax-benefit system
and current and proposed tax-benefit reforms in parts three and four of this
study. The evolution of New Zealand's tax-benefit system is split into three
periods reflecting dominant policy objectives influencing the design of
policies. Prior to 1984 an emphasis in policy was placed upon a wage
earners'welfare state. Between 1984 and 1999 emphasis changed to give
greater weight to reducing the role of government intervention in the
economy and improving incentives for beneficiaries to work. Following the
election of Labour-led governments after 1999 greater emphasis has been
placed on povefi reduction and improving the financial incentives for labour
supply ('making work pay') more broadly among the population, including
secondary earners in families with children. Separating the 1984 to 1999
period from the period since 1999 does not imply a major break with the
policies from 1984 to 1999, but reflects the focus on evaluating tax-benefit
reforms since 1999 in the later parts of this study.
5.2 The Wage Earners' Welfare State
Social Assistance, Full Employment, and Wage Policies
The origins of New Zealand's social assistance system were in an economic
and social environment of low and generally short-term unemployment and
where couples with children and male breadwinners were the most common
fami[ type. Early social assistance programmes were developed alongside
policies that aimed to attain full employment and to ensure adequate market
incomes for breadwinners in families. The Pensions Act 1898 established
state funded flat-rate old-aged pensions that were income tested (selective)
and provided for a low-level of subsistence living (residual) [Castles, 1985, p.
161. Following the enactment of this legislation the coverage of the social
assistance system gradually expanded through including various additional
categories of people in need [Beaglehole, 1993, p. 1; Stephens and
Waldegrave, 2001, p. 771. Governments also engaged in public work
schemes and policies that aimed to protect and develop manufacturing in
etforts to achieve full employment. The Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration
Act 1894 established compulsory mediation of industrial disputes and the
setting of national wage awards and in 1908 the Court of Arbitration
introduced the concept of a living wage [Goodger, 1998, p. 126], which was a
basic wage rate for men set at a level deemed adequate for a breadwinner
with a non-working spouse and two children through the arbitration system
[Reeves, 1923, pp.85,216-242; Condliffe, 1959, pp. 118-119; Castles, 1985,
p. 151. Consequently the role of the social assistance system was generally
restricted to dealing with residual pockets of hardship due to temporary spells
of unemployment or incapacity [Stephens and Waldegrave, 2001 , pp.77-78].
When the number of unemployed rose dramatically in the 1930s large
public work schemes (work relief) were initiated. Due to the large number of
the unemployed and the meagre pay and irregularity and generally
purposeless nature of work relief there was a growing awareness that income
support needed to be more wide-ranging and flexible [McClure, 1998, pp. 50-
511. The Social Security Act 1938 extended the range of income tested
benefits to invalids, deserted wives, the sick, widows without children,
orphans, and the unemployed and introduced an emergency benefit for
people ineligible for main benefits. Yet principles that the state should provide
employment and that recipients of welfare have a duty to work remained
important.
Early social assistance programmes were based on beliefs that men
had dependents and women did not and that married women rarely worked
in paid employment [Beaglehole, 1993, p. 2]. lt was assumed that when
determining the need for public support a husband and a wife were a single
income sharing unit. Thus despite concerns for motherhood and providing for
children, when cash benefits were first introduced they were granted to male
breadwinners and their dependents [Beaglehole, 1993, p. 2]. Differing levels
of public support for the lifestyles of different groups of women also
influenced the timing and nature of their support; with widows receiving
assistance before deserted wives and deserted wives receiving assistance
before sole mothers [Beaglehole, 1993, p. ix]. These differences in the
treatment of these groups of women reflected the ditficulty of reconciling
desires to meet the needs of women and children whose private support had
broken down while also avoiding encouraging and affirming family dissolution
[McClure, 1998, p.67].
State-funded and income tested family allowances were first
established in New Zealand with the enactment of the Family Allowances Act
1926 [Campbell, 1927, p. 369]. These family allowances were limited to
large families on low incomes and were extended in scope (through the
creation of an income-tested Family Benefit) during the 1930s and 1940s.
Yet during World War Two the income testing of this assistance was seen as
a constraint on the expansion of production through discouraging increased
work etfort [McClure, 1998, pp. 97-98]. Further, following the release in
Britain of William Beveridge's 1942 report Social lnsurance and Allied
Seruices there was also a shift towards the provision of universal family
benefits internationally.l Thus in New Zealand the income tested Family
Benefit was replaced with a universal Family Benefit with the enactment of
the Social Security Amendment Act 1945.
Although a tax exemption for children had been introduced in 1914, at this time few wage
and salary earners paid income tax so this tax relief did not affect most households. With the
establishment of the universal Family Benefit the tax exemption for children was removed to
help fund this programme [McClure, 1998, p. 104, 39-401.
' ln his 1912 report, Srcial lnsurance and Allied Seruices, William Beveridge proposed that
Britain adopt a system of income transfers that would provide a minimum standard of living
from the cradle to the grave below which no one should be allowed to fall [McGlure, 1998,
pp.98-99, 1051.
The universal Family Benefit was paid to principal caregivers of children
and was not targeted by income. This programme was designed to
redistribute income to all families with children not only to alleviate poverty.
When established the Family Benefit was set at a generous level of 10
shillings per-week, which was equivalent to 8.8 percent of the male nominal
wage and 25 percent of the single Unemployment Benefit [Goodger, 1998, p.
1261. This level was considerably higher than the British Family Benefit of five
shillings, which was introduced in 1946 [Beaglehole, 1993, p.2]. However, as
the value of the Family Benefit was not indexed to inflation its real value
eroded over time. For instance, as the Royal Commission on Social Policy
[1988, p. 5] estimated, between 1979 and 1988 the real value of the benefit
felf to 35 percent of its 1979 value.
After 1951 supplementary assistance was provided in order to address
variations in needs that were unable to be addressed by the main forms of
social assistance or that could only be addressed by main forms assistance
at high fiscal costs to the government. Payments of supplementary
assistance were income tested and at times subject to administrative
discretion. Perceived problems with supplementary assistance included
stigma associated with the application process and a lack of information on
assistance, which discouraged its take-up [McClure, 1988, pp. 134, 140-141].
Nevertheless, this supplementary assistance was the precursor to a range of
supplements that would be added on to main benefits in following decades
[McClure, 1998, p. 1a0].
Because of the largely residual role of social assistance there was an
extensive use of income testing for the main forms of social assistance
except for pensions [Boston, 1999a, p. 8]. There were some exceptions to
this residual role of the social assistance system for the working aged. These
exceptions occurred where governments aimed to achieve objectives other
than solely reducing hardship. The provision of the universal Family Benefit
from 1945 to 1991 was, for example, not only influenced by concerns
regarding families' flnancial needs but was also influenced by concerns
regarding birth rates and desires to reinforce women's maternal roles in
society [Beaglehole, 1993, p. ix]. Overall, however, the origins of New
Zealand's social assistance system reflected an emphasis upon residual and
right-based principles as opposed to insurance or contributory principles
[Boston, 1999a, p. 8]. Residual principles emphasise self-reliance and
individual responsibility. Right-based principles base entitlement on people's
status as citizens. Insurance or contributory principles base entitlement on
previous financial contributions. New Zealand's system of income support
could thus be classified as a social assistance, as opposed to a social
insurance, regime [Atkinson and Micklewright, 1991 , pp. 1692-1693].
A Narrow Base and High Rate Tax System
This development of New Zealand's social assistance system was
underpinned by a progressive income tax system which, except for a period
between 1939 and 1960, levied personal income taxes on an individual
basis. Over the first half of the twentieth century the number of personal
income tax thresholds increased (from two in 1900 to 39 in 1940) but then fell
after the late 1960s. In 1967 there was a 33-tier personal income tax scale
with rates ranging from 15 to 60 percent and by 1978 this was a five-tier
scale with rates ranging from 20 to 60 percent, with the 60 percent rate
starting at three times average earnings [Stephens, 1993, p. 50; McLeod,
Chatterjee, et al, 2001a, p.il.By 1982 a five-tier personal income tax scale
had rates ranging from 20 to 66 percent, with the top rate starting at2.5 times
average earnings [Stephens, 1993, p.50].
There was a large reliance upon taxing employee income due to the
narrowness of the income tax base. By 1984, for example, a wide range of
family tax rebates (discussed in chapter six) and other tax rebates had been
established, exemptions were available for work-related expenses and for
contributions to life insurance and superannuation schemes, and fringe
benefits were outside the tax base. There were also a number of
An individual based income ta:( was first introduced with the Land and Income Tax 1891
[Chan, 1993, p. 61]. The Land and Tax Amendment Act 1939 introduced a system of tax
aggregation where income derived by a married woman was deemed to be income derived
by her husband and the husband was assessable and liable for income tax on the joint
income. Separate assessment was possible but did not atlect a couple's total liability as this
only meant that the tax payable under the aggregate method would be split between the
spouses. This was similar to the system in operation in England at that time. Joint taxation
was repealed with the Land and lncome Tax Amendment Act 1960 on the grounds that this
would improve the financial incentives to work facing both spouses and consequently
increase private savings [Chan, 1993, pp. 61-62].
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concessions for the self-employed and companies [McLeod, Chatterjee, et al,
2001b, pp.5, 101. In relation to the taxation of companies, the classical
system of company taxation taxed the income of companies at 45 percent
and then again in the hands of shareholders at their marginal tax rates upon
distribution [McLeod, Chatterjee, et al, 2001a, p. i]. Disparities between the
company tax rate and personal income tax rates (particularly the top personal
rate of 66 percent) led to incentives to change company organisational form
and retain earnings, created a bias to debt finance, and encouraged
takeovers of less highly geared companies [Stephens, 1993, p. 48]. Further,
the wholesales sales tax, with five rates ranging from 10 to 50 percent,
covered only 39 percent of the potential wholesales sales tax base (excluding
the service sector and value-added by retailers) and 23 percent of total
consumption. These gaps in the wholesale sales tax base were generally a
result of political lobbying or justified on income distributional grounds (e.9.,
lower rates on goods accounting for high proportions of low-income families'
consumption, such as food and clothing) rather than Ramsey taxation
principles (for taxing goods with relatively elastic demands at lower rates)
[Stephens, 1993, p. 48].
The Overload Debate
By the early 1980s New Zealand had experienced a growth of per-capita
income less than that being experienced overseas and a fall in relative living
standards [Hawke, 1985, p. 213; Mascarenhas, 1996, p.71]. Factors that
constrained economic growth in New Zealand included the collapse in the
price of cross-bred wool after the 1966-1967 season, the entry of Britain into
the European Economic Community in 1973, increases in oil prices by the
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries in 1973 and 1979, and
persistently high inflation and interest rates. The low etfectiveness of the tax
system at raising revenue and increasing fiscal cost of government
expenditure were reflected in government deficits. The narrow tax base was
failing to raise tax revenue sufficient to meet the governmenfs expenditure
' The effective rate for companies varied from -50 percent for forestry to 39 percent for
drugs, chemicals, and the retailtrade [Bevin, in Stephens, 1993, p.48].
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requirements as high tax rates and uneven tax rules contributed to poor rates
of economic growth and tax avoidance was commonplace [McLeod,
Chatterjee, et al, 2001b, p. 61. Government expenditure requirements
increased due to the lack of income testing for much social security
expenditure, including education, healthcare, and some forms of social
assistance (such as student allowances) by the early 1980s [Boston, 1999a,
p. 91. Government expenditure also increased due to government policies
such as Supplementary Minimum Prices for primary products, Think Big
industry development schemes, the universal National Superannuation, and
increasing take up of the income-tested Domestic Purposes Benefit and
Unemployment Benefit.
The numbers of recipients of the Domestic Purposes Benefit and
Unemployment Benefit had grown from 4,000 at the beginning of the 1970s
to over 100,000 in 1984 [McClure, 1998, p. 204). The take-up of the
Domestic Purposes Benefit, which grew gradually between 1968 and 1973
while the benefit remained discretionary and then more rapidly after 1973
when this benefit became non-discretionary, led to anxiety that it was
encouraging negative social changes, particularly a decline in the traditional
two-parent basic family unit, and a doubling of its annual cost between 1980
and 1984 [McOlure, 1988, pp. 179, 185]. Further, by 1981 the numbers of
registered unemployment had reached three percent of the labour force and
by 1983 it was over five percent [Boston, 1999a, p. 9]. This increase reflected
worldwide shifts in the structures of economies away from secondary sectors
(i.e., manufacturing) to tertiary sectors (i.e., services) and consequent
reduciions in blue-collar employment and a marked rise in unemployment in
most OECD countries during the 1970s and 1980s. As a consequence of this
increase in unemployment policymakers and academic researchers gave
greater attention to the etfect of social assistance on financial incentives to
supply labour [Atkinson and Micklewright, 1991, p. 1679].
Thus by the early 1980s the combination of declining economic growth,
high inflation and interest rates, increasing costs of state intervention, falling
confidence in the tax system, increasing financing costs for large fiscal
deficits, and increasing unemployment and take-up of main welfare benefits
led to an overload debate and a policy response centred around reducing
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public expenditure [Evans, Grimes, et al, 1996; Mascarenhas, 1996, p. 104;
Silverstone, Bollard, and Lattimore, 19961. These fiscal, economic, and social
pressures were matched by an ideological shift away from a rights-based
approach to a more targeted or residual social asslstance regime [Boston,
1999a, p.91.
5.3 Neo-Liberal Policy Settings
After the 1984 election of the fourth Labour government there was increased
emphasis on redesigning the social assistance system to constrain fiscal
costs, reduce scope for moral hazard, and encourage labour supply and
human capital acquisition [Stephens and Waldegrave, 2001]. The previous
National government had reduced the rate of the unemployment benefit by
making it taxable and increased the stand-down period for the Unemployed
Benefit from one to two weeks [McOlure, 1998, p. 2211. The Labour
government maintained this stringency. However, in response to poverty
among working families with children the Family Care wage supplement for
non-beneficiary families with children was introduced in 1984. Family Care
was subject to problems of take up and the exclusion of beneficiaries was
contentious. In 1986 the income-tested and in some cases work-tested
Family Assistance Tax Credits were established.
The Family Support Tax Credit was available to beneficiaries, although
the base adult benefit level was reduced to keep the total payment to
beneficiaries similar and to improve benefit replacement rates. Family
Support was provided at a higher rate than Family Care to also compensate
low-income families for the introduction of the Goods and Services Tax
[McOfure, 1998, pp. 216-217]. The Guaranteed Minimum Family Income
(GMFI) was introduced for working families with chiHren and who satisfied
hours-based work tests. In 1986 benefit abatement thresholds were
increased. Liberalisation of the economy and corporatisation and privatisation
of state owned enterprises lead to an increase in unemployment and the
numbers of people receiving the Unemployment Benefit continued to grow.
Growth also took place in take-up ol the Sickness Benefit, Invalids Benefit,
and Special Benefit and in 1990 proposals were made for a single core
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benefit. After the early 1980s there were changes in the overall tax mix and
the structure of the personal income tax system (discussed below).
After the November 1990 general election the newly elected Bolger
National government discovered that their fiscal position was worse than they
had anticipated due to large increases in the forecast deficit and the need for
funds to stop the collapse of the Bank of New Zealand [McClure, 1998, p.
234; McKinnon, 2003, p. 3471. Reflecting this fiscal position the National
government took the restructuring of the social assistance system further
than the previous Labour government through pursuing greater targeting of
expenditure, liberalisation of the labour market, and reductions in benefit
levels. These three policy settings are discussed below.
Greater Targeting of Expenditure
The government budget in July 1991 brought major changes to social
services and social security. There was greater emphasis on the user
charges for tertiary education and health services. Universal benefits were
removed. The aims were reduced fiscal costs, greater targeting efficiency,
and a more modest safety net, which would support people at a level
sufficient for needs when necessary [Shipley, 1991 , p. 13; McOlure, 1998, p.
2351. This shift in policy objectives reflected an increasing concern that
middle-class groups were large financial beneficiaries of (had captured) the
welfare state although they had relatively low needs [Stephens, 1997, p. 475;
Bertram, 1988].
In 1991 the universal Family Benefit was removed and all unabated
Family Support rates were increased by the value of the Family Benefit ($6
per-week). As Family Support was targeted on the basis of joint income, low-
income families retained their support, average-income families received
more limited help, and higher-income families became fully responsible for
their children's upbringing [McClure, 1998, p. 235]. Only 42 percent of the
fiscal savings from the removal of the Family Benefit went into Family
Support [Stephens, 1999, p. 2471. Combined expenditure on the Family
Benefit and Family Support of $695 million in 1990-91 fell to expenditure of
$618 million on Family Support in 1991-92. However, there was little public
protest at the removal of the Family Benefit. The lack of indexation had
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meant that the value of the programme had reduced to being a token amount
and the large number of recipients (approximately 900,000 children) meant
that the fiscal savings to the government in abolishing the programme were
significant [McOlure, 1998, pp.238-239]. Yet some critics argued that the
loss of even token membership of the system by middle-class families meant
that the community lost able advocates with a stake in the system [McOlure,
1998, pp.238-239]. Further the removal of the Family Benefit marked the
end of provision of social assistance on the basis of family structure
regardless of income and need. The removal of the Family Benefit also
meant the loss of an independent income for non-working caregivers in
families not eligible for targeted assistance [McOlure, 1998, pp. 238-239].
Liberalised Labour Markets
The Bolger National government coordinated reform of social security for
working-aged beneficiaries with labour market reform. The nature of
employment in New Zealand underwent dramatic change with the
corporatisation and privatisation of a number of state trading enterprises that
began under the fourth Labour government. Changes in the nature of
employment increased with the shift towards an industrial relations
framework emphasising increasing wage flexibility [Brosnan, Rea, and
Wilson, 1995, p. 171. The Employment Contracts Act 1991, which applied to
all employment contracts, broke the historical link between union
membership and negotiating authority. This Act overturned the century-old
labour arbitration and award system and formalised the growing deregulation
of the labour market. Trade union membership, which had already begun to
decline, fell significantly. The loss of legislative props, such as compulsory
unionism, led to a fall in trade union density of 69 percent in the first 18
months of the Act (May 1991 to December 1992) [Walsh and Brosnan, 1999,
pp. 125-1261. Parallel to these labour market changes were reductions in
benefit levels and tightening of benefit regulations in efforts to shift people
from benefits to paid employment [McOlure, 1998, p. 235].
Alongside these policy changes were trends in the labour market such
as increasing part-time and casual work, variations in weekly hours of work,
variations in wage rates, and participation rates of women [Callister, 2000,
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pp. 6-161. Between December 1985 and December 2001 the labour-force
grew by 20 percent to reach approximately two million [Statistics New
Zeafand, 2002a} The numbers of people classified as working part-time grew
by 62 percent and accounted for an increasing percentage of total
empfoyment (of 22.7 percent up from 16.6 percent). There was a decline in
employment rates of working-aged men, particularly low-skilled workers, and
an increase in women's employment rates and representation in managerial
and professional occupations. Between December 1985 and December 2001
the number of women in the labour force increased by almost one-third and
the number of men in the labour force increased by 5.4 percent [Statistics
New Zealand, 2002b, p. 14]. At the family level work became more polarised
with a growth in both work-rich families, including dual-earner couples, and
work-poor families, including couples where neither partner is in paid work
[Singley and Callister, 2003].
Reduced Benefit Levels and Greater Use of Supplementary Assistance
In 1991 stringent cuts in benefit levels were introduced for working-age
beneficiaries. These cuts were motivated by concerns regarding the rise in
the numbers of people receiving a main welfare benefit. After the early 1970s
the steady increase in receipt of the Domestic Purposes Benefit reflected the
increasing proportion of sole-parent families, increasing take-up rates of the
benefit, and declining employment of sole-parents between 1976 and 1991
[Stephens, 1999, pp.242-243]. After the late 1980s there was a marked rise
in the numbers of people receiving the Unemployment Benefit, which
reflected a low rate of economic growth and a significant increase in potential
labour supply, particularly with growth in the population aged 15-19
[Stephens, 1999, p.2421. The 1991 benefit cuts were also motivated by
Treasury concerns that benefit levels in New Zealand were relatively high by
international levels [Stephens, 1999, p.247]. To create greater incentives for
beneficiaries to move from benefits into the workforce all benefits that could
be regarded as short-term (e.9., not life-long) were reduced in value
[McCfure, 1 998, pp. 236-2371.
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Table 5.1: Net Main Benefit Rates Before and After 1991 Reforms
Category Before Reforms After Reforms Difference % Ditference
Unemployment
Single Adult
Married couple
Single (1 child)
Married couple
(1 child)
Sickness
Single adult
Married couple
Single (1 child)
Married couple
(1 child)
DPB and
Widows
Single adult
Single (1 child)
Married couple
(1 child)
lnvalids
Single adult
Married couple
Single (1 child)
Married couple
(1 child)
$14|.57
$223.22
$213.40
$255.08
$162.26
$27O.24
$213.14
$255.08
$162.26
$213.14
$228.87
$162.26
$270.44
$213.14
$25s.08
$129.81
$216.34
$185.93
$229.88
$135.22
$245.86
$185.93
$245.86
$13s.22
$185.93
$202.83
$162.26
$27O.M
$213.14
$270.44
-$13.76
-$6.88
-$27.47
-$25.20
-$27.04
-$24.38
-$27.21
-$9.22
-$27.04
-$27.21
-$26.04
$15.36
-9.s8
-3.08
-'t2.87
-9.88
-16.66
-9.02
-12.77
-3.61
-16.66
-12.77
-11.38
6.02
Source: Morrison and Waldegtave,2002, p. 88. New rates came into effect 1 April 1991
Table 5.1 shows the main net benefit rates before and after the 1991
reforms. The average cut to all benefits was approximately 10 percent. The
largest cuts faced young and single beneficiaries. Youth benefit rates were
extended from 18 to 24, representing a 25 percent cut for people these ages
[McOlure, 1998, p.237]. In contrast the maximum benefit of married couple
without children fell three percent [Morrison and Waldegrave, 2002, pp. 86-
871. Domestic Purposes Benefit and Widows Benefit recipients faced benefit
reductions between 11.38 and 16.66 percent. Invalids were recognised as
long-term beneficiaries who were unlikely to rejoin the workforce and their
rates were not reduced. Eligibility for main benefits was also more closely
scrutinised and restricted with increased use of work tests and longer stand-
down periods for some benefit categories [McOlure, 1998, pp.236-237).
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An immediate outcome of the benefit cuts was an increase in the
incidence and severity of poverty [Stephens, 1999, pp.238-249]. The benefit
cuts also led to an increase in the use of food banks and special needs
grants. ln the first quarter of 1990 the Salvation Army distributed 1,226 tood
parcels and by the first quarter of 1994 this had increased to 14,906
[Stephens, 1999, p. 251]. Further:
Supplementary benefits became the government's chief means of
adjusting benefit levels in cases of extreme hardship, a vital backstop to
a more focused benefit system. Supplementary benefits took the
principle of targeting those in need one stage further, and meant that the
Department [of Social Welfare] could treat people with a range of needs
according to their particular circumstances, giving extra help to those
short of clothing or paying high rent or medical bills; it also allowed the
government flexibility in raising or lowering levels without legislation. To
assist beneficiaries who faced severe hardship after the benefit cuts, the
gap between income and essential outgoings necessary for special
benefits (the most common of the supplementary benefits) was lowered
from $45 to $20 [McOlure, 1998, pp.237-238].
In the five months to May 1995 special needs grants increased by 75 percent
and food grants by 142 percent and food bank use fell by '12 percent.
However, following the large increase in expenditure on supplementary
assistance (in the year to June 1995 expenditure on food grants increased
from $3.4 million to $9.8 million) the criteria for special benefits and special
needs grants were tightened. Consequently grants decreased and food bank
use increased [Stephens, 1999, p. 251].
This increasing demand for supplementary assistance increased the
administration and compliance costs associated with the social assistance
system. These costs were reflected in cases of administrative decisions
being subject to review by the courts. In the case of Haidi Mai Ankers v
Attorney General (1994) the processing of claims for special benefits was
reviewed and in the case of Ruka v Department of Social Welfare (1997) the
application of the test to be used to determine whether recipients are in a
relationship in the nature of marriage was reviewed. However, as
supplementary assistance was not indexed for inflation but the main working
aged benefits were, over time the balance in the social assistance system
shifted back towards the main forms of assistance [Mackay, 1998, p. 16]. The
lack of indexation of supplementary assistance also meant that the povefi
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reduction effectiveness of these programmes fell [Waldegrave, Stephens,
and King, 2003, p.z0n.
In 1998 further reforms to working aged benefits were announced. In
this second stage of restructuring emphasis was placed upon complementing
financial incentives for labour supply with active case management, tighter
eligibility conditions, and work-for-the dole schemes [Stephens, 1999, p. 239;
Green, 2001, p.491.
The perception of why people were on a benefit also altered.
Traditionally, being on a benefit was viewed as a consequence of
adverse economic conditions or a rigid labour market. The new
perception was that individuals were on benefits as a result of their own
lack of motivation 
- 
a situation permitted by a benefit system that was
poorly designed, structured and enforced [Stephens, 1999, p. 239].
Efforts had also been made to improve the financial incentives to work with
the Tax Cuts and Social Policy Package (the Hand-Up Package), which was
phased in from 1996 to 1998. Central to this package were increases in the
generosity of the Family Support Tax Credit and Guaranteed Minimum
Family lncome (renamed the Family Tax Credit in 1999) and the introduction
of a work-based Independent Family Tax Credit (renamed the Child Tax
Credit in 1999).
Broad Based and Low Rate Tax Policy
The 1981 tax system was a narrow base and high rate tax system that was
also seen as being unfair and inetficient and unlikely to be able to continue to
meet governments' revenue needs [McLeod, Chatterjee, et al, 2001b, p. 5].
The 1981 tax system was heavily reliant upon revenue levied on individuals'
incomes. This reliance on taxing individuals' incomes fell over the next 25
years. The proportion of tax revenue received from taxing individuals'
incomes fell from two-thirds of total revenue in 1984 to around half in 2001.
The proportions of tax revenue received from taxing consumption and
companies increased. By 2001 a broad based consumption tax (the Goods
and Services Tax) generated 25 percent of total revenue [McLeod,
Chatterjee, et al, 2001b1. As well as changes in the overall tax mix the
structure of the personal income tax system also changed after the early
1980s. Between 1981 and 1999 the number of personal income tax
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thresholds including the Low Income Earner Rebate fell from five to three,
real income levels at which high marginal tax rates applied increased, and
the top personal income tax rate reduced from 60 to 33 percent [Stephens,
1993, p. 511. ln 1999 a new lop personal income tax rate of 39 percent was
introduced. The 1981 and 2001 personal income tax scales are illustrated in
table 5.2.
Table 5.2: Flattening of New Zealand's Personal Income Tax Scale (1981 to 2001)
1981 Personal lncome Tax Scale 2001 Personal Income Tax Scale
Taxable Income Taxable Income Statutory Rate Taxable Income Statutory Rate Statutory Rate
(1981 Dollars) (2001 Dollars) (2001 Dollars) lncluding Low
lncome Eamer
Rebate
$1 - $5,000
$5,001 -
$1 1,683
$1 1,684 -
$16,266
$16,267 -
$22,000
Over
$22,000
$1 - $11,600
$11,601 -
$27,000
$27,001 -
$37,600
$37,601 -
$50,900
Over $50,900
$1 - $9,500 19.5%
$9,501 - 19.5olo
$38,000
$38,001 - 33.0%
$60,000
Over $60,000 39.0%
14.5"/o
35.0%
48.0%
55.0olo
60.0olo
15.O"/o
21.0/o
33.0/"
39.0%
Source: Mcleod, Chatterjee, et al, 2001b, p. 9
This flattening of the personal income tax scale took place with (and
was financed by) a broadening of the tax base. The income tax base was
broadened through changes to taxation of fringe benefits and superannuation
and the introduction of resident withholding tax. Personal income taxes were
broadened through the removal or consolidation of complex systems of
personal income tax deductions and rebates for single-income families and
families with dependents.
In 1986 a range of tax rebates for single-income families and families
with dependents were replaced with the Family Assistance Tax Credits. The
Family Assistance programmes were established to compensate for the loss
of personal income tax deductions and rebates for single-income families and
families with dependents and the introduction of the Goods and Services
Tax. In 1991 the Family Benefit was removed. In the mid-1990s the work
focus of the Family Assistance programmes was strengthened with the
introduction of an lndependent Family Tax Credit, which provided $15 per-
week per-child to families who were independent from forms of main income-
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tested benefits. In 1999 the objectives of the Family Assistance programmes
were extended to also include providing a Parental Tax Credit, which
provides up to eight weeks of assistance for families independent from main
income-tested benefits with a newborn child.
5.4 Neo-Liberal Reform and Social Assistance
Expenditure
It has been argued that following the 1984 election of the fourth Labour
government there was an ideological shift favouring retrenchment of the
welfare state in New Zealand [Boston, 1999a, p. 9]. This retrenchment is
illustrated below with expenditure-based measures of the welfare state.
Internationally the use of expenditure-based measures of welfare state
retrenchment has been subject to debate. Esping-Andersen has argued that
expenditure is epiphenomenal to the theoretical substance of welfare states
[1990, p. 19]. lf, for example, there is an increase in the level of
unemployment in an economy then total expenditure on assistance to the
unemployed could increase while expenditure per unemployed person
decreases. Further, as well as changes in expenditure, welfare state
expansion or contraction also reflects changes to the level of public sector
employment, the extent of direct and non-profit service provision by the state,
and state support for the charitable sector [Clayton and Pontusson, 1998, p.
90]. Nevertheless, as Pierson has argued, an expenditure measure can
illustrate important features of welfare state retrenchment, such as the
stability of programmes due to political sensitivity and constituencies of
support for established welfare programmes [Pierson, 1996, pp. 174-1751.
Figure 5.1 shows total net social assistance expenditure and social
assistance expenditure by type from 1980-81 to 1999-2000 as proportions of
GDP. Figure 5.2 shows total net social assistance expenditure excluding
pensions by type from 1980-81 to 1999-2000 as proportions of GDP. In figure
5.2 pensions are included in the calculation of total expenditure but are not
shown in the graph. Figure 5.3 shows total social assistance net expenditure
by type from 1980-81 to 1999-2000. Again pensions are included in the
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calculation of total expenditure but are not shown in the graph. These figures
draw on net social assistance expenditure data provided by the Inland
Revenue Department and the Ministry of Social Development. Net
expenditure data for later years were not avaihbb for this study. These data
do not include the Low Income Earner Rebate or tax exemptions. The Low
Income Earner Rebate is a tax rebate paid on all wage and salary income
below the bottom statutory personal income tax threshold and can thus be
seen as a feature of the personal income tax scale and not a tax rebate. Tax
exemptions were distinct from the tax-benefit programmes considered in this
study as they were largely provided to support activities such as the
purchasing of life insurance.
Figure 5.1: Social Assistance Net Expenditure by Type 198G81 to 1999-2fi)0 (o/o of
GDP)
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Figure 5.2: Social Assistance Net Expenditure by Type (Excluding Pensions) 1980,'81 to
199$2000 f/o of GDP)
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Sources: lnland Revenue Department, 2001 , estimates of tax expenditures 1980-81 to 'l999-
2000; Ministry of Social Development, 200'l , Social Seruices Statistical Report, Table
14; Ministry of Social Development, 2002, estimates of net social assistance
expenditure 1997-98 to 2005-06; Nolan, 2002, p. 25
These expenditure figures illustrate the change in welfare state priorities
in New Zealand after 1984. Total net social assistance expenditure declined
from 11.3 percent of GDP in 1980-81 to 8.5 percent in 1999-200. This was
largely due to the fall in expenditure on pensions, which fell from 7.4 percent
of GDP in 1980-81 to 4.3 percent in 1999-2000, following the phased
increase in age of eligibility to 65. Pensions include New Zealand
Superannuation, War and Veterans Pensions, Widows Benefits, and
Transitional Retirement Benefits. After 1980-81 the proportions of
expenditure on income-tested Unemployment Benefits, Domestic Purposes
Benefits, and Invalids and Sickness Benefits all increased.
The proportion of expenditure on dependent children in families had
fallen over the early part of this period due to the declining real value and
1991 removal of the universal Family Benefit and the removal of family tax
rebates in the mid-1980s. Some forms of expenditure targeted towards
families with dependent children, such as the higher rates of main benefits
paid to such families, are not included in these figures. In 1986 the Family
Assistance Tax Credits were introduced. The introduction of and later
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extensions to Family Assistance meant that the proportion of expenditure on
dependent children in families partly recovered its old levels. There was,
nevertheless, a shift from universal towards income-tested support for
dependent children.
Figure 5.3: SocialAssistance Net Expenditure by Type (Excluding Pensions) 198$,81 to
199$'2000 (o/o of Social Assistance Expenditure)
Bcentot Social
Assbtanc€
Sp€ndiu
25"h
sSEgEEbEBSs6+Nob+,Adtdd6gEEEEEEEEEE
No
E
ESdrdEE
ssbF$E$EEEEH
+UnenplryrBnt +Doresdc Rlfposes +hvalidsand gclness +Faniv
Sources: Inland Revenue Department, 2001, estimates of tax expenditures 1980-81 to 1999-
2000; Ministry of Social Development, 2001 , Social Seruices Statistical Report, Table
14: Ministry of Social Developmenl, 2002, estimates of net social assistance
expenditure 1997-98 to 2005-06; Nolan, 2002, p.25
Overall in New Zealand from 1980-81 to 1999-2000 there was a shift
away from universal assistance for the old and for dependent children and
towards targeted assistance for people on low-incomes, particularly the
unemployed and sole-parents. The New Zealand social assistance system
had become more residual. However, rather than merely indicating a
retrenchment of the welfare state the changing allocation of social assistance
expenditure indicated attempts to respond to new and emerging welfare state
priorities, reflecting changes in pattems of family structures and the labour
market.
The New Zealand tax system also underwent significant change during
the 1980s and 1990s [Stephens, 1993, p. 45]. Yet social assistance
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expenditure in the form of family tax rebates (excluding the Low Income
Earner Rebate) through the income tax system remained relatively stable
during these decades. Figure 5.4 shows tax expenditures as a proportion ol
GDP from 1980-81 to 1999-2000. Figure 5.5 shows the proportion of social
assistance expenditure through the tax system from 1980-81 to 1999-2000.
While total expenditure through the tax system fell from 3.8 percent to 1.8
percent of GDP over this period, expenditure on family tax rebates (excluding
the Low Income Earner Rebate) accounted for a relatively stable proportion
of GDP, accounting for 0.9 percent of GDP in 1980-81 and 1.1 percent in
1999-2000. These rebates were largely provided to families as assistance to
offset the costs of dependent children. In 1980-81, 6.5 percent of total social
expenditure was provided through the tax system. In this year the
combination of expenditure on the Family Benefit and expenditure on family
tax rebates accounted for 16 percent of total social assistance expenditure.
Following 1992-93 expenditure through the tax system accounted for
increasing proportions of social assistance expenditure. By 1999-2000, 11.3
percent of total social assistance expenditure was provided through the tax
system. In this year the social expenditure through the tax system accounted
tor 22 percent of total social assistance expenditure excluding pensions.
Figure 5.4: Tax Expenditures 1980-81 to 199$20$ f/o of GDP)
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Figure 5.5: Proportion ol Social Assistance Expenditure through the Tax System 198G
81 to 199$20fi1
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2000; Ministry of Social Development,2001 , Sacial Services Statistical Report,Table
14; Ministry of Social Developmenl, 2002, estimates of net social assistance
expenditure 1997-98 to 2005-06; Nolan, 2002, p.25
5.5 Social Development and Making Work Pay
Since '1999 in New Zealand there has been a greater focus on improving the
financial incentives for labour supply facing low-wage caregivers (including
secondary earners) and not just recipients of main welfare benefits. This
emphasis on low-wage caregivers' labour supply has been part of a broader
strategy for reducing child poverty. This shift in emphasis has been termed a
social development strategy for social assistance [Clark and Maharey, 2001,
p. 51. Efforts to develop a social development strategy have taken place
within constraints such as the number of social welfare beneficiaries, limits to
the level of taxation, the etfect of programmes on incentives to work, and
social attitudes towards social security [Stephens and Waldegrave, 2001, pp.
78-791. Further, exclusion of families receiving main welfare benefits from
some social assistance has been contentious and is currently being
challenged as discriminatory and breaching the Human Rights Act 1993 [St
John and Craig,2004, p. 541.
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Social Assistance Expenditure by Benefit Type
The total numbers of people in receipt of a main benefit have fallen since
1999. The numbers of people receiving the Unemployment Benefit have
declined. There were on average 167,200 recipients on the Unemployment
Benefit in 1999. ln 2004 this had fallen to 89,600, reflecting strong economic
and employment growth [Cullen, 2004, p. 1195]. The numbers of people
receiving the Domestic Purposes Benefit has remained steady. In 1999 the
number of recipients of the Domestic Purposes Benefit averaged 1 10,900.
This fell to 108,800 in 2002 and increased to 111,200 in 2004 [Cullen, 2004,
p. 11951. There has been an increase in people receiving the lnvalids Benefit
and other disability-related benefits. The numbers of Invalids Benefit
recipients have been estimated to have increased from 53,200 in 1999 to
74,500 in 2004 and Sickness Benefit recipients from 32,700 to 45,300
[Cullen, 2004, p. 1195]. Recipients of the supplementary Disability Allowance
have been estimated to have increased from 181 ,700 in 1999 to 241,900 in
2OO4 [Gullen, 2004, p. 1194].
The New Zealand Government was estimated to collect approximately
$48.26 billion in tax revenue in 2004-05. This revenue represented
approximately 33.4 percent of GDP [Cullen, 2004]. The New Zealand
Government was estimated to have total expenses of approximately $44.5
billion. Expenditure on New Zealand Superannuation, Domestic Purposes
Benefits, Unemployment Benefits, and other benefits was estimated to
account for 36 percent of this total. These estimates included the personal
income taxes levied on benefits and departmental expenses. Other areas of
key expenditure included health expenditure of 20 percent of total
expenditure and education expenditure of 18 percent of total expenditure.
Table 5.3 shows the major areas of expenditure in the New Zealand
social assistance system for 2004-05. These figures are gross of personal
income taxes and are for the year ended 30 June. Total social assistance
expenditure was estimated at $13,599 million for this year. This expenditure
included $6,176 million on New Zealand Superannuation and the Widows
Benefit and other pensions. Expenditure on pensions was the largest single
area of expenditure in the social assistance system and a key determinant of
total social assistance expenditure. Current p@ections are for significant
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increases in the costs of pensions due to the impact of demographic changes
after 2011 [Creedy and Scobie, 2002].
Table 5.3: Social Assistance Expenditures by Benefit Type (2004-05)
Benefit Type Estimated
Expenditure ($m1n Vo)Proportion of GDP
Main Benefits
New Zealand Superannuation
(lncluding Widows Benefits)
Domestic Purposes Benefit
Unemployment Benefit
Invalids Benefit
Sickness Benelit
6,176
1,577
939
1,0M
514
4.28
1.09
0.65
0.72
0.36
Supplementary Assistance
Family Support Tax Credit
Accommodation Supplement
lncome Related Rents
Disability Allowance
Special Benefit
Childcare Assistance and
OSCAR Programmes
Paid ParentalLeave
Special Needs Grants
Child Tax Credit
ParentalTax Credit
Family Tax Credit
Other*
918
754
366
274
164
85
74
54
150
15
14
481
0.64
0.52
0.25
0.19
0.11
0.06
0.05
0.04
0.10
0.01
0.01
0.33
TotalWelfare Benefits
TotalWelfare Benefits
(Excluding NZS)
fI Year ended 30June
* Student Allowances, Benetits Paid in Australia, Orphans Benefits, Handicapped Child
Allowances, Training Incentive Allowances, lndependent Youth Benef its
Sources: Vote: Housing, Vote: Revenue, and Vote: Social Developmenl, The Estimates ot
Approp ri ation s 2004- 05, Treas u ry, Wel lin giton
By excluding expenditure on New Zealand Superannuation and the
Widows Benefit and other pensions the expenditure on the working aged can
be estimated at $7,423 million. This expenditure on the working aged
included expenditure of $1,577 million on the Domestic Purposes Benefit,
$939 million on the Unemployment Benefit, $1,045 million on the Invalids
13,599
7,423
9.41
5.14
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Benefit and $514 million on the Sickness Benefit, and $1,120 million on the
Accommodation Supplement and Income Related Rentals. Expenditure on
the Family Support Tax Credit was $918 million, the Child Tax Credit $150
million, the Parental Tax Credit $15 million, and the Family Tax Credit $14
million.
Working-aged benefits differ in the emphasis they place upon
addressing short-term fluctuations in need, such as temporary loss of
employment and support for childrearing, as opposed to longer-term
incapacity to work, due to invalidity or sickness. The Domestic Purposes
Benefit and the Unemployment Benefit are the largest areas of expenditure
on income-tested assistance to working-aged and work-capable people.
There have been concerns at the rates at which, in response to increases in
the work requirements associated with the Unemployment Benefit and
Domestic Purposes Benefit, recipients have switched to the Invalids Benefit
and Sickness Benefit in order to remain eligible for assistance. The Invalids
Benefit and Sickness Benefit account for significant levels of expenditure.
Significant levels of expenditure are also made through the Family
Assistance Tax Credits. The Family Support Tax Credit is the largest single
area of social assistance expenditure provided through the tax system. The
Family Support Tax Credit is provided to all low-income families with
dependent children irrespective of work status. The Child Tax Credit, Family
Tax Credit, and Parental Tax Credit are only provided to low-income working
families with dependent children. Only a small proportion of social assistance
expenditure is provided through the tax system for these low-income working
families. Estimated expenditure on all the Family Assistance programmes of
$1,097 million for 2004-05 was approximately 14.8 percent of total welfare
spending on the working aged. Further, the expenditure on the Child Tax
Gredit, Family Tax Credit, and Parental Tax Credit accounted for 16.3
percent of the total Family Assistance expenditure. Little more than 2.4
percent of total welfare spending on the working aged was assistance
provided through the tax system that was only available for families with
children in work.
At an estimated total of $1,120 million the two major forms of
accommodation assistance, the Accommodation Supplement and Income
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Related Rentals, accounted for a proportion of total social assistance
expenditure similar to that of the Family Assistance programmes. The
Accommodation Supplement remains the main instrument for delivering
housing assistance. For both the Accommodation Supplement and Income
Related Rentals the majority of assistance goes to recipients of main social
welfare benefits lRoper and Greenland,2002, pp. 47,55-56].
Working for Families
On 27 May 2004 the Minister of Social Development, the Hon. Steve
Maharey, announced a number of tax-benefit reforms (collectively know as
Working for Families) targeting low-wage families with children. These
reforms include increases in the rates of the Family Assistance programmes,
removal of abatement of the Family Assistance programmes below $27,500,
the introduction of an hours-based eligibility threshold for the Child Tax Credit
(which will also be renamed the In-Work Payment), removal of the child
component of main benefits (so that partnered people with children, for
example, will receive the same Unemployment Benefit rate as partnered
people without children), increases in the Accommodation Supplement,
reductions in the abatement of the Accommodation Supplement and the
introduction of a new Accommodation Supplement region, and increases in
childcare subsidies. (These reforms are described in greater detail in chapter
10.) The government has also announced an intention to introduce single
core benefit reforms. Under such a system recipients would receive
supplementary assistance on the basis of their need rather than benefit
category. Few details are currently available on the single core benefit
proposal. This proposal has been signalled for implementation after 1 April
2007.
5.6 Conclusion
This chapter considered the evolution of New Zealand's tax-benefit system.
The evolution of New Zealand's tax-benefit system was split into three
periods, reflecting dominant policy objectives present in the design of
policies. Before 1984 an emphasis in policy was placed upon a wage
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earners' welfare state. The shift in policy after 1984 reflected declining
economic groMh, increasing unemployment and take up of main welfare
benefits, falling confidence in the tax system, increasing financing costs for
large fiscal deficits, and an ideological shift towards a more residual and
targeted social security regime.
Between 1984 and 1999 emphasis changed to reflect a desire for a
reduced role of government intervention and improving incentives for
beneficiaries to work. Greater emphasis was given to expenditure on
targeted assistance for working-aged people. Following reductions in main
benefits in 1991 there was a shift in the structure of the system towards
supplementary assistance. Indexation of main benefits and not
supplementary assistance meant that this shift was not permanent. There
were changes in the tax-mix (away from income and towards consumption
taxes) and the flattening of the personal income tax scale. However, social
assistance expenditure through the tax system has played an increasingly
important role in the social assistance system.
Following the election of Labour-led governments since 1999 greater
emphasis has been placed on reducing poveny and 'making work pay' more
broadly among the population, including secondary earners in families with
children. This shift in policy reflected a greater political consensus for
alleviating child povefi and improved rates of economic growth. Following
the Working for Families reforms and the single core benefit reforms, which
are proposed for implementation in 2007, there will be a shift in the structure
of the social assistance system towards supplementary assistance. This shift
will increase the proportions of social assistance expenditure for which the
Family Assistance programmes account, which in 2004-05 had a combined
total greater than expenditure on the Unemployment Benefit.
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6 New Zealand's Family Assistance
Tax Credits
6.1 Introduction
The previous chapter discussed the evolution of New Zealand's tax-benefit
system. A feature of this evolution was the increasing proportion of total
social assistance expenditure provided through the tax system over the last
two decades. This chapter discusses the evolution and operation of the major
forms of social assistance expenditure through the tax system, which are the
Fami[ Assistance Tax Credits. tn comparison to other tax-benefit
instruments in New Zealand little previous research has been undertaken on
these programmes. Section two of this chapter discusses the evolution of the
Family Assistance programmes and considers the designs and objectives of
the Family Assistance programmes and their antecedents. This is then
followed by a discussion on the changing levels of aggregate expenditure on
Family Assistance. Section three of the chapter then considers the
administration of these programmes. This section includes discussions on
calculating entitlement, under-payments and over-payments, and rates of
take-up of support. The material in this chapter 
- 
along with that in chapters
five and seven 
- 
forms the basis for the evaluation of the tax-benefit system
and current and proposed tax-benefit reforms in parts three and four of this
study.
New Zealand has a small number of other tax expenditures, including the Housekeeper
Rebate and the Transitional Tax Allowance. These programmes account for low levels of
government expenditure and are not discussed in this study.
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6.2 Evolution of the Family Assistance
Programmes
Antecedents to the Family Assistance Programmes
A system of family allowances was first introduced in New Zealand in 1926
[Campbell, 1927, p. 369]. During the 1930s and 1940s these family
allowances were extended in scope. In 1946 the universal Family Benefit
was established. This programme was designed to redistribute income to all
families with children, not only to alleviate povefi [Royal Commission on
Social Policy, 1988, pp. 5-61. The level of the benefit was not indexed for
inflation and so the real value of the benefit was vulnerable to erosion. The
Royal Commission on Social Policy [1988, p. 5] estimated that by 1988 the
real value of the benefit was 35 percent of its 1979 value. The operation of
the benefit is described in table 6.1. The Family Benefit was paid to principal
caregivers.
As well as the Family Benefit a number of small tax rebates that aimed
to assist low-income breadwinners with the costs of maintaining a family
preceded the introduction of the Family Assistance Tax Credits [Koopman-
Boyden and Scott, 1984, pp.63-65,144-1451. Table 6.1 describes the tax
rebates that were in operation during the ten years prior to the introduction of
Family Assistance. Until 1984 these rebates were limited to working families,
paid to principal income earners, and did not vary according to the number of
children in the family. These rebates sought to compensate breadwinners
both for the cost of children and for the withdrawal of the secondary earner
from the labour market. Rebates abated against a mixture of the primary
earner's income, secondary earnefs income, and joint caregivers' income.
Families with children but who received social welfare benefits, and thus
were not eligible for these rebates, could receive supplementary assistance
in the form of a Family Maintenance Allowance.
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Table 6.1: Antecedents to the Family Assistance Programmes
The Family Benefit
The Young Family
Rebate
The Spouse Rebate
The Single-lncome
Family Rebate
The Low-lncome
Family Rebate
The Family Rebate
The Principal-lncome
Earner Rebate
Family Care
Established in 1946. Paid to principalcaregivers. The benefit was
universal (not targeted by income). ln 1976 the value of the
payment was $3 per-week ($156 per-annum) per-child. The value
increased to $6 per-week ($gte per-annum) in 1979 and remained
at this level until 1991, when the benefit was merged with Family
Support. Between 1976 and 1989 eligibility was automatic for
children sixteen years or under. The benefit could also be received
for older children undertaking schooling. Between 1 January 1989
and 'l April 1991 the automatic qualifying age was lowered to
fitteen.
Established in 1976. Paid to principal income earners of low-
income families with a child under five. In 1976 the manimum
value was $6 per-week ($312 per-annum). The value was
increased to $9 per-week ($+09 per-annum) in 1977. Abated
against the principal income earner's income in excess of $13,710.
The level of the rebate did not vary with the number of children.
Established in 1976 (replacing the Dependent Spouse Tax
Exemption). Paid to principal income earners. The maximum value
was $3 per-week ($156 per-annum). Abatement began once
secondary earners' incomes reached $10 per-week ($520 per-
annum). The levelof the rebate did not vary with the number of
children.
Established in 1977. Paid to income earners of low-income and
single-income families with a child under ten. Extended to
qualifying families with a child under twelve in 1978. The value of
the payment was $4 per-week ($208 per-annum). The level of the
rebate did not vary with the number of children.
Established in 1981 (replacing the Single-lncome Family Rebate).
Paid to principal income earners and sole-parents. The rebate
abated against total joint income. Abatement began once joint
income reached $9,800. The levelof the rebate did not vary with
the number of children.
Established in 1983 (replacing the Spouse Bebate, the Young
Family Rebate, and the Low-lncome Family Rebate). Paid to
principal income earners of working families with a dependent
child. The maximum value was $27 per-week ($1,+O+ per-annum).
Abatement began when joint income reached $9,800. The level of
the rebate did not vary with the number of children.
Established in 1983. Paid to principal income earners of families
without children and families with children (if the level of this rebate
exceeded the value of the Family Rebate). Families could not
receive both the Principal Income Earner Rebate and the Family
Rebate. Abatement began when the individualassessable income
of the principal earner reached $6,118.
Established in 1984. Paid to principalcaregivers of working
families. The ma,rimum value was $10 per-week ($520 per-
annum) per-child. Eligible parents had to work a totalol30 hours
per-week. Abatement began once joint income exceeded $20,470.
Source: Koopman-Boyden and Scott, 1984; Nolan,20Oz
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Following increasing concern with poverty among families with children
the Family Care programme was established in 1984. As with the Family
Benefit, assistance was provided to caregivers to emphasise that this was
assistance to compensate for the costs of children, rather than a contribution
to the general family budget, and to provide an independent source of
income for primary caregivers. The greater costs facing larger families were
recognised through providing assistance for every child in the family,
although there was no differentiation between older and younger children or
between the first and additional children. This programme was subject to
problems of take up and the exclusion of beneficiary families was
contentious. As well as not receiving a main income-tested benefit families
were required to work a total of 30 hours per-week to be eligible for the
programme [McClure, 1 998, pp. 21 6-214.
The Family Assistance Programmes
ln 1986 a wide range of tax rebates for families with dependents were
replaced with the Family Assistance Tax Credits. The changing levels of
assistance, abatement regimes, and eligibility criteria for each of the Family
Assistance programmes are discussed below. These refundable tax rebates
can be paid either at the end of the income tax year or in fortnightly
instalments during the year. In some years policy changes to annual figures
came into effect during the income tax year. Figures on the levels of
assistance and abatement regimes are provided as annual amounts for the
income tax year (1 April to 31 March) as this is the period over which
entitlement is calculated. Where policy changes came into effect during the
income tax year composite rates (composites of the proportion of the year at
the old rate and the proportion at the new rate) are provided. (Levels of
assistance and abatement regimes at the dates of policy change can be
found in Nolan 12002, pp.35-361).
In the tables below figures on the levels of assistance and abatement
regimes are provided below in both nominal and inflation adjusted (real)
levels. The inflation adjusted figures have been calculated using the Statistics
New Zealand GPI index with April 2004 as the base. As this index is
influenced by changes to consumption taxes (such as those following the tax-
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mix switch in New Zealand in the 1980s) it has been argued that it is
inappropriate for deflating gross incomes, which should be deflated using the
CPI index excluding GST [O'Dea, 2000]. However, as the Family Assistance
programmes are added to net income the CPI index is appropriate to use for
deflating these levels of assistance. Further, although the Family Abatement
thresholds are expressed in gross incomes these thresholds have been
deflated with the CPI index to ensure consistency in the index used for both
the levels of assistance and thresholds for abatement.
Assistance is paid to the principal caregiver rather than the primary
income earner. A principal caregiver is a person deemed to have
responsibility for the day-to-day care of a dependent child other than on a
temporary basis. A dependent child is someone who is 15 years or younger,
16 or 17 and not working full-time (more than 30 hours per-week) or receiving
a main welfare benefit, student allowance, or other government assistance,
or 18 years of age and still at secondary school or a tertiary institution. The
principal caregiver does not have to be the child's parent lncome Tax Act
2000 s OB1l. In a shared custody arrangement there can be more than one
principal caregiver. For instance, both parents of a dependent child can
qualify as a principal caregiver if they are living apart, they are both qualitying
persons, and they care for the dependent child for at least one third of the
time throughout the year (or eligible period) flncome Tax Act 2000 s KD2AAI.
For Family Assistance purposes the concept of care is based on having
responsibility for the child. To be a qualifying person a person has to be aged
16 years or over, a principal caregiver of a dependent child, and satisfy
residency requirements. The residency requirements can be met in two
ways. Firstly, a person can satisfy these requirements if he or she has been
in New Zealand continuously for at least 12 months at any time, is a tax
resident, and is present in New Zealand when he or she applies for a
Where there is a dispute between separated caregivers, such as over the length of time for
which a person is the principal caregiver, the Inland Bevenue Department bases the
payment to the caregivers on the allocation of responsibility under a custody order or the
previous allocation of the payment to the caregivers. lt is the responsibility of the caregiver
who contests this split of the payment to provide additional factual information to the lnland
Revenue Department that demonstrates that the previous allocation no longer applies.
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payment. A person can also satisty these residency requirements by caring
for a dependent child who is both a tax resident and present in New Zealand.
Family Support
Fami$ Support replaced Family Care, the Family Rebate, the Principal
Income Earner Rebate, and the Family Maintenance Allowance on 1 October
1986, Family Support is a refundable tax rebate available to low-income and
middle-income families irrespective of their work status. The level of the
unabated entitlement is based on the number and ages of children in the
family. Table 6.2 describes changes in the level of the unabated entitlement
and the abatement regime of Family Support. For partnered families this
programme abates against joint income of the caregivers. This income is
adjusted for the proportion of the income tax year that the family is eligible for
the programme (the eligible period). For sole-parent families Family Support
abates against the income of the caregiver adjusted for the eligible period.
What is counted as income for the purposes of calculating Family Support
entitlement and abatement ditfers from the definitions of income used to
calculate social welfare benefit entitlement and abatement and income tax
liability.
Since establishment Family Support has provided greater assistance for
the eldest child in a family than for additional children. This structure reflects
an assumption that due to economies of scale each additional child in the
family incurs a lower marginal financial cost to the family. Since 1 April 1989
Family Support entitlement has also reflected the ages of children in the
family, with entitlement for older children being greater than that for younger
children. This structure reflects an assumption that families' costs increase
with the age of children. Since 1986 the degree to which assistance varies
with the ages of children has increased. Where a child's age group changes
during the income tax year the annual Family Assistance entitlement is a
weighted average reflecting the proportions of the eligible period the child is
at the younger and older ages.
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Table 6.2: Family Support Unabated Entitlement and Abatement Regime
Unabated Entitlement
Age of Annual Annual AnnualChild Entitlement Entitlement Entitlement Entitlement
Eldest Child Additional Eldest Child Additional(Nominal) Children (Real 
- 
ChiHren(Nominal) APril2004 (Real-Base) April2004
Baso)
0 -'r8 s1,872.00
0 - 18 $1 ,872.00
0 - 18 $1,872.00
0 - 15 $1 ,872.00
16 - 't8 $1,872.00
0 - 15 $1 ,872.00
1 6 - 18 $1 ,872.00
0 - 15 $2,184.00
16 - 18 $2,184.00
o- 12 $2,184.00
13 - 'r8 $2,184.00
$2,184.00
0 - 12 $2,184.00
r3 - 'r8 $2,184.00
$2,184.00
0 - 12 $2,184.00
13 - 18 $2,184.00
'r $2,184.00
o- 12 $2,281.50'
13 - 18 $2,281.50'
0 - 12 $2,411.50
t3- 15 $2,411.50
16 - 18 $2,580.50
o - 12 $2,444.00
'r3 
- 15 $2,444.00
16 - 18 $3,120.00
$3,475.43 $1,s44.63
$2,921.9s $1,298.65
$2,747.58 $1,21.15
$832.00
$1,872.00
$832.00
$1,872.00
$1,144.00
$2,184.00
$1,196.00'
$1,482.@'
$2,184.00
$1,326.00'
$1,820.00
$2,184.0O
$1,,104.00
s1,820.00
$2,184.00
sl,so'l.s0'
$1,917.50-
$1,63'1.s0
$2,047.50
$2,307.50
$1,664.00
$2,080.00
$3,120.00
$2,630.88
$2,630.88
$2,444.s0
$2,444.50
92,773.80
$2,7/3.80
$2,711.55
$2,711.55
s2,711.5s
$2,682.21
$2,682.21
V,6p,2.21
$2,564.69
$2,s64.69
$2,s64.69
$2,626,66
$2,626.66
$2,7t4.9S
92,744.99
s2,937.97
$2,7375.14
$2,737s.14
$3,494.13
$1,169.28
$2,630.88
$1,086.44
$2,444.50
$1,833.96
$2,773.80
$1,484.89
$1,839.92
$2,711.55
$1,628.49
$2,235.18
$2,682.21
$1,648.73
$2,137.24
$2,564.69
$1,728.66
$2,207.50
$1,857.s1
s2,331.14
$2,6ni5
$1,841.14
$2,3N.42
s,494.13
Income
Tax Year
(1 Aprilto
31 March)
1 986-87rr
1987-88
1988-89
1989-90
1990-91
1991-92
1993-94
199/t-95
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
19S&99
Abatement Regime
Abatement Abatem€nt
Threshold Threshold(Nominal) (Real-
April 2004
Base)
Marginal
Abatement
Rate
$14,000.00
$'15,000.00
$15,000.00
$16,000.00
$27,000.00
$16,750.00
$27,000.00
$17,500.00
$27,000.00
$17,500.00
$27,000.00
$17,500.00
$27,000.00
$18,125.00'
$27,000.00
$20,000.00
$27,000.00
$20,000.00
$27,000.00
$20,000.00
$27,000.00
$20,000.00
$27,000.00
s25,991.44 1870
$23,413.09 18o/"
$22,015.90 9o/o
$23,483.63 180/"
$39,628.63 30o/o
$23,540.4 1870
$37,9,L5.4| 30o/"
$72,851.90 18"/o
$35,257.21 300/e
$2.225.99 180/"
$31,291.53 300/"
$21,727.12 18Yo
$33,521.85 307"
$22,259.68 180/"
$33,159.24 30%
$23,€6.15 ',|80/o
$31,706.30 300/"
$23,025.71 18"/"
$31,084.71 30%
$2,770.55 180/o
$30,740.25 30o/o
$22,398.25 180/o
s30,237.63 g0"h
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Table 6.2: Family Support Unabated Entitlement and Abatement Regime (Year lo 31 March)
Age of Annual Annual Annual AnnualChild Entitlement Entitlem€nt Entitlement Entitlement
Eldest Child Additional Eldest Child Additional(Nominal) Children (Real 
- 
Children(Nominal) April 2004 (Real-Base) April 2004
Base)
0 - 12 $2,444.00
13 - 15 $2,444.00
16- 18 $3,120.00
o - 12 $3,744.00
13 - 15 $3,744.00
16 - 18 $4,420.00
0 - 12 $3,744.00
13 - 15 $3,744.00
16. 18 $4,420.00
0 - 12 $3,744.00
13 - 15 $3,744.00
16 - 18 $4,420.00
o - 12 $4,264.00
13 - 15 s4,264.00
16 - 18 $4,940.00
$1,664.00
$2,080.00
$3,120.00
$2,444.@
$2,860.00
$3,S00.00
$2,M.00
$2,860.00
$3,900.00
$2,444.@
$2,860.00
$3,900.00
$2,9e1.00
$3,380.00
$4,420.00
$2,4.14.00
$2,44'1.00
$3,120.00
$3,640.36
$,8rc.36
$4,188.94
$3,548.28
$3,548.28
$4,188.94
$3,ffi.28
$3,s8.28
$4,188.94
$3,944.64
$,3,944.64
$4.s70.01
$1,664.00
$2,080.00
$3,120.00
$2,376.3s
$2,710.49
$3,696.12
$2,316.24
$2,7'10.49
$3,696.12
$2,316.24
$2,710.49
$3,696.12
$2,742.00
$3,126.85
$4,088.95
Income
Tax Year
(1 Aprilto
31 March)
2006-07"'
$20,356.00 S20,356.00 18%
$27,481.00 s27,481.00 30%
$20,356.00 $19,792.51 18"/o
s27,4{t1.00 $26,720,28 300/"
$27,500.00 $26,062.39 30%
s35,000.00 $33,170.31 200/"
$27,500.00 $25,2140.33 3Oa/o
or or or
$35,000.00 $32,378.60 zo%*'
atr ttt
rT Only applied for the six months of the 1986-87 income tax year for which Family
Support was in place
* Composite annual rate based on the proportions of the income tax year for which the
old and the new rates applied
*t Provision for those bom on or before 30 Septembet 1977 (aged sixteen at the time
of the change in policy)tt* Labour Party election proposal(not enacted at completion of study)
Sources: Income Tax Acts (various years), Statistics New Zealand CPI Index (April 2004
base)
In the United Kingdom research has shown that while parents' average
spending increases with the age of children this increase was less than that
assumed in the age-related scales in benefits and allowances. This research
estimated that, for instance, spending on eleven year olds was 86 percent of
spending on 16 year olds lMiddleton, Ashworth, and Braithwaite, 1997].
Australian research, in contrast, has shown that that the estimated average
cost of a child increases with age and with gross joint income. The precise
estimates differ according to the methodology employed (e.9., expenditure
Abatement Regime
Abat€msnt Abatement
Threshold Threshold(Nominal) (Real-
April 2004
Base)
Marginal
Abatement
Rate
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surveys or basket-of-goods approaches) [Saunders, 1999, p. 2].There is a
lack of equivalent research on families' spending on children by age of child
in New Zealand. However, spending on younger children is often less
discretionary than spending on older children and families with younger
children often face particular costs that do not have as great an impact on
families with older children (such as funding the withdrawal of a caregiver
from the labour market (in New Zealand caregivers tend to re-enter the
labour market when children are older)).
In New Zealand's Family Assistance programmes in 2004 the rate for
the eldest child aged up to 12 was approximately 78 percent of the rate for a
16 to 18 year-old eldest child. The rate for an additional child aged up to 12
was approximately 53 percent of the rate for an additional child aged 16 to
18. The rate for an additional child aged 13 to 15 was approximately 67
percent of the 16 to 18 rate. In the light of the research in the United Kingdom
and the particular costs that face families with younger children, the age-
related scales in the Family Support programme could overcompensate
families with older children (particularly for additional children in the family).
Between 1 October 1986 and 1 April 1990 Family Support payments
were split equally between spouses in two-spouse families. Since 1 April
1990 Family Support payments have been paid to principal caregivers only.
A principal caregiver is a person who is deemed to have responsibility for the
day-to-day care of a dependent child other than on a temporary basis. Before
23 June 1987 where spouses were separated only one spouse could receive
the Family Benefit and thus Family Support. After this date provision was
made for the Family Benefit and thus Family Support to be split between
spouses. With the discontinuation of the Family Benefit from 1 April 1991
new criteria for the splitting of Family Assistance Payments were established.
Between 1 April 1991 and 1 April 1993 spouses were eligible for these
payments provided they were the principal caregiver for four out of every
twelve weeks. On 1 April 1993 this provision changed to one third of the
income-tax yeat.
The marginal abatement rates listed in table 6.2 apply for each dollar of
gross income for Family Assistance purposes above the corresponding
threshold until the entitlement is fully abated. Since 1 April 1989 the Family
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Support abatement rates of 18 and 30 percent have not changed (although
the 18 percent rate will be removed on 1 April 2006). Although were a
number of changes to the lower abatement threshold, the top abatement
threshold applied from incomes in excess of $27,000 from 1 April 1988 until 1
April 2004, at which point the threshold increased to $27,481. The lower
abatement threshold applied to incomes in excess of $20,000 from 1 April
1995 until 1 April 2004, at which point the threshold increased to $20,356.
There have thus been long periods of little change in these rates and
thresholds.
Table 6.2 also shows the level of the unabated entitlement and the
abatement regime of Fami[ Support adjusted for inflation. The real levels of
Family Support and abatement thresholds illustrate the consequences of the
long periods of little policy change to these programmes. In real terms the
$27,000 threshold for 30 percent abatement in 1988'89, for example, was
equivalent to approximately $40,000 in 2004-05. This effective shifi in the
threshold increased the numbers of people facing higher abatement of their
Family Assistance entitlement. A second way that inflation impacts on
families' Family Assistance entitlement is through eroding the real value of
assistance [St John and Graig, 2004, pp. 40-41]. Over the period from 1991
to 1999 the Family Support levels largely retained their real value due to the
Hand Up package, which was phased in from 1 April 1996, and in real terms
the rates for children aged 16 to 18 increased. In the period from 1999 to
2005 there was a notable drop in the value of the assistance.
Following Working for Families, however, the value of assistance will
increase in real terms. On 1 April 2005 the Family Support rate for the eldest
child increased by $eS per-week and the rate for additional children by $tS
per-week. From 1 April 2006 Family Support will only abate against income in
excess of $27,500 at a rate of 30 percent. The final component of the
Working for Families reforms is a $10 per-week per-child increase in Family
Support from 1 April 2007. However, some of this increase will be eroded by
inffation between 1 April 2005 and 1 April 2007 due to the delay in
impfementing the inflation adjustment of the programmes. From 1 April 2007
the Family Assistance rates and thresholds will be increased in line with the
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CPI whenever inflation increases reach a total of 5 percent or more. Yet no
account will be made for inflation between 1 April 2005 and 1 April 2007.
Family Tax Credit
The Guaranteed Minimum Family Income was introduced with Family
Support on 1 October 1986. The Guaranteed Minimum Family lncome was
renamed the Family Tax Credit on 1 October 1999. This refundable tax
rebate is one of the Family Plus Tax Credits (along with the Child and
Parental Tax Credits), which are only available to working families. This
rebate ensures a minimum net income before Family Assistance for working
families with dependent children and abates dollar-for-dollar against the
combined net income of both caregivers or, for sole-parent families, the
income of the caregiver adjusted for the eligible period. The structure of the
programme is similar to that of a negative income tax and provides an
income guarantee for working families. Reflecting the design of the rebate as
an income guarantee for low-income workers the rebate was paid to the
primary earner until 1 April 2003. Since this date the rebate has been paid to
the principal caregiver, as this is the approach taken for the other Fami$
Assistance programmes.
Between 1 October 1986 and 1 April 1991 to be eligible for the rebate a
family needed to satisty the conditions for the receipt of the Family Benefit
(see table 6.1), have a joint income below the guaranteed minimum income,
be independent from income-tested benefits, and satisfy a work test. Income-
tested benefits include the Domestic Purposes Benefit, Widows Benefit,
Transitional Retirement Benefit, Invalids Benefit, Independent Youth Benefit,
Emergency Benefit, and Unemployment Benefit. Recipients of assistance
under the public accident compensation scheme (ACC) became ineligible for
the rebate once they received ACC payments for three months or more. The
work test required sole-parents to work at least twenty hours per-week and
two-parent families a combined total of at least thirty hours. Families were
eligible for the rebate only for the proportion of the year for which they
satisfied this work test. Information on hours and weeks of work was not
audited independently of the general taxpayer audit process. With the
removal of the Family Benefit from 1 April 1991 additional eligibility criteria for
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the rebate were introduced based on principal responsibility for the day-to-
day care of dependent chlldren.
Table 6.3: Family Tax Credit Unabated Entitlement and Abatement Regime
lncome Tax Year Annual Annual Marginal
(1 April to 31 March) Guaranteed Guaranteed AbatementMinimum Minimum Rate
Family lncome Family Income(Nominal) (Real- April
2004 Base)
1986-87"
1987-88
1988-89
1989-90
1990-91
1 996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-2000
2006-07
$10,816.00 $20,080.25 1oo%
$11,856.00 $18,505.71 1Qo"/"
$13,416.00 $19,691.02 100%
$13,936.00 $19,585.47 1oo%
$14,456.00 $18,876.97 100"/"
$14,690.00' $16,912.38 1oo%
$14,768.00 $16,813.78 'looo/o
$15,002.00' $16,821.08 1oo%
$15,080.00 $16,949.92 100%
$17,OOO.OO $15,726.75 1o0/"
n Only applied for the six months of the 1986-1987 income tax year for which the Family Tax
Credit was in place
* Composite annual rate based on the proportions of the income tax year for which the old
and the new rates applied
Sources: lncome Tax Acts (various years), Statistics New Zealand CPI lndex (April2004
base)
What is counted as income for the purposes of calculating the Family
Tax Credit entitlement and abatement ditfers from the definitions of income
used to calculate social welfare benefit entitlement and abatement and
income tax liability. The guaranteed minimum income is the net income
before the payment of Family Support, the Child Tax Credit, and the Parental
Tax Gredit. Table 6.3 shows the guaranteed minimum family income. Since 1
October 1986 the level of the guaranteed minimum family income has been
the same for all families with children and assistance has abated at a
marginal abatement rate of 100 percent above this threshold. The annual
guaranteed family income was increased annually from 1 October 1986 until
1 April 1990. The guaranteed income was next increased regularly from 1
April 1996 until 1 April 1999. From 1 April 2006 the guaranteed minimum
income will increase to $17,000 per-annum after a period of erosion in the
real value of the programme.
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Child Tax CrediAln-Work Payment
The Independent Family Tax Credit was introduced on 1 July 1996. The
Independent Fami[ Tax Credit was renamed the Child Tax Credit on 1 April
1999. This refundable tax rebate is one of the Family Plus Tax Credits (along
with the Parental and Family Tax Credits), which are only available to
working families. The rebate is paid to low-income families that are
independent from state assistance (not receiving an income-tested benefit).
Families are only eligible for the Child Tax Credit for the proportion of the
income tax year for which they are independent from main income-tested
benefits. The rebate is paid to principal caregivers. lf custody is shared the
rebate may be split according to the proportion of the income tax year that
each spouse is the principal caregiver. To be eligible for a payment a spouse
must be the principal caregiver for at least one third of the income tax year.
The levels of the unabated entitlement are listed in table 6.4.
Table 6.4: Child Tax CrediUln-Work Payment Unabated Entitlement and Abatement
Regime
lncome Tax Year
(1 April to 31 March)
Annual Entitlement
Per-Child/Family
(Nominal)
Annual Entitlement Abatement
Per-Child/Family(Real Regime
- 
April 2004 Base)
1 996-97"
1997-98
1998-99
2006-07
$390.00
$682.50.
$780.00
$,149
$777.05
$873.53
Family Support
regime
Family Support
regime
Family Support
regime
$3,120.00 Per-Family $2,886.32 Per-Family FamilySupport
$78O.OO Fourth+ $721.58 Fourth+ reglme
chird
n Only applied for the nine months of the 1996-97 income tax year for which the Chitd Tax
Credit was in place
* Composite annual rate based on the proportions of the income ta:( year for which the old
and the new rates applied
Sources: Income Tax Acts (various years), Statistics New Zealand CPI Index (April 2004
base)
The level of the Child Tax Credit remained unchanged from 1 April
1998. An increase planned for 1 April 1997 was phased in over two years
due to changes in the Government's fiscal position following an economic
downturn [Boston and Church, 2002, p. 30]. For abatement purposes the
Child Tax Credit is added to Family Support and the Parental Tax Credit (if
applicable). This total amount abates following the thresholds and rates in
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table 6.2 and using the same definition of income as Family Support. Under
the Working for Families reforms, from 1 April 2006 the Child Tax Credit will
be paid at a rate of $60 per-week per-family with a top-up of $15 for the
fourth and every additional child. Eligibility will require independence from
main forms of state assistance and satisfying an hours based work test of 20
hours per-week for sole-parents and 30 hours per-week for partnered
families. The programme will be renamed the In-Work Payment. In real terms
the add-on for the fourth and additional child will be less than the 1998 per-
child rate. However, the unabated assistance for the first three children will
be greater than the 1998 per-child rate.
Parental Tax Credit
The ParentalTax Credit was introduced on 1 October 1999. This programme
was a response to increasing political pressure for the introduction of publicly
funded paid paternal leave [Liebschutz, 1999], which was later introduced in
2002. This refundable tax rebate is one of the FamiV Plus Tax Credits (along
with the Child and Family Tax Credits) that are only available to working
families. The rebate is paid to low-income families that are independent from
state assistance (not receiving an income-tested benefit) for the first eight
weeks after the birth of the child. Families are only eligible for the Parental
Tax Credit for the proportion of the eight-week period that they are
independent from main income-tested benefits. Families cannot receive both
the ParentalTax Credit and publicly funded paid parental leave.
Table 6.5: Parental Tax Credit Unabated Entitlement and Abatement Regime
lncome Tax Year Annual Entitlem€nt Annual Entitlement Abatement
(1 Aprirto 31 March) 
i-"j-"ifiT,it
Per-Family(Real- Regime
April2004 Base)
1999-2000 $1,200.00 $1,348.80
Family
Support
regime
Sources: lncome Tax Act (2000), Statistics New Zealand CPI Index (April2004 base)
The rebate is paid to principal caregivers. lf custody is shared the
rebate may be split according to the proportion of the eight-week period that
each spouse is the principal caregiver. To be eligible for a payment a spouse
must be the principal caregiver for at least one third of the eight-week period.
Where the eight-week period occurs over two income tax years the rebate is
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split between the two years and each instalment is assessed against the
specified income for the appropriate year fincome Tax Act 2000 s KD 2
(6)l.The unabated rebate provides an end-of-year sum of $1,200 or $150 per-
week for the eight weeks following the birth of a child. For abatement
purposes the Parental Tax Credit is added to Family Support and the Child
Tax Credit. This total amount abates following the abatement thresholds and
rates in table 6.2 and using the same definition of income as Family Support.
Aggregate Expenditure on the Family Assistance Programmes
Table 6.6 presents data on the fiscal cost of the Family Assistance
programmes and the Family Benefit. The entire Family Assistance Vote goes
to the Inland Revenue Department. The Ministry of Social Development
makes a weekly request to Inland Revenue Department for a cash transfer to
fund Family Assistance payments to beneficiaries. The Family Assistance
programmes are treated as expenditure in the national accounts.
The Family Benefit was paid until 1991-92, at which point the benefit
was integrated with Family Support payments. Reflecting the greater
targeting of the Family Support programmes the increase in Family Support
from 1990-91 to 1991-92 was less than the reduction in the Family Benefit.
Family Support payments were estimated to have a fiscal cost of $9tA million
in 2004-05. Family Support payments were available to low-income families
irrespective of their work status. The Family Plus Tax Credits were estimated
to have a fiscal cost of $179 million in 2004-05. The largest Family Plus Tax
Credit was the Child Tax Credit.
lllustrating the etfect of credit corrosion due to inflation (discussed
above) the real level of expenditure on Fami[ Assistance declined during the
early 1990s and then increased following the Hand-Up package of tax
reductions and increases in Family Assistance from 1996 to 1998. Since 1
April 1999 there has been little change to the parameters of the Family
Assistance programmes and consequently real Family Assistance
expenditure has declined since this date.
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Table 6.6: Family Benefit and Family Assistance Fiscal Cost ($ Million)
Year n Family Family Family Child
Benefit Support Tax Tax
Credit * Credit
Parenial
Tax
Credit
Total
Real
Total
Nominal
1986-87
'1987-88
1988-89
1989-90
1990-91
1991-92
1992-93
1993-94
1994-95
199s-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-
2000
2000-01
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
2004-
05***
$273.3
$290.6
$258.4
$284.4
$223.0
NI/A
N/A
rVA
fr/A
TVA
TI/A
l.l/A
tl/A
t{/A
NI/A
I\UA
tl/A
t!/A
NIIA
$186.9
$403.4
$,139.3
$465.0
$472.0
$618.0
$577.3
$609.4
$700.1*'
$7,+8.3
$777.0
$874.4
$906.5
$899.0
$860.7
$870.0
$922.0
$80s.0
$918.0
t\UA
wA
wA
N/A
l.l/A
tl/A
t\UA
N/A
hr/A
TI/A
$8.2
$6.6
$8.2
$10.6
$17.3
$12.0
$13.0
$14.0
$15.0
f\YA
tl/A
t!/A
fvA
N/A
NI/A
t{/A
NI/A
lVA
TI/A
$40.5
$121.4
$161.9
$167.0
$161.3
$159.0
$1s6.0
$152.0
$150.0
NI/A
NI/A
t\UA
tVA
N/A
tl/A
N/A
tVA
t{/A
t{/A
N/A
tl/A
t\UA
$6.8
$17.2
$19.0
$17.0
$14.0
$14.0
$460.2
$694.0
$697.7
$749.4
$69s.0
$618.0
$577.3
$609.4
$700.1
$748.3
$82s.7
$1002.4
$1076.6
$1083.4
$1056.5
$1060.0
$1108.0
$985.0
$1097.0
$854.4
$1083.3
$1024.0
$1053.2
$907.6
$784.9
$725.8
$8s7.2
$859.8
$878.7
$950.6
$1141.3
$1205.7
$1217.7
$1164.2
$1131.5
$1 151.0
$1008.3
$1097.0
n Prior to 1989-90 the year ended 31 March; from 1989-90 onwards the year ended 30 June
" The Family Tax Credit was recorded together with Family Support until 1996-97
** The increase from 1993-94 to 1994-95 partly reflected the shift from cash to accrual
accounting after 30 June 1994
*** Contained in the 2004-05 Estimates of Annual Appropriations. Actual out-turns may differ
from the figures listed
Sources: Govemment of New Zealand, various years, Estimates of Annual Appropriations
and Departmental Budgets of the Government of New Zealand, lnland Revenue
Department, various years, lnland Revenue Annual Report Ministry of Social
Development, 2001, Social Seruices Statistical Beport, Table 14; Statistics New
Zealand CPI lndex (April2004 base)
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6.3 Estimating Entitlement and Take-Up
Taxation and Abatement of Social Welfare Benefits
Due to the interaction of the Family Assistance programmes with main
welfare benefits and the personal income tax system, calculating entitlement
to the Family Assistance programmes can be complex. Social welfare benefit
levels are set and paid to recipients as net amounts. Personal income tax on
the benefit income is then calculated to give gross benefit levels. Income tax
is calculated on benefits to ensure that the full costs of benefits are reported
in government accounts and that beneficiaries face similar tax rates on
additional earnings as low-income earners not receiving a benefit.
When beneficiaries receive non-benefit earnings their net unabated
benefit (n) abates against gross non-benefit earnings (ee). Abatement of the
net benefit (bA) is based on gross earnings and equals the net benefit
abatement rate (rs) multiplied by the level of the gross non-benefit earnings
above the gross threshold at which abatement begins (the level of the
earnings disregard (o') below which non-benefit earnings do not reduce the
net benefit).
bs = (e6 - de) re
Subtracting benefit abatement from
net benefit after abatement (uH).
(3.1)
the net unabated benefit results in the
bru=b-bn (3.2)
The net benefit after abatement is then increased for personal income taxes
on the benefit (t') to give the level of the gross abated benefit (oe).
be = bn /(1 - tB) (3.3)
The gross non-benefit earnings (ee) are reduced by personal income tax on
non-benefit income (t) and the ACC earner account levy (ncc) to give the net
non-benefit earnings (eH).
€ru= 
€G (1 
- 
(t + ACC)) (3.4)
For beneficiaries, non-benefit earnings are taxed under the secondary tax
regime at 21 percent. The secondary tax is a withholding tax so any
excessive tax withheld during the year is returned at the end of the income
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tax year. The tax on the gross abated benefit and the non-benefit earnings
are calculated separately as the tax rate applying to the benefit income may
differ from the tax rate applying to non-benefit earnings. Differences in the tax
rates applying to benefit and non-benefit income occur when a beneficiary's
annual gross benefit income is below a personal income tax threshold yet
non-benefit earnings increase total gross income to above the threshold.
Under the current personal income tax scale such a ditference would occur if
a beneficiary receives a gross abated benefit below $9,500 along with non-
benefit income that increases total gross income to above $9,500.
Entitlement to the Family Assisfance Programmes
Net income before Family Assistance (v) equals the net benefit after
abatement (oN) plus net non-benefit earnings (eH).
y 
= br + Bp (3.5)
For Family Assistance purposes a number of income adjustments (y') are
made to net income before Family Assistance. Some income that is exempt
from income tax is not exempt for Family Assistance purposes, such as child
support transfers and maintenance payments. Conversely some deductions
that are allowable under the general income tax rules are not allowed for
Family Assistance purposes, such as business adjustments. The income
adjustments are made on application for Family Assistance and are also part
of the end-of-year square-up process. Inland Revenue have estimated that,
based on data for part of the 2000-01 income tax year, business adjustments
accounted for a large maiority of the adjustments (76.2 percent of the total
adjustments), followed by child support (13.6 percent), and maintenance
payments (9.9 percent) finland Revenue Department, 2002]. These income
adjustments lead to net specified income for Family Assistance purposes (v').
Ys=Y-Yr (3.6)
The Family Assistance registration form collects information on the receipt and payment of
child support payments. This includes both payments made via the Inland Revenue
Department and payments made by private arrangement. The lnland Revenue Department
checks child support payments made via the lnland Revenue Department automatically.
Payments made by private arrangements are not audited separately from the general
taxpayer audit process. Child support payments made are subtracted from income for Family
Assistance abatement purposes. Child support payments received are added to income for
Family Assistance abatement purposes.
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Both entitlement for and abatement of Family Assistance is adjusted for
the number of days of eligibility during the income tax year (the eligible period
(pr)). There are two periods of the income tax year, which may or may not
differ, for Fami$ Assistance purposes. The specified period is an unbroken
period where the recipient is eligible for some form of Family Assistance. The
eligible period is an unbroken period where the applicant meets allfour of the
following criteria:
. the applicant is a qualifying person;
. the applicant is a principal caregiver;
. the applicant has an unchanging maritalstatus during the period; and
. the applicant is making the claim in relation to a dependent child or
dependent children fincome Tax Act 2000 s OB 1].
For example, the specified period for a family that is eligible for some form of
Family Assistance during the full income tax year would be the full income
tax year. However, if the nature of the family's entitlement changes during the
year due to, for example, a change in the number of dependent children in
the family the specified period would be made up of more than one eligible
period. lf a family with one child adopts an additional child during the year
they will have two eligible periods; one period where entitlement is based on
one child and one period where entitlement is based on two children.
The criteria used to calculate the eligible period differ among the four
Family Assistance programmes. For Family Support purposes the eligible
period is based on the four standard criteria above. As well as these four
standard criteria the eligible period for the Child Tax Credit and the Parental
Tax Credit is also based on the number of weeks the recipient's family is
independent from main income-tested benefits. For the Family Tax Credit the
eligible period is based on the four standard criteria, the number of weeks the
recipient's family is independent from maln income-tested benefits, and the
number of weeks the recipienfs family satisfies an hours-based work test of
a total of 30 hours for partnered families and 20 hours for sole-parents.
The assessment period for the Family Assistance programmes is the
income tax year adjusted for the proportion of the year that the recipient is
eligible for the programmes. This allows taxable income, subject to a number
of income adjustments, to be used for calculating entitlement and abatement.
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However, over-payments and under-payments of Family Assistance can
arise for families paid during the year because the entitlement is based on
income at time of application and then projected forward until the end of the
tax year, at which time payments made during the year and actual
entitlement are reconciled.
The full year abatement rate (rr) is adjusted for the eligible period (p') to
give the abatement rate for the eligible period (re).
rp = Ir (pr / 365) (3.7)
lmplications of basing abatement rates as well as the level of entitlement on
the etigible period are that the programmes are received by higher income
earners who are eligible for short periods of the income tax year (if, for
example, a chiH is born late in the year) and the entitlement can vary
significantly from year to year.
There are two Family Assistance entitlement and abatement regimes;
that applying to the Family Tax Credit and that applying to the Family Support
Tax Credit, the Child Tax Credit, and the ParentalTax Credit. The Family Tax
Credit pays the difference between net specified income and the net
guaranteed minimum income. The rebate abates dollar for dollar against
increases in family net specified income. Family Support, the Child Tax
Gredit, and the Parental Tax Credit are added together and this total figure
abates against gross specified income. Family Support is the first payment to
abate, followed by the Child Tax Credit and then the Parental Tax Credit.
Fami[ Support, the Child Tax Credit, and the Parental Tax Credit
entitlements equalthe unabated rebates minus abatement. This abatement is
the abatement rate multiplied by the level of the gross specified income,
which is the net specified Income increased for personal income taxes, above
the gross abatement threshold. The four abated rebates are added together
to give the total Family Assistance (ra) entitlement.
FA = FS + CTC + PTC + FTC (3.8)
This Family Assistance entitlement is then added to net specified income
giving a net income including Family Assistance (v*).
(3.e)yo,,=ys+FA
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Income from the Family Assistance Tax Credits does not increase gross
taxable income for the person to whom the rebate is paid fincome Tax Act
2000 s KD8l. Thus the marginal tax rates applying to additional benefit
income and non-benefit earnings are those applying to gross income
excluding Family Assistance.
Family Assistance Payment Periods and Under-Payments and Over'
Payments
Family Assistance payments can be received fortnightly during the year or as
a lump sum at the year-end. Around half of the Family Support payments
made by the Inland Revenue Department (a quarter of the total Family
Support payments) are paid at year-end [Nolan, 2OO2l. Payment during the
year can be by cheque or bank transfer. A year-end payment can take the
form of a cheque or bank transfer or through a reduction in the tax payable
by the recipient. The taxpayer may also elect for any end of year payment to
be otfset to another taxpayer.
The assessment period for the programmes is the income tax year
adiusted for the proportion of the year that the recipient is eligible for the
programmes. This allows taxable income to be used for calculating
entitlement and abatement. People receiving their entitlement from the Inland
Revenue Department have their entitlement reconciled when their taxable
income is known at year-end. Beneficiaries who receive their entitlement
from the Ministry of Social Development can have their Family Assistance
entitlement reconciled at year-end by requesting an income tax reconciliation.
Over-payments and under-payments of Family Assistance can arise for
families paid during the year because the entitlement is based on income at
time of application and then projected forward until the end of the tax year.
Families can be underpaid or overpaid Family Assistance during the year if,
for example, they change their income, caregiver status, or marital status and
do not inform the Ministry of Social Development or the Inland Revenue
Department. Families who are overpaid during the year incur a debt with the
Inland Revenue Department. Families who are underpaid during the year can
receive their additional entitlement in a year-end payment. To reduce the
extent of overpayments, legislation contains an uplift factor, where the
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previous yeafs income is increased to account for the likely increase in the
family's income. The uplitt factors are contained in schedule 12 of the Income
Tax Act 2000.
Table 6.7 contains data compiled by the Inland Revenue Department on
the numbers of recipients underpaid and overpaid during the year to March
2001. Data from more recent years were not available for this study. These
figures lack information on some recipients paid during the year by the
Ministry of Social Development. This lack of information is due to both the
failure of some of these people to file tax returns and to the incomplete
nature of the information on these people provided to the Inland Revenue
Department when tax returns are filed. The table shows that numbers of
taxpayers underpaid and overpaid are roughly equal. Table 6.7 also shows
that the majority (85 percent) of the recipients of the Family Assistance
programmes chose to take-up assistance at during the year. Of all Fami$
Assistance recipients, 56 percent were paid by the Ministry of Social
Developmenl, 22 percent by the Inland Revenue Department, and seven
percent by both the Ministry of Social Development and the Inland Revenue
Department at different times during the year (these were people who moved
between benefit and work within the income tax yeaQ.
Administrative changes made by the Inland Revenue Department since
2001 are likely to mean that the incidence of underpayments and
overpayments (and consequently taxpayer debt) is likely to have fallen. Since
October 2OO2 the Inland Revenue Department has developed the Proactive
Actions programme. This programme monitors the incomes of Family
Assistance recipients contained in monthly schedules provided by employers
and reconciles this against income estimates provided upon application for
Family Assistance. Where discrepancies are identified the income estimates
for Family Assistance are revised flnland Revenue Department, 2003, p. 3].
The Inland Revenue Department has also developed new debt and hardship
rules, which allow the agency to write-off debt where its enforcement would
lead to hardship or require an inefficient use of departmental resources
flnland Revenue Department,2003, p. 3].
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Table 6.7: Timing and Accuracy of Family Assistance Payments (Year to 31 March
2001)
Agency and Payment Underpaid during Overpaid during Total
Timing of accurate to the year the yearPayment within $100 (more than $100) (more than
$1oo)
MSD Paid Dudng 117,45On 0 0 117,450
Year (No Tax
Retum Filed)
MSD Paid During 31,260 12,960 9,780 54,000
Year Oax Return
Filed)
IRD Paid Dudng 9,490 28,660 28,780 66,930
Year
Both MSD and 2,120 6,440 12,400 20,960
IRD Paid During
Year
TotalPaid During 160,320 48,060 50,960 259,340
Year
Paid at Year-End 46,100 0 0 46,100
Total 206,420 48,060 50,960 305,450
Percentages
MSD Paid During 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
Year (No Tax
Retum Filed)
MSD Paid During 57.9 24.0 18.1 100.0
Year (Tax Retum
Filed)
IRD Paid During 14.2 42.8 43.0 100.0
Year
Both MSD and 10.1 30.7 59.2 100.0
IRD Paid During
Year
Total Paid During 57.0 18.5 19.7 100.0
Year
Paid at Year-End 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
Total 67.6 15.7 16.7 100.0
n lncludes 12,510 recipients whose entitlements could not be reconciled at year-end due to
insufficient information
Source: lnland Revenue Department estimates (based on a sample of March 2001 tax
returns, personaltax summaries and lR348s)
Estimatee of Famlly Assistance Participation Rates
Measures such as eliminating the need for the majority of personal taxpayers
to file annual tax returns (lRs forms) reduced the costs facing taxpayers of
complying with the tax system. However, the annual tax returns process also
played a role in indicating Family Assistance entitlement to potential
recipients and to the Inland Revenue Department. Reducing the Inland
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Revenue Department's contact with personal taxpayers has therefore
potentially increased the importance of the Family Assistance application
process for the take-up of the rebates. Non take-up occurs when, for some
number of people, the amount they receive from social assistance
programmes is less than the amount they are entitled to receive. There are
also a number of people who receive more than their entitlement (due to
factors such as administrative error and taxpayer fraud). Non take'up and
overpayments have implications for both the design and evaluation of social
assistance programmes lRiphahn, 2001, p. 379; Creedy, 2002, p. 151].
There are few estimates of the level and causes of non-take-up of
Family Assistance. The Inland Revenue Department has calculated
estimates of the take-up of Family Assistance by comparing numbers of
recipients with approximations of numbers eligible from the 2001 Census
[Ministry of Social Development, 2003]. The eligible population is ditficult to
estimate due to llmitations to the Census data, particularly as income bands
are only available in $10,000 increments. From the 2001 Census data the
fnfand Revenue Department estimated that some 174,000 families were
eligible to receive Family Assistance payments from the Inland Revenue
Department. This compares with approximately 160,000 families who were
assessed for Family Assistance, giving a figure of about 92 percent take-up.
From this data there were no identifiable sub-group of the population who
were excluded from Family Assistance coverage. This relatively high
estimate of Family Assistance take-up can be explained by the design and
administration of the programmes.
. Only one application form is required for the Family Assistance
programmes. Annual reapplications are not required. The Family
Support programme is targeted on the basis of relatively straightforward
criteria. Full-year beneficiaries receive their Family Support
automatically from the Ministry of Social Development. Family Support
accounts for the majority of spending on the Family Assistance
programmes. High take-up rates for Family Support are likely to be
reflected in high take-up rates for Family Assistance.
. Overpayments, underpayments, or non-take-up are most likely to arise
when a person moves on and otf a main social welfare benefit. The
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lnland Revenue Department and the Ministry of Social Development
have recently enhanced their exchange of information. Thus, for
example, when a person exits a main benefit the Inland Revenue
Department is informed, up to date income information is obtained from
the person, and interim payments of the Child Tax Credit may be made
finland Revenue Department, 2003, p. 4].This exchange of information
is likely to ensure higher take-up of the Child Tax Credit.
The use of hours-based thresholds for the Family Tax Credit could,
however, atfect take-up for this programme. The Inland Revenue
Department can update information on incomes and benefit receipt
without the taxpayer filing additional information. Informing the Inland
Revenue Department of changes in hours of work, in contrast, requires
a taxpayer to file additional information (unless this change in hours is
reflected in the exit or entry of a main benefit). Generally information on
hours of work is provided on a voluntary basis and is not audited
independently of the general taxpayer audit process. As the Family Tax
Credit accounts for only a small proportion of total Family Assistance
expenditure low take-up of this programme is not likely to significantly
change overall rates of take-up of Family Assistance.
6.4 Conclusion
This chapter reviewed the evolution and operation of New Zealand's Family
Assistance Tax Credits. Since their 1986 establishment the Family
Assistance programmes have provided assistance targeted on the basis of
family structure and income (the Famlly Support Tax Gredit) and targeted on
the basis of family structure, income, and work effort (first the Family Tax
Credit and then the Child Tax Credit and Parental Tax Credit). In relation to
total expenditure on Family Assistance the expenditure on the work-based
programmes has been marginal in comparison to expenditure on Family
Support. All Family Assistance programmes, including the work-based
programmes, are only available to families with children. Since 1 April 2003
all Family Assistance programmes have been paid to the primary caregiver
(providing caregivers with an independent source of income).
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There have been long periods of little change in the design of the
Family Assistance programmes. Apart from increases in levels of assistance
and abatement thresholds, the Family Tax Credit is largely identical to the
programme established in 1986. The rationale for the Family Tax Credit was
to provide an income guarantee (that abates at 100 percent) for working
families. In the design of the Family Support Tax Credit since 1986 greater
emphasis has been placed on targeting assistance by the numbers and ages
of children in families. Since 1986 assistance has increased with the ages of
children. Failure to increase the levels of the Family Assistance programmes
in line with inflation has been well documented. Also important are the long
periods of little change in the abatement thresholds and abatement rates for
the programmes. For instance, the top threshold at which Family Support
abatement begins remained unchanged for the twelve years prior to 1 April
2000 and the abatement rates of 18 and 30 percent have been in place since
1 April 1989.
In the 1990s an extension of the work-focus of the Family Assistance
programmes took place with the introduction of the Child Tax Credit and the
Parental Tax Credit. The Parental Tax Credit also represented an attempt to
extend the objectives of the Family Assistance programmes to include the
provision of support to working families with newborn children. Both the Child
Tax Credit and the Parental Tax Credit abate under the Family Support
abatement regime. The current Family Assistance programmes are
summarised in table 6.8.
Due to the interaction of the Family Assistance programmes with main
welfare benefits and the personal income tax system, calculating entitlement
to the Family Assistance programmes can be complex. Family Assistance
entitlement is based on projected annual income and the period of the
income tax year for which the caregiver is primarily responsible for the child.
Application for the Family Assistance programmes is relatively
straightforward. However, for non-beneficiaries application for assistance
does require the family to file a Family Assistance application form with the
Inland Revenue Department and the child and caregiver to have Inland
Revenue Numbers. In the majority of cases the Inland Revenue Department
can identify changes in entitlement during the year. Take-up of the Family
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Assistance programmes (particularly Family Support) is likely to be relatively
high. Assessment of entitlement is largely based on voluntary compliance
and is only audited as part of the general process of auditing income tax
returns.
Table 6.8: Family Assistance Programmes (1 April 2005)
Family Support Tax Entitlement depends on number and ages of children. Entitlement
Credit
Family Tax Credit
Child Tax Credit
ParentalTax Credit
per-child ranges from $47 to $85 per-week. The entitlement abates
against gross specified joint income.
Guarantees a minimum after-tax income for families with children
and who are independent from main income-tested benefits and
working more than 30 hours per-week if a couple or 20 hours per-
week if a sole-parent. The entitlement abates dollar for dollar
against increases in net specified income above the guaranteed
minimum family income.
Entitlement is $15 per-child per-week. Only families who are
independent from main income-tested benefits are entitled. The
entitlement abates together with Family Support.
Payment for the first eight weeks afier the birth of a child.
Entitlement is $150 per-baby per-week. Only families who are
independent from main income-tested benefits are entitled. The
entitlement abates together with Family Support and the Child Tax
Credit.
Increasing the reliance in the social assistance system on the Family
Assistance programmes is likely to place increasing pressure on these
application, assessment, and auditing processes. This is particularly the case
if there is a greater emphasis on the work-based credits, particularly when
they employ complex targeting criteria such as hours of work. Increasing the
role of the Family Assistance programmes in the tax-benefit system will also
place increasing pressure on the joint administration of these programmes by
the Inland Revenue Department and the Ministry of Social Development.
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7 Anglo-American Family and
Employment Tax Credits
7.1 Introduction
The previous chapters discussed the evolution and operation of New
Zealand's tax-benefit system and Family Assistance Tax Credits. This
chapter continues to establish the context for the Working for Families
reforms and compares New Zealand's tax-benefit system and family and
employment tax credits with those in four other Anglo-American countries.
This comparative public policy research illustrates distinctive and important
features of New Zealand's social assistance system and potential lessons for
New Zealand from social assistance reform internationally.
In section two of this chapter the tax-benefit systems in five Anglo-
American countries are compared. Particular attention is paid to the
proportions of spending on family cash benefits and active labour market
programmes. Family and employment tax credits are then compared in
section three of the chapter. This section first discusses the directions of
reform to family and employment tax credits in the countries. The section
then models the structures and generosity of assistance to three
representative families and compares the goals designs of family and
employment tax credits in the five countries.
7.2 Comparison of Tax-Benefit Systems
Policies of adopting tax credits to reduce child poverty and to improve
financial incentives to work have almost solely been limited to the liberal or
Anglo-American welfare states [Adler, 2004, p. 103]. These countries have
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been classified as liberal or residual welfare states on the basis of their
degree of welfare etfort, reliance upon targeting, strict entitlement rules, and
emphasis on work for povefi relief [Esping-Andersen, 1990]. Of these
countries New Zealand and Australia place heavy reliance upon non-
contributory social assistance programmes provided without time limits for
eligibility for assistance. Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States
all use a mixture of contributory social insurance and non-contributory social
assistance programmes, with the United States placing the greatest
emphasis on time limits for eligibility for assistance. As Whiteford [2001, p.
461 argued the absence of contributory programmes in the New Zealand and
Australian social assistance systems means that the mean-tested non-
contributory programmes have to perform the functions that would be
performed by social insurance programmes in other countries.
In New Zealand and Australia there has been a growing consensus for
reforming personal income tax schedules to place a greater focus on
economic etficiency and improved financial incentives rather than a concern
with distributional goals. In these countries personal income tax scales have
been flattened through reductions in marginal income tax rates and the
numbers of income tax thresholds. Tax bases have been broadened through
removing or consolidating complex systems of tax deductions and rebates for
single-income families and families with dependents. In recent years
emphasis has been placed on developing family and employment tax credits
to reduce povefi and improve financial incentives for labour supply. Family
and employment tax credits are able to provide tax relief on a more targeted
basis than changes to personal income tax scales and, as they are generally
provided through personal income tax systems, are seen to more strongly
reinforce work etfort than traditional welfare programmes [Alstott, 1995;
Nolan and Fairbrother, 20051.
In the five Anglo-American countries the unit of assessment for
assessing personal income taxes is generally the individual, except for those
families who opt for joint taxation in the United States. Welfare programmes
are assessed on the basis of definition of income that presumes intra-family
income sharing and includes wealth indicators, which indicate potential
income as well as actual income received [Stephens, 1997]. Family and
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employment tax credits are assessed on a compromise between taxable
income and the welfare definition of income, using joint annual taxable
income of the caregivers and with a number of income adjustments that do
not apply to taxable income, such as for child support payments.
Table 7.1: Expenditure on Family Cash Benefits and Total Public Social Expenditure
(2001)
Australia
Canada
New Zealand
United Kingdom
United States
Family Cash
Benefits
Cost Per-Annum
(Billions 
- 
National
Cunencies)
20,314
9,756
2,661
22,432
38,145
TotalPublic
Social
Expenditures
Cost Per-Annum
(Billions 
- 
National
Currencies)
128,337
196,425
22,655
219,627
1,470,967
Percentage of Percentage of
Public Social GDP
Expenditures
15.8
5.0
11.7
't0.2
2.6
2.8
0.9
2.2
2.2
0.4
Sources: OECD, 2004, 'Public Social Expenditure by Main Category at Current Prices in
National Currency (1980-2001)'. OECD, 2004, 'Public Social Expenditure by Main
Category as a Percentage of GDP (1980-2001)'
The five countries ditfer in the emphasis they place upon spending on
family cash benefits in their tax-benefit systems. Table 7.1 shows data on
expenditure on family cash benefits and total public social expenditure for
2001 from the OECD's Social Expenditure Database. The OECD defines
family cash benefits as expenditures that support families, e.9., excluding
one-person families, and are associated with the costs of raising children.
This database does not include expenditure on family cash benefits where
the family receives this expenditure as a reduction in tax liability. Only the
refundable component of tax assistance is included in this database. Thus,
for example, in 1997 US$24.4 billion of the US$30.5 billion of the expenditure
on the Earned Income Tax Credit in the United States was refundable and
included in these figures [Adema, 2001, p. 211. In 2001 the United States
spent the lowest proportion of total public social expenditures on family cash
benefits. Canada had the second lowest proportion. New Zealand and
Australia had the highest levels of expenditure on family cash benefits both
as a proportion of total public social expenditures and of GDP, although the
United Kingdom spent a similar proportion of GDP on these programmes.
Among OECD countries New Zealand and Australia provided two of the four
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highest levels of family benefits relative to GDP, along with Luxembourg and
Austria (2.4 percent) [Dwyer, 2005, p. 17]. The United States provided one of
the four lowest levels of expenditure on family benefits relative to GDP, along
with Korea, Japan, and Spain [Dwyer,2005, p.1|'
Table 7.2: Expenditure on Family Cash Benefits and Active Labour Market
Programmes (2001)
Australia
Canada
New Zealand
United Kingdom
United States
Family Cash Benefits
Cost Per-Annum
(Billions 
- 
National
Cunencies)
20,314
9,756
2,661
22,432
38,145
Active Labour Market Proportion
Programmes
Cost Per-Annum
(Billions 
- 
National
Cunencies)
3,185
4,683
644
3,517
14,947
6.38:1
2.08:1
4.13:1
6.39:1
2.55:1
Sources: OECD, 2004, 'Public Social Expenditure by Main Category at Current Prices in
National Currency (1980-2001)'. OECD, 2004, 'Public Social Expenditure by Main
Category as a Percentage of GDP (1980-2001)'.
As well as the provision and design of tax-benefit programmes the
management of programmes' recipients through active labour market
programmes can have an important influence in determining policy outcomes
and shaping how recipients perceive their opportunities and obligations to
change their recipient status [Stephens, 1997, p. 502]. The five countries
differ in the emphasis they place upon spending on active labour market
programmes as opposed to family cash benefits in their tax-benefit systems.
Table 7.2 shows data on expenditure on family cash benefits and active
labour market programmes for 2001 from the OECD's Social Expenditure
Database. Active labour market programmes are social expenditures other
than education that are aimed at improving beneficiaries' prospect of
employment or increasing their earnings' capacity. These expenditures
include public employment services and administration, labour market
training, and programmes to provide or promote employment for the
unemployed, disabled, and youth IOECD, 2002, p. 32]. These programmes
Although, as Dwyer [2005, p. 18] argues, New Zealand's ranking is inflated because of the
inclusion of the Domestic Purposes Benefit in the New Zealand data and the exclusion of
comparable assistance in other countries.
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do not include family cash benefits that are structured to encourage financial
incentives to work.
The United States and Canada were similar in their expenditures on
family cash benefits as a proportion of active labour market programmes.
These countries both placed relatively equal weights upon active labour
market programmes and family cash benefits. Australia and the United
Kingdom placed less weight upon expenditure on active labour market
programmes. Spending in New Zealand was between these two groups.
The figures in table 7.2 do not capture the greater emphasis placed
upon active labour market programmes since 2001. In the United Kingdom,
for instance, the New Deal policy, which was first established in 1997,
distinguishes able people who require encouragement to work and people
unable to work who require relatively unconditional support. These different
groups have different administrative points of contact (JobOentre Plus for the
able group and the Pensions Agency for the second group) [Adler, 2004, p.
961, Case management is used to provide (encourage) employment
opportunities for the group able to work. As much of the available work is low
paid tax credits are used to "demonstrate that work pays and to persuade
peopfe to accept poorly paid employmenf' [Adler, 2004, p. 103]. This
approach is similar, but not identical, to that taken in the United States [Adler,
2004, p. 1031.
Expenditure in the New Zealand social assistance system is tightly
targeted. Targeting in the other four countries is less severe. A 1992 analysis
of 18 OECD countries (not including Canada) ranked child-benefit packages
into four tiers, with the first tier the most generous and the fourth the least.
Australia and the United Kingdom were ranked as having second tier levels
of assistance over a range of income levels and family types. New Zealand
and the United States were seen as laggards with fourth tier levels of
assistance [Stephens and Bradshaw, 1995]. Since then Australia, Canada,
the United Kingdom, and the United States have introduced new policy
initiatives and extended existing ones to address poverty and make work
pay. Equivalent initiatives in New Zealand are not due to be fully
implemented until 2007. ln a 2002 analysis of 22 countries New Zealand
remained in the laggard category (ranked eighteenth after housing costs).
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Canada (ranked eleventh) and the United States (ranked seventh) were in
the third tier and Australia (ranked fourth) and the United Kingdom (ranked
second) were in the second lBradshaw and Finch,2002l.
7.3 Comparison of Family and Employment Tax
Credits
The following section of this chapter discusses the use of family and
employment tax credits in New Zealand, Australia, Canada, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. The programmes that are discussed are:
. New Zealand: the Family Assistance Tax Credits, comprising the Family
Support Tax Credit and the Family Plus Tax Credits (the Child,
Parental, and Family Tax Credits);
. Australia: the Family Tax Benefit Part A and Family Tax Benefit Part B;
. Canada: the Canada Child Tax Benefit, comprising the Basic Benefit
and the National Child Benefit Supplement, and, as an example of
provincial-level assistance, the British Colombia Family Bonus and
Earned Income Credit;
. United Kingdom: the Child Tax Credit, comprising the Family Element
and the Child Tax Credit, the Working Tax Credit, and the universal
ChiH Benefit; and
. United States: the federal Earned Income Tax Credit, Child Tax Credit,
and, as an example of state-level assistance, the Wisconsin Earned
Income Credit.
Generally family tax credits are paid to families with dependent children
irrespective of workforce status, while receipt of employment tax credits is
dependent upon work etfort. Reforms to family and employment tax credits
have been at the heart of tax-benefit reforms throughout the Anglo-American
world. Yet there has been relatively little comparative public policy research
on these prominent tax-benefit reforms. Mendelson [2001] reviewed cash-
benefits for children in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. This study extends this research to include New Zealand. This
study also ditfers from the approach taken in Mendelson in two ways. First,
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the scope of this paper is family and employment tax credits and not cash-
benefits for chlldren. Thus this paper includes the full level of employment tax
credits (not just the chiH-based component of these programmes) but child-
based assistance provided through other policy instruments (such as child-
based personal income tax exemptions) is not included. Second, in this
earlier work levels of assistance were modelled against gross incomes.
However, in the five Anglo-American countries the levels of family and
employment tax credits provided also vary with wage rates, family types, and
family sizes. Thus although entitlement and abatement schedules are often
expressed in terms of gross incomes this paper models financial assistance
available to families at different hours of work with a fixed wage rate
reflecting a low wage rate for these family types. This approach separates
low-wage families from higher-wage families who have low hours of work and
thus low incomes. Modelling assistance against gross incomes could create
a misleading picture of the financial assistance provided to families as while
particular programmes may appear relatively heavily targeted by income
when modelled against gross incomes this may not be the case when levels
of financial assistance are modelled against hours of work for families with
relatively low wage rates.
Approaches to Reform in AngleAmerican Countries
To address goals such as reducing relatively high rates of child poverty and
increasing caregivers' labour supply (as part of a broader poverty reduction
strategy) Anglo-American countries have placed emphasis on redesigning
family and employment tax credits [Adler 2004]. Some of these reforms,
particularly those to the Earned Income Tax Credit in the United States and
the Child Tax Credit and Working Tax Credit in the United Kingdom, have
influenced reforms in the other countries, particularly the reforms to New
Zealand's Family Assistance programmes currently underway. To provide
further context for the comparison of these reforms in later sections of this
chapter, this section briefly discussed approaches to reform in the Anglo-
American countries except New Zealand (discussed in chapters five and six).
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Australia
Australia, like New Zealand, has few contributory social insurance
programmes. Social assistance programmes arc flat-rate and provided
without time limits. Since the early 1980s Australia has reformed its personal
income tax scale away from a concern with distributional goals and fiscal
constraints and towards a greater concern with economic efficiency and
improved financial incentives for labour supply [Beer, 1995; Nolan, 2005, p.
41. Over the last 25 years general tax assistance for families has also been
cashed out and paid as income-tested assistance to caregivers [Whiteford,
2001, p. 431. Payments for children in low-income families have been made
payable to caregivers rather than as part of beneficiaries' income support
payments [Whiteford,2001,pp.43-44]. In 1983 a Family Income Supplement
was established to provide income-tested assistance for low-income working
families at the same rate as income support recipients. By 1998 coverage of
this programme had expanded from one percent of children in 1983 to nearly
14 percent [Whiteford, Mendelson, Millar, 2003, p. 3].
In July 2000 the Final Report of the Reference Group on Welfare
Reform (the McClure report) was released. This report emphasised five
principles of individualised service delivery, simpler income support, better
financial incentives and assistance, mutual obligations, and fostering social
partnerships. The report recommended extending mutual obligation
principles to sole-parents, people on disability pensions, and the mature-
aged jobless and rolling the plethora of social assistance benefits into one
common payment with an incentive bonus to encourage people to move off
state support [McOlure, Jackson, et al, 2000].
Also in July 2000, the Australian Government integrated a range of tax
rebates for single-income families and families with dependents into the
Family Tax Benefit Part A, Family Tax Benefit Part B, and Child Care Benefit.
These Family Tax Benefit reforms were part of a package of general tax
reforms that emphasised simplification and consolidated administration into a
single agency (Centrelink). The Family Tax Benefit Part A is designed to
assist with the general costs of raising children. The Fami[ Tax Benefit Part
B is designed to support single-income partnered and sole-parent families.
Entitlement for Family Tax Benefits is assessed on the basis of estimated
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taxable income for the forthcoming income tax year with a reconciliation with
taxable income at year-end. To minimise problems of people incurring tax-
debts the first A$1,000 of debt is waived [Whiteford, Mendelson, Millar, 2003,
p. 51. In 2001, of the 2.6 million families with children in Australia 1.8 million
received the Family Tax Benefit Part A and 1.2 million received the Family
Tax Benefit Part B [Whiteford, Mendelson, Millar, 2003, p. 4]. However, some
concern has been expressed regarding the targeting etficiency of the Family
Tax Benefit Parts A and B and the lack of targeting of assistance on the basis
of work effort ilngles, 20011.
Canada
The Canadian social security system operates at both federal and provincial
levels. Social assistance programmes vary between provinces and are
generally available to only those people who have exhausted all other
sources of income, such as employment earnings, savings, and social
insurance benefits [Battle and Mendelson,2001, p. 108]. In 1978 Canada
introduced a Refundable Tax Credit. In 1993 this Refundable Child Tax
Credit, a non-refundable Child Tax Credit, and Family Allowances were
integrated to create the Child Tax Benefit. This programme was paid by the
Canadian tax authority to families on low-incomes and middle-incomes and
was complemented by a Working Income Supplement to low-income working
families.
In 1998 the Working Income Supplement was abolished and the Child
Tax Benefit (renamed the Canada Child Tax Benefit) was expanded to
include a more generous supplement to low-income families regardless of
employment status. The rates of this credit have since been increased to
extend coverage of the credit up to families on relatively high-incomes. In
2002 around 80 percent of Canadian families with children received some
benefit from the Canada Child Tax Benefit [Whiteford, Mendelson, Millar,
2003, p. 91. Entitlement to the Canada Child Tax Benefit is based on net joint
income for the previous calendar year. There are no mid-year adjustments
for changes in income. Adjustments may, however, be made for changes in
family composition. A family whose income falls may be eligible for a top-up
of provincial assistance. As the Canadian tax system does not use a pay-as-
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you-earn withholding system the majority of Canadian taxpayers are required
to undertake an annual tax reconciliation process. As entitlement is based on
earnings in the previous year issues of overpayment and debt do not arise
[Whiteford, Mendelson, Millar, 2003, pp. 10-11].
Under the National Child Benefit reform provinces and territories are
replacing their social assistance child benefits with increased federal child
benefits and provincial income-tested programmes for low-income families
with children [Battle and Mendelson,2001, p. 109]. Under these reforms
provincial and territorial governments are expected but not required to reduce
their social assistance expenditures for children to take into account
increasing federal expenditures on the National Child Benefit Supplement,
provided that they reinvest savings in other programmes and services for
lowincome families with children [Battle and Mendelson, 2001, p. 105]. Most
provinces and territories now offer income-tested child benefit programmes
and/or employment earnings supplements for families with children. Four
provinces have added provincial supplements to the Canada Child Tax
Benefit. All the provincial child benefit programmes emphasise anti-povefi
objectives and are designed to mesh with the federal system in terms of
thresholds and reduction rates [Battle and Mendelson, 2001 , pp. 105-106].
United Kingdom
The first child tax allowances were introduced in 1909 on the grounds of
ensuring horizontal equity between taxpayers with children and those
without. Family Allowances were introduced in 1946 for second and
subsequent children. Family Allowances were intended to contribute to the
costs of raising children and it was assumed that wages would cover the cost
of the first child. Benefits for child dependants were included in the
contributory National Insurance and the non-contributory National Assistance
(renamed Supplementary Benefit in 1966 and Income Support in 1988)
[Millar,2001, p. 192]. The Child BenefitAct 1975 created a newsystem of
universal support. Both child tax allowances and Family Allowances were
abolished and the Child Benefit was introduced from April 1977 as a
universal cash payment for all children [Millar,2001, p. 192]. ln 1977 a
supplement to the Child Benefit for sole-parent families was introduced and
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was paid per-family not per-child. This supplement was abolished in July
1998 (although existing claimants can continue to receive it). A higher rate of
Child Benefit has been payable for the first child since 1991 lMillar, 2001, p.
1e31.
Since 1997 Labour governments have pursued welfare and taxation
reform with the objectives of making work pay and supporting families with
children. Governments have also committed to eradicating child poverty.
There has been a growth of a range of tax credits and benefits to address
child poverty and poverty among workers and improve incentives to work for
the low-waged and disabled. Central to these reforms has been the Working
Families' Tax Credit. Under the Working Family Tax Credit families on low-
incomes and where the main earner worked more than 16 hours per-week
were entitled to a Basic Tax Credit with an add-on if the main earner worked
more than 30 hours. The Working Families'Tax Credit was based on a six
monthly assessment of means so that once entitlement was established the
credit continued to be paid for the six months even if the family stopped
working during this period. A Child Tax Credit was also paid on the basis of
the ages of children and a childcare tax credit ol 70 percent of eligible
childcare costs was available.
Following a desire to produce a simpler tax credit system, in 2003 the
Working Families Tax Credit and Disabled Persons Tax Credit were replaced
by the Child Tax Credit and Working Tax Credit (discussed in greater detail
below). The six monthly assessment of need was removed. Entitlement is
initially based on the previous year's gross joint income. At year end there is
a reconciliation of entitlement. The first t2,500 increase in gross joint income
is disregarded for the current year (but is included in calculating entitlement
for future years). Thus if income increases by less than this amount
entitlement is not reduced. lf gross joint income falls then entitlement is
increased. However, backdated payments can only be made for a maximum
of three months [Whiteford, Mendelson, Millar, 2003, pp. 14-15]. The
establishment of the Child Tax Credit and Working Tax Credit were linked
with institutional changes, particularly the creation of the Department for
Work and Pensions and merging of the benefits and employment services
agency (JobOentre Plus).
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The United States
The United States has a federal political system with social security provided
at federal and state levels. Non-contributory social assislance programmes
(welfare) are less generous than contributory social insurance programmes
[Meyer, 2001, p. 263]. The United States has a long history of providing
assistance to families with children through the tax system. Indirect benefits
to families with children have been provided through the tax system for nearly
a century. The main mechanism for this support has been a tax exemption
for every individual in a family of the same amount for adults and children.
This provision was typically not seen as an explicit provision of benefits for
children but a response to these families' lesser abili$ to pay taxes [Meyer,
2001, pp. 259-2601.
The Earned Income Tax Credit was established in 1975 and initially
provided low levels of assistance. Levels of federal expenditure and
assistance per-recipient increased significantly following expansions of the
programme in 1986, 1990, and 1993. This expansion reflected bipartisan
political support for the programme, as it was seen as helping the working
poor rise above the poverty line without increasing the minimum wage or
funding to welfare programmes for those out of work. As well as the federal
programme, increasing numbers of state Earned Income Tax Credits have
been offered. These state programmes are extensions of the federal Earned
Income Tax Credit and are generally based on a percentage of the federal
programme. In more recent years, however, the Earned Income Tax Credit
has been subject to criticism due to a perceived proliferation of fraud and
abuse, increased costs, and expansion of the programme beyond working
poor families with children.
Expansion of the federal Earned Income Tax Credit has been
undertaken in conjunction with broader social security reform. The Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 1996 removed the
61-year-old Aid to Families with Dependent Children programme and the
Jobs Opportunity and Basic Skills Training Programme. In place of these
programmes the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families programme was
established. Lifetime limits of up to five years for receiving welfare were
introduced, work requirements were strengthened, and state governments
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were subject to financial incentives to reduce their welfare rolls. In 1997 a
non-refundable Child Tax Credit was established for families with children
and in 2001 was extended through being increased in value and being made
refundable for families with taxable earnings above a threshold.
Family and Employment Tax Credits Provided to Three Family Types
Payments of family and employment tax credits vary according to wage
rates, hours of work, family types, and family sizes. The family and
employment tax credits available to three family Vpes are modelled below.
The first family consists of a sole-parent earning an hourly gross wage rate of
NZ$10.00 and with two children aged three and five. The second family
consists of a partnered person earning an hourly gross wage rate of
NZ$15.00 and with a non-working spouse and two children aged three and
five. The third family consists of a partnered person earning an hourly gross
wage rate of NZ$15.00 and with a working spouse and two children aged
three and five.
Assistance is modelled according to hours of work (rather than income)
to separate low-wage families from higher'wage families with low hours of
work and thus low incomes. The family and employment tax credits modelled
are those in place for 2004-05. This is not a complete picture of all the
assistance to which these families would be entitled. Canada and the United
States also provide assistance through the personal income tax scale that is
not modelled and in these countries the levels of assistance provided at the
provincial or state level vary. The provincial-level and state-level assistance
modelled in this study are those of British Columbia for Canada and
Wisconsin for the United States, which both have relatively ungenerous tax-
benefit systems. These systems have been chosen to provide low-level
benchmarks against which the New Zealand system can be compared.
Emphasis is given to family and employment tax credits because of the
prominence of reform to these programmes in the five countries and their
importance for the financial incentives to work facing sole-parents and
secondary earners. All figures are in New Zealand dollars (adjusted using
OECD purchasing power parity rates for 2004) [OECD,2005b].
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A Sole-Parent with Two Children
Figure 7.1 illustrates the family and employment tax credits provided to a
sole-parent with two children and earning a wage rate of NZ$10.00 for up to
50 hours of work per-week. Australia and the United Kingdom generally
provide the most generous levels of assistance. Canada and the United
States are less generous than Australia and the United Kingdom. In New
Zealand the assistance provided is the least generous of the five countries.
Figure 7.1: Family and Employment Tax Credits for a Sole-Parent with Two Children
(Aged 3 and 5) and Earning $10.00 Per-Hour (2004'05)
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Variations in targeting regimes mean that the effects of changes in
hours of work on assistance differed in the five countries. These differences
indicate the degree to which the different countries targeted assistance on
the basis of family structure as opposed to paid employment. For this sole-
parent family Australia and Canada largely targeted assistance on the basis
of family structure. In Australia there was no change in the level of assistance
provided to this sole-parent at this wage rate if their hours of work varied
between zero and 50 hours per week. Family tax credits in Canada were also
largely targeted by family structure and not paid employment. At this wage
rate the sole-parent received similar levels of assistance from not working,
working part-time, or working full-time.
The United States placed greater emphasis upon targeting assistance
by paid employment. Under the federal Earned Income Tax Credit and state-
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level programme (the Wisconsin Earned Income Credit) the assistance
provided to the sole-parent increased with earnings from work until their
income reached a threshold. At low hours of work the levels of assistance
were low. This phase-in of assistance boosted financial incentives to
increase hours of work in this range. At a little over 30 hours a week this
family qualified for the Child Tax Credit, which provided assistance to families
with earned income above a threshold, and which only began to abate at
high-income levels. Above this threshold the level of assistance remained
stationary until the sole-parent's earned income reached the threshold for
abatement of the Earned Income Tax Credit (creating disincentives to
increase hours of work).
The United Kingdom provided a mixture of universal programmes,
programmes targeted by family structure, and programmes targeted by paid
employment (hours of work). Sole-parents who worked between zero and 16
hours per-week received a universal Child Benefit, a Family Element that
only began to abate at very high income levels, and a Child Tax Credit that
began to abate at relatively low income levels. At 16 hours of work the sole-
parent became eligible for a Working Tax Credit, which increased when they
became eligible for the Full-Time Premium at 30 hours of work. New Zealand
provided a mixture of programmes targeted by family structure and
programmes targeted by both family structure and paid employment (hours of
work and rules excluding welfare recipients). There was no change in the
level of assistance provided to this sole-parent until abatement of the Family
Assistance programmes began at just over 39 hours of work per week. In
New Zealand at around 47 hours of work the sole-parent exited welfare and
increased their entitlement with the work-based Child Tax Credit.
The Child Tax Credit contains a direct reduction in tax liability and a refundable component.
Families with earnings above US$10,750 may receive up to US$1,000 per child. lf any credit
remains following the direct reduction in tax liability the family may receive the refundable
component, which is calculated at a rate of 15 percent on income above the eligibility
threshold up to the maximum levelof the credit. The graphs show both the direct reduction in
tax liability and the refundable component of the credit. The sole-parent's tax liability
assumes they received one personal exemption and two dependent exemptions. The credit
abates at a rate of 5 percent against income in excess of US$75,000 for unmarried
individuals and US$110,000 for married people who file jointly.
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Table 7.3: Structure of Child Benefit Package for Sole-Parent With One Child
Earning Average Female Earnings (UKt Per-Month) (2001)
lncorns Income Universal Net Net ChildcareTax Related Child Rent Local costsChild Benelit Tax
Benefit
Net
after
all
Health
Costs
Net after
taxes
and
benefits
Australia
Canada
New
Zealand
United
Kingdom
United
States
Sources: Bradshaw and Finch, 2002, p, 139
This modelling of family and employment tax credits does not provide a
complete picture of all the assistance to which these families would be
entitled. However, the conclusion that New Zealand's tax-benefit
programmes had relatively low levels of generosity among the Anglo-
American countries is consistent with other research on the structure and
generosity of child benefit packages in OECD countries. Table 7.3 illustrates
the generosity of the child benefit package provided to a sole-parent with one
child and earning average female earnings in a selection (five Anglo-
American countries) of the countries contained in this other research. Income
tax assistance provided in New Zealand was less generous than the United
Kingdom, Australia, and the United States. Canada was alone in providing an
income related child benefit to this family and the United Kingdom was alone
in providing a universal child benefit to this family. New Zealand was the least
generous jurisdiction net after taxes and benefits. Ghildcare costs were high
in all the countries. At low earned income levels Australia and the United
States gave substantial assistance to offset childcare costs, New Zealand
and Canada less, and the United Kingdom relatively little. Australia and
Canada also increased the amount of income-related cash benefits for pre-
school aged children and the United Kingdom and the United States allowed
an otfset against taxable income for childcare costs. New Zealand and
Canada were the least generous jurisdictions net after all.
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A Partnered Person with a Non-Working Spouse and Two Children
Figure 7.2: Family and Employment Tax Credits for a Primary Earner with Two Children
(Aged 3 and 5) and Earning NZ$l5.00 Per-Hour (2004-05)
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Figure 7.2 illustrates the family and employment tax credits provided to a
partnered person earning a wage rate of NZ$15.00 with a non-working
spouse and two children. In partnered families when either the primary or
secondary earner change their hours of work total joint income changes. As
family and employment tax credits generally abate against total joint income
the levels of assistance provided to primary and secondary earners are
influenced by the hours of work of the other partner. Yet for modelling
purposes the levels of assistance below are calculated as individual
decisions, where only one person makes a labour supply decision and the
rest of the labour supply decisions in the family are held constant [Prebble
and Rebstock (eds.), 19921. Thus while the levels of assistance are those
provided to the family as a whole the hours of work are those applying to the
one individual who is assumed to be able to vary their hours of work.
Australia and the United Kingdom provided the most generous levels of
family and employment tax credits. Canada and the United States were
generally less generous than these two countries. In New Zealand in 2004-05
the assistance provided was the least generous of the five countries.
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Table 7.4: Structure of Child Benefit Package for Couple With Two Ghildren and
One Earner on Average Male Earnings (UKt Per-Month) (2001)
lncome Income Univ€rsal Net Net School Health N€t aftelTax Related Child Rent Local cost9 Costs taxesChild Benefit Tax benefits andBenefit benefits
Net
after
all
Australia
Canada
New
Zealand
United
Kingdom
United
States
106
0
6
0
60
0
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107
0
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0
0
0
0
0 0
0
0
0
0
-21
0
0
0
-12
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-46
90
37
-10
134
-78
155
-18r' 107
Sources: Bradshaw and Finch, 2002,p.137
Although this modelling of family and employment tax credits does not
provide a complete picture of all the assistance to which these families would
be entitled, the conclusion that New Zealand's tax-benefit programmes had
relatively low levels of generosity among the Anglo-American countries is
consistent with other research on the structure and generosity of child benefit
packages in OECD countries. Table 7.4 illustrates the generosity of the child
benefit package provided to a couple with two children and one earner on
average male earnings in a selection (five Anglo-American countries) of the
countries contained in this other research. Income tax assistance provided in
New Zealand was less generous than the United States, Australia, and the
United Kingdom. Canada was alone in providing an income related child
benefit to this family and the United Kingdom was alone in providing a
universal child benefit to this family. New Zealand was the least generous
jurisdiction net after taxes and benefits. Health costs were highest in the
United States. The United States and New Zealand were the least generous
jurisdictions net after all.
A Partnered Person with a Working Spouse and TWo Children
Figure 7.3 illustrates the family and employment tax credits provided to a
partnered person earning a wage rate of NZ$15.00 with a working spouse
and two children. lt is assumed the working spouse eamed a fixed income of
NZ$600 gross per-week (at a wage rate of NZ$15.00 per-hour and 40 hours
of work per-week).
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Figure 7.3: Family and EmploymentTax Credits for a Secondary Earner with Two
Children (Aged 3 and 5) and Earning NZ$l5.00 Per-Hour (2004'05)
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Australia and the United Kingdom provided the most generous levels of
family and employment tax credits. Canada and the United States were
generally less generous than these two countries. In New Zealand in 2004-05
the assistance provided was the least generous of the five countries. In all of
the five countries the secondary earner faced abatement of family and
employment tax credits from (or soon after) their first dollar of earnings. New
Zealand was the only country not providing base levels of assistance
received by families with relatively high joint incomes. In Australia the family
received a base rate of the Family Benefit Part A, in the United Kingdom the
family received a universal Child Benefit and a Family Element, in the United
States the family received a Child Tax Credit, and in Canada the family
received a National Child Benefit Supplement up to high hours of work.
Changing the numbers and ages of children in the family had some
impact on the structure of assistance identified in the cases above. As the
number of children in the family increased, the level of assistance paid to the
family also increased. As a consequence of this increase the abatement of
assistance took place over a larger number of hours of work. Likewise, in
New Zealand and Australia when the ages of children increased the level of
assistance paid to the families increased and the abatement of assistance
also took place over a larger number of hours of work. In the United Kingdom
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the levels of assistance provided to families with children under one would
have been greater than those modelled above.
Goals and Designs of Family and Employment Tax Gredits
The five Anglo-American countries have taken differing approaches to the
design of their tax credits. Australia places the strongest emphasis upon
targeting assistance by family structures and does not provide employment
tax credits, although there have been calls for such programmes [lngles,
20011. Since the 1998 removal of the Working Income Supplement (an
employment tax credit) the design of tax credits in Canada has also reflected
a strong emphasis upon targeting assistance by family structure [Battle and
Mendelson, 20011. Since 1986 New Zealand has provided family and
employment tax credits to low-income families with dependent children. The
United Kingdom provides a mixture of universal programmes, programmes
targeted by family structure, and programmes targeted by paid employment
(hours of work) [Millar, 2001]. Since 1975 the United States has provided an
employment tax credit to families with dependent children, which was
extended to working families without children in 1993 [Meyer, 2001]. In 1997
a Child Tax Credit was established for families with children and with taxable
earnings and was extended to include families with children and without
taxable earnings in 2001. Earned and family tax credits are also provided at
the provincial and state levels in Canada and the United States [Mendelson,
20011.
Designs of family tax credits differ in the five countries, reflecting
assumptions regarding the degree to which families' costs reflect the number
of children (the degree to which economies of scale in childrearing mean
each additional child incurs a lower marginal financial cost to the family) and
the age of children.
. In the targeting of this assistance by family structure the United States
(Child Tax Credit) takes a simple approach and does not differentiate
between additional and older children.
. Australia (Family Tax Benefit Part A) also takes a relatively simple
approach and does not ditferentiate between the first three children
(although there is a supplement for the fourth and additional children)
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but varies assistance by ages of children, with additional assistance for
older children.
New Zealand (Family Support Tax Credit) varies assistance by number
of chiHren (additional entitlement for the eldest child) as well as ages of
children, with additional assistance for older children.
The United Kingdom (Child Tax Credit, including the Fami$ Premium)
targets assistance by ages of children (increased assistance for
children under one) and number of children and provides a universal
Child Benefit that pays a higher annual rate for the eldest eligible child.
Canada (Canada Child Tax Benefit, including the National Child Benefit
Supplement) places the strongest emphasis on targeting family tax
credits by child-based criteria, with assistance varying by ages of
children (additional payments made for each child under the age of
seven) and number of children. Under the Canada Child Tax Benefit
regime additional payments are made for the third and each additional
child, rates of abatement vary between single and multiple chiH
families, and the levels of assistance vary between the first child,
second child, and additional children (assistance decreases for later
children).
The provision of greater assistance for older children in New Zealand
and Australia reflects an assumption that families' costs increase with the
age of children. In contrast Canada and the United Kingdom provide
additional assistance to younger children (under seven in Canada and under
one in the United Kingdom) and the United States does not target assistance
on the basis of age of children. In the United Kingdom research has shown
that while parents' average spending increases with the age of children this
increase was less than had previously been assumed in age-related scales in
benefits and allowances [Middleton, Ashworth, and Braithwaite, 1997].
Australian research has shown that that estimated average costs of children
increase with age and with gross joint income but precise estimates differ
according to the methodology employed (e.9., expenditure surueys or basket-
of-goods approaches) [Saunders, 1999]. There is a lack of equivalent
research on families'spending on children by age in New Zealand. However,
spending on younger children is often less discretionary than spending on
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older children and families with younger children often face costs that do not
have as great an impact on families with older children, such funding the
withdrawal of a caregiver from the labour market. lt could thus be argued
that age-related scales contained in New Zealand's Family Support
programme overcompensate families with older children (particularly for
additional children in the family),
Designs of employment tax credits also differ. Two approaches taken to
designing these programmes have been to base assistance on satisfying
hours-based eligibility thresholds (often in conjunction with rules reducing
receipt of assistance by welfare recipients) or to provide an earned income
subsidy that increases with earnings up to a threshold.
' In New Zealand employment tax credits are only available to families
with dependent children and following proposed reforms will largely
require satisfying hours-based eligibility criteria (20 hours per week for
sole-parents and 30 hours per week for partnered families). ln the
United Kingdom since 2003 the Working Tax Credit has been paid to
people in work both with and without children. Eligibility requires
satisfying an hours-based eligibility threshold (at least one income
earner in the family working 16 hours per week) and a full{ime premium
is paid when total family hours of work exceed 30 hours per week. This
use of hours-based thresholds in New Zealand and the United Kingdom
is likely to lead to distortions in distributions of hours of work and
appears inconsistent with the increasing use of employment contracts
requiring variations in hours of work, such as for seasonal work.
Since 1978 in the United States the Earned Income Tax Credit has had
a phase-in zone (where assistance increases with earnings), a
stationary range (where the level of assistance does not vary with
earnings), and an abatement zone. Although providing positive financial
incentives for labour supply this phase in of assistance has been
criticised on distributional (vertical equity) grounds. The rates for
families with two or more children have been increased relative to those
As Johnston [2005] illustrated New Zealand women tend to leave the labour force when
they have children and to retum strongly to the labour force when their children get older.
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for families with a single child. A smaller Earned Income Tax Credit has
been made available to childless families. The subsidy rates,
thresholds, and abatement rates vary between families with no, one,
and multiple children (all increasing with numbers of children) and vary
between married and unmarried families.
Employment tax credits are important for the financial incentives to work
facing sole-parents and secondary earners in families with children [OECD,
20011. With the exception of Australia (which had a rate of 58 percent), in
2001 the proportions of married mothers working in Anglo-American
countries were all around 70 percent, With the exception of the United States
(which had a rate of 68 percent), there were large differences in employment
rates between married and single mothers in each of the Anglo-American
countries, with single mothers' rates ranging from 46 percent in Australia to
51 percent in Canada [Stephens, 2003; OECD 2004b]. Evidence on
employment tax credits in the United States and United Kingdom indicated
that it is on this margin of caregivers' participation rates that the labour supply
behavioural responses to these programmes are likely to be strongest. This
evidence indicates that the overall increase in employment from these
programmes was composed of increases in employment of sole-parents,
smaller increases in employment of males in partnered families, and
decreases in employment among women in couples [Ellwood, 2000; Blundell,
Brewer, and Shephard, 2OO4; Eissa and Hoynes, 20041. Recent estimates on
the Working for Families reforms in New Zealand reached similar conclusions
[Kalb, Cai, and Tuckwell, 2005].
This result for mothers in couples reflects the use of joint income as the
basis for assessing entitlement. With the exception of the Family Tax Benefit
Part B (which abates solely against secondary earners'incomes) in Australia,
all Anglo-American family and employment tax credits are assessed on joint
income. Assessing entitlement on joint income encourages some secondary
earners to drop out of the labour market rather than working or registering for
unemployment assistance and leads to some families reducing their earned
incomes. Basing entitlement on joint income means secondary earners
generally face higher effective marginal tax rates from their first dollar of
income than primary earners and when secondary earners reduce their
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earned incomes there is little reduction (or an increase) in joint income. Some
secondary earners are effectively subsidised to stay at home [Eissa and
Hoynes, 20041. However, using individuals as the unit of assessment would
increase fiscal costs through increasing the number of eligible recipients
(particularly income-poor individuals with wealthy spouses) unless the
generosity of assistance was reduced, increase administration and
compliance costs (as both partners in a couple would be required to apply for
assistance), and be likety to lead to moral hazard (through partnered families
reallocating incomes and assets within families to minimise taxes or
maximise assistance) [Whitehouse, 1996; Stephens, 1994.
In Australia families largely dependent on a single income are eligible
for additional assistance (the Fami[ Tax Benefit Part B). Sole-parents are
not subject to any abatement of this additional assistance. In partnered
families this assistance only abates against the lowest income earner's
income. Partnered families face higher abatement of this programme (and
larger disincentives for work) when a secondary earner increases their
earned income than when a primary earner increases their earned income. In
the United States support for single-income partnered families is provided
through ditferences in income tax filing status for married couples and tax
exemptions for married spouses and dependants. This continued use of joint
taxation contrasts with the trend among OECD countries to move towards
separate taxation of couples to reduce disincentives to work facing
secondary earners IOECD, 2001]. Non-refundable tax rebates (only
available to taxpayers with some level of earned income) for the support of a
spouse or common law partner and a dependant are also provided in
Canada.
The five countries also take a variety of approaches to adjusting
assistance to fluctuations in recipients' circumstances due to, for example,
changes in job status, hours worked, and family status. Entitlement to the
Canada Child Tax Benefit is based earnings for the previous year, although
' Levying taxes on an individual rather than joint basis increases the personal income tax
base and allows personal income ta( rates to be reduced (shifts towards individual income
tax bases partly funded reductions in personal income tax rates in a number of OECD
countries during the 1980s and 1990s IOECD 2001a]).
172
adjustments can be made for changes in family composition. Failure to adjust
tax-based assistance during the year may lead to recipients experiencing
periods of hardship when incomes fall.
In other jurisdictions assessment based on current year income with
year-end square-ups and advance-payment schemes (that pay benefits
during the year) are used to increase the ability of tax credits to respond to
changing needs. A high proportion of recipients take-up assistance during the
year in New Zealand and these payments tend to be relatively accurate,
reflecting the largely automated nature of the administration of these
programmes with the tax authority adjusting levels of assistance when
families' incomes or welfare receipt change, However, administrative and
compliance issues, particularly low awareness of entitlements and potential
recipients' aversion to incurring debts from overpayments, have reduced the
effectiveness and take-up of advance-payment schemes in the United States
and United Kingdom [Whitehouse, 1996]. Under an advance payment
scheme with a year-end square-up, over-payments or under-payments may
arise if incomes fluctuate during the income tax year and the level of
assistance does not adjust. To minimise the problems of people incurring tax-
debts some small levels of debt are waived in Australia and in the United
Kingdom small levels of income changes are disregarded in the year-end
square-up process [Whiteford, Mendelson, and Millar, 2003]. Basing
entitlement on income at time of application and disregarding future changes
in income during the income tax year would avoid these ditficulties. This
approach could, however, lead to moral hazard through encouraging
recipients to suppress their income around time ol application through
altering the timing of income streams.
7.4 Conclusion
This chapter compared the New Zealand tax-benefit system and family and
employment tax credits with those in four other Anglo-American countries.
Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States have all
undertaken reform to their family and employment tax credits. Such reforms
are currently underway in New Zealand. This chapter illustrated the ditferent
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approaches taken to designing family and employment tax credits in these
countries. Of these designs the dual objective approach, particularly of the
United Kingdom, appears to offer greater opportunity for both directly
addressing relatively high rates of child poverty and increasing low-wage
caregivers' labour supply (as part of a broader poverty reduction strategy).
The United States has emphasised encouraging paid employment in
the design of family and employment tax credits. Generosity of assistance is
relatively low, which indicates a reluctance to subsidise caregivers'
withdrawal from the labour market. Labour market participation rates of sole-
parents and married mothers and poverty rates are relatively high. Reflecting
increases in caregivers' employment rates and relatively high rates of
economic growth, over the 1990s child poverty rates fell. With flexible labour
markets employment tax credits play an important role in reducing child
poverty through encouraging low-wage caregivers' employment. The
effectiveness of this assistance at reducing poverty would fall should
economic growth and rates of caregivers'employment decline. In this context
in the United States the growing emphasis on pursuing child-based goals
through extending the Child Tax Credit is significant.
Canada and Australia both place emphasis on targeting assistance by
family structure. In Canada relatively little emphasis is given to promoting
paid employment (except at the provincial level) and assistance strongly
differentiates between families on the bases of numbers and ages of
children. In Australia emphasis is placed upon maintaining family structures
(particularly single-income families with children), as shown by the generous
Family Tax Benefits provided to caregivers largely irrespective of
employment status and the higher abatement of these credits when
secondary income earners work for more than a few hours per week. In
these countries greater emphasis could be placed on the potential role
employment tax credits (improving financial incentives for low-wage
secondary earners' labour supply) as part of a strategy for reducing child
poverty, particularly in Australia where rates of caregivers' labour supply tend
to be relatively low.
The United Kingdom and New Zealand both aim to balance goals for
ensuring income adequacy among families with children and encouraging
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caregivers' labour supply. This approach has partly influenced the relatively
large fall in the rate of child poverly in the United Kingdom over the 1990s,
although take-up of tax credits has been relatively low. In New Zealand
emphasis is also given to reducing programmes' fiscal costs (providing
assistance on a more residual basis). In this country employment tax credits
are, for example, limited to families with children to both compensate these
families for the additional costs they face when working and to ensure that
assistance to working families is tightly targeted and fiscal costs reduced.
This highly residual nature of assistance in New Zealand was reflected in an
increasing rate of child povefi over the 1990s.
Within these broader attempts to reconcile policy goals the Anglo-
American countries have taken ditferent approaches to the designs of family
and employment tax credits. In their design of family tax credits, Australia,
New Zealand, and the United States have placed relatively little emphasis on
additional needs facing families with younger children, particularly the costs
of caregivers' withdrawal from the labour market in New Zealand. The United
Kingdom and New Zealand both use hours-based thresholds to exclude high-
wage and low-hour workers from receipt of their employment tax credits,
although (as argued in chapters 10 and 11) the use of these thresholds is
inconsistent with increasing use of employment contracts requiring flexibility
in hours of work.
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III EvNLUATING N EW ZENLA N D'S TNX -
BEruEFtr SvsrEM
I Income Adequacy
8.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses income adequacy and aims to identify whether there
are particular demographic groups of particular concern for this study. These
changes in incomes have taken place within important changes in patterns of
family structures and work in New Zealand. Section two of this chapter thus
discusses these changes in historical and comparative context. The chapter
then discusses the changing distribution of income (particularly income
inequality), poverty incidence, poverty gap, and poverty reduction
effectiveness of the tax-benefit system, and comparisons between New
Zealand poverty rates and rates in other Anglo-American countries. Following
this the chapter discusses living standards measures, which can indicate
which demographic groups forego consumption of certain items because of
their costs and can thus be used to verity analysis based on income
measures. Finally the duration of benefit receipt in New Zealand is
discussed. These discussions illustrate the interaction of labour market
outcomes and income adequacy outcomes and reinforce the need to address
low financial incentives for low-income families to supply labour or povefi
traps (considered in the following chapter).
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8.2 Population Heterogeneity and Income
Inequality
Increasing Heterogeneity of Families
Changes in the income distribution and living standards in New Zealand have
taken place within important changes in patterns of family structures.
Between 1976 and 2001 the percentage of two-parent families decreased
from 62 lo 42 percent of all families. In 2001 of the 967,614 families
(excluding one-person families) in New Zealand two-parent families
numbered 407,793. In this period there were corresponding increases in the
proportions of couples without children from 29 to 39 percent and sole-parent
families from 9 to 19 percent [Statistics New Zealand, 2002b, p. 9]. In 2001
sole-parent families numbered 182,919. Since 1976 there has also been a
significant increase in one-person families [Statistics New Zealand, 2002b, p.
101. In 2001 one-person families numbered 307,635.
In 2001 the majority (53 percent) of sole-parent families had one child.
Partnered families were more likely to include two children (39 percent) than
one child (35 percent). Larger families were less common with 26 percent of
partnered families and 18 percent of sole-parent families having three or
more children. Among families with children the patterns of family size
showed little change between 1991 and 2001 . One-child families accounted
for an increasing proportion of total families. Beneficiary families tended to
have lower numbers of children than the wider population.
These changes in New Zealand can be seen in the light of trends in
similar countries. Table 8.1 compares a number of demographic and labour
market indicators for New Zealand and four other Anglo-American countries.
The other countries are Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. In these countries increases in divorce and non-marital
childbearing and shifts in the living arrangements of young adults and
families have led to rises in sole-parenthood, single adults living alone, and a
decline in extended families [Singley and Callister, 2003, p. 2l.While New
Zealand and the United States have the largest proportions of families
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headed by a sole-parent and incidences of teenage births among Anglo-
American countries, all five countries are above the OECD average for these
outcomes, which are significant indicators of hardship and poor child
outcomes [Jacobsen, MayS, et a\,2002]. There is an ethnic dimension to the
results for New Zealand and the United States, with Maori and Pacific in New
Zealand and African-American and Hispanics in the United States having
higher incidences of sole-parenting and teen births than the dominant
European populations, although the results for the predominant European
populations are stillwell above the OECD average [Stephens, 2000].
Table 8.1: Anglo-American Demographic and Labour Market Indicators (2001)
Country Children Sole- Manied Sole Female Fertility Births Teen
Under 16 Parents Mothers Mothers Eamings Rate Out Of Births
f/.) eht. Working Working (% Male) Marriage
Australia
Canada
New
Zealand
United
Kingdom
United
States
74
73
50
68
58
70'
68
68
68
21
17
29
22
29
20
20
23
20
21
46
51
47
81
72
76
1.7
1.5
2.0
1.6
2.1
28.7
42.O
40.1
33.0
4.7
5.7
8.4
7.6
12.3
. Allwomen aged 16 or older
Source: Nolan, Stephens, and Callister,2005, p.2
Increasing Polarisation of Work
As well as patterns of family structures, the Anglo-American countries have
also experienced significant changes in labour market outcomes. In the five
countries there has been an increase in the labour market participation of
females, particularly in managerial professions, and a decrease in labour
market participation rates of males, particularly blue-collar workers [Singley
and Callister, 2003, p. 31. In these countries changes in family structures and
labour markets have influenced the polarisation of work, with a growth in both
work-rich families (including dual-earner couples) and, with the exception of
the United States, work-poor families (including couples where neither
partner is in paid work) [Singley and Callister, 2003; Gregg, Scutella, and
Wadsworth, 20041.
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With the exception of Australia, which has a relatively low proportion of
married mothers working despite a relatively high level of female earnings,
proportions of married mothers working in Anglo-American countries are
similar. ln New Zealand the increasing incidence of dual-income families
reflects the strong relationship between age of the youngest child in the
family and the labour market status of the mother. As Johnston [2005, p. 14]
has illustrated, New Zealand women tend to leave the labour force when they
have children and to return strongly to the labour force when their children
get older. With the exception of the United States there are large differences
in employment rates between married and sole mothers in each of the Anglo-
American countries. Proportions of sole mothers working have risen in the
five countries over the last decade with the largest increase occurring in New
Zealand, where their employment rate has risen from 27 percent in 1991
[Nolan, Stephens, and Callister, 2005, p.21.
Singley and Callister [2003] illustrated the incidence of jobless families
within fami[ types in New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United
States in 2000. In all three countries single families had the highest
percentages of joblessness, with sole-parents having higher rates of
joblessness than single adults. Partnered families had much lower rates of
joblessness than single families and partnered families without children had
higher rates of joblessness than partnered families with children. New
Zealand and the United Kingdom had similar proportions of jobless families
within family type. The United States had much lower proportions of sole-
parent and single adult iobless families. The proportions of jobless partnered
with children families were simihr in the three countries.
Since the mid 1980s the trends for jobless families have generally
followed broader economic trends. New Zealand, Australia, and the United
Kingdom experienced both periods of growth and periods of decline in the
proportion of prime-aged jobless families. In comparison to these three other
countries the United States had a lower proportion of jobless families and
relatively little change in the proportion of jobless families until the fall in this
rate following sustained economic growth during the 1990s [Singley and
Callister, 20031.
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Income lnequality 1984 to 1998
Since 1984 the New Zealand income distribution has undergone significant
change. When reviewing changes in incomes in New Zealand from 1991 to
1998, Mowbray [2001, p. 8] identified that family incomes in dollar terms,
which fell throughout the 1980s, reached a low point between 1992 and
1994. This fall was associated with the business cycle, with the economy
moving into recession at the end of the 1980s and entering a recovery phase
from 1991 [Bakker and Creedy, in O'Dea, 2000]. Mowbray [2001, p. 8] also
identified that between 1994 and 1998 family income levels recovered,
although not to the levels of the 1980s.
As well as this trend for falling real family incomes there was also a
trend for increasing income inequality. To illustrate this changing income
inequality the findings of a number of studies of the changing Gini coefficient
in New Zealand are presented in table 8.2. The Gini coefficient indicates the
extent to which the Lorenz curve deviates from the line of equality. The Gini
coetficient measures the area between the line of equality and the actual
income distribution and can have a value of between zero and one, where
zero implies total equality (everyone has the same income) and one implies
total income inequality (all income is in the hands of one person) [Creedy,
1999, p. 413; O'Dea, 20001.
The studies of the changing Gini coetficient in New Zealand presented
in table 8.2 employed a range of ditferent income measures. However, these
studies are all based on Household Economic Survey data and show an
increase in income inequality from 1983 to 1995. The bulk of this increase
occurred between 1985 and 1990. Gini coefficients based on census data
confirm these results [Martin, 1998, in O'Dea, 2000]. The Statistics New
Zealand [1999] study allows the increase in income inequality due to
changing composition of family structures to be isolated. The increase in the
Gini coefficient from 1985 to 1995 on the basis of family market income was
0.077 and of this 0.013 was due to change in family structures. Changes in
family structure were thus responsible for 17 percent of the increase in
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income inequality on the basis of family market income. Changes in family
structure had a much smaller etfect on the increase in inequality of
disposable equivalised income. Of this increase, changes in family structure
only accounted for 1.5 percent.
Tabfe 8.2: Estimates of Gini Coetticients in New Zealand (1983-84 to 1995-96)
Income Concept 1983- 1985- 1990- 1991- 1995-84 86 91 92 96
Podder and Gross Equivalised 0.353
Chatterjee [19981
0.394
0.407
0.254
0.255
0.453
o.454
0.305
0.303
0.404
0.471
o.471
0.322
0.322
0.398
(199s
to
1se8)
Statistics New
Zealand [1999]
Statistics New
Zealand [19991
Hyslop and Mar6
[1eee]
Family Market
Actual
- with
Demographic
Adjustment
Disposable
Equivalised
- with
Demographic
Adjustment
Gross Family
lncome
0.347
(1s83
to
1988)
Source: O'Dea,2000
To further illustrate the drivers of this increase in income inequality,
O'Dea [2000] reviewed research that isolates the etfect of a range of
demographic factors (e.9., age, sex, and family type) on rising income
inequality in New Zealand. Key findings of this study were that:
. Influencing the change in income lnequality at a family level were
changes in family composition (such as the relative share of sole-parent
and two parent families), the age profile of the population, and
qualifications.
. Influencing the change in income inequality at an individual level were
age, sex, ethnicity, and qualifications.
' The Lorenz curve graphs the cumulative distribution of income against the cumulative
distribution of people. The line where the relative population share equals the cumulative
income share (the 45 degree diagonalfrom the origin) is the line of equality.
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. Falling labour force participation rates for men contributed to income
inequality. At a family level rising female labour force participation may
have partially masked the effect of falling male participation on changes
in income inequality.
. Reflecting life cycle changes (such as increasing earnings with
workforce experience and income falling in child-bearing age-groups for
women) an individual's age strongly influenced their income.
. Due to difficulty in measuring important contributors to inequality no
study could explain more than 60 percent of the increase in income
inequality. For example, while studies assume that qualifications can
act as a proxy for changes in skill levels there are a range of skills (such
as interpersonal skills) not captured by the type of qualifications people
hold.
Overall the key drivers of the increase in income inequality included changes
in wages and salaries (wages and salaries comprise the large majority of
market income), changes in family composition (especially the growth in sole-
parent families and older families without children), a growing proportion of
workers in their prime earning years and with higher educational
qualifications, and changes in employment outcomes [O'Dea, 2000].
The Composition of Low-lncome Families 1988 to 1998
The discussion above emphasised changes in the inequality of incomes in
New Zealand. The following section, in contrast, focuses only on those
families at the bottom of the income distribution. Mowbray [2001] found that
in 1998 families with children tended to cluster in the bottom two-fifths of the
income distribution. Families with children had lower equivalised disposable
incomes than families without children, irrespective of the numbers of adults
present in the family [Mowbray, 2001, pp. 21 and 29-31]. Table 8.3 illustrates
the percentage of different family types in the lowest income quintile. These
data are based on disposable family incomes equivalised with the Revised
Jensen Scale [Mowbray, 2001, pp. 12 and 21]. From 1998 to 1990, 19
percent of families with children had incomes in the bottom quintile of
equivalised family income. By 1992 this had increased to 29 percent. This
incidence of low incomes among families with children remained at around
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this level until 1996, when the incidence fell to24 percent. In 1998 a quarter
of families with children were in the lowest income quintile. Families with
three or more children were most likely to be in the lowest quintile than
families with one or two children.
Table 8.3: Families in Quintile One by Number of Children (1988-1998)
Family Type 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
(Percentage Within Lowest Quintile)
One-Child Family
Two Child Family
Three-Child Family
Four Or More-Child Family
Any Children or Dependent
Young People in Q1
11
16
27
6
39
13
19
25
42
38
22
30
36
47
61
16
24
29
39
48
19
23
19
34
43
27
26
31
50
56
Percentage of Families with
Children or Dependent Young
People in Q1
Percentage of Children or
Dependent Young People in
Q1
Source: Mowbray, 2001, p. 31
Sole-parents were more likely to lie toward the lower end of the income
distribution. In 1988 and 1989 approximately 20 percent of sole-parents had
equivalised disposable incomes that put them in the lowest income quintile.
The proportion of sole-parents in the lowest income quintile increased to
approximately 34 percent in 1991 and 50 percent in 1992, possibly reflecting
the 1991 reductions in main welfare benefits [Mowbray,2001, p.35]. The
incidence of sole-parents in the lowest income quintile remained at this level
until 1994, atter which it reduced to 44 percent in 1996 and 38 percent in
1998 [Mowbray, 2001, p. 35].
Factors such as age of youngest child and family size were also
correlated with low incomes. The distribution of family incomes by age of
youngest child indicated that families with younger children were more likely
to have lower incomes and that generally the level of family income rose with
the age of youngest child. For sole-parents the age of youngest child was a
more significant factor at the low end of the income distribution than it was for
couples. There was also some correlation between family size and income,
with larger families being less likely to have higher incomes than smaller
families.
1919
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The proportion of beneficiary families in the lowest income quintile
increased from 28 percent in 1990 to 42 percent in 1991. In 1992 the
proportion had increased to 57 percent. The proportion fell to 54 percent in
1994 and 43 percent of families that received a main welfare benefit had
disposable incomes that placed them in the bottom quintile of the income
distribution in 1998. The mean equivalised income of families that included a
recipient of a main welfare benefit was 72 percent of the average disposable
family income in 1982. The mean equivalised income of beneficiary families
fell to between 65 and 72 percent until 1990. After 1991 the mean
equivalised family income of beneficiaries fell to 57 percent [Mowbray, 2001,
p. 351.
8.3 Poverty
The section above identified that families with children tended to cluster in
the bottom two-fifths of the income distribution. Among these families low
incomes were also correlated with larger family size, younger children, sole
parenthood, and receipt of a main welfare benefit. To assess whether or not
the incomes of these low-income families were not only relatively low but also
inadequate, the following section summarises research on the changing
poverty incidence, poverty gap, and poverty reduction effectiveness from
1984 to 1998 and from 1998 to 2001. The 1984 to 1993 period saw a large
increase in poverty, particularly reflecting the 1991 benefit reductions and
declining rates of economic growth. By 1998 rates of poverty had begun to
fall but between 1998 and 2001 rates of child poverty had begun to increase
again.
Poverty Incidence 1984 to 1993
The Povefi Measurement Project used a focus group methodology to
establish a poverty line related to current economic conditions and social
policies. This threshold was then adjusted in line with consumer prices to
give an absolute measure [Stephens, 1999, p. 2521. The Poverty
Measurement Project calculated that from 1984 to 1993 the percentage of
families below the consumer price adjusted poverty line before housing costs
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rose from 4.3 percent of (42,000 families and 159,000 people) to 10'8
percent of families (1 16,000 families and 393,000 people). In 1984 the family
types with the highest incidences of poverty were adults with three or more
chifdren (with a povefi incidence of '14 percent) and sole-parents (with an
incidence of 1 1.8 percent). By 1993 sole-parents had the highest poverty
incidence of all family types of 46.2 percent. The poverty incidence of adults
with three or more children had increased to 24j percent [Stephens, 1999,
p. 2521. Overall, families with dependent children had higher poverty
incidences than families without and these incidences rose with the number
of children in the family [Stephens, 1999, p.2521.
The increasing incidence of poverty among sole-parents was reflected
in a change in the structure of overall poverty. Sole-parents accounted for an
increasing proportion of families in pover$, rising from 10.1 to 22.8 percent of
all families. Single adults also accounted for a greater proportion of the
structure of poverty, increasing from 15.4 in 1984 to 17.4 percent in 1993 and
becoming the second most common type of family in poverty. Adults with
three or more children and adults with two children accounted for lower
proportions of the structure of poverty (falling trom 28.2 to 15.7 percent and
18.8 to 11.2 percent respectively) but still accounted for significant
proportions of all the families in poverty [Stephens, 1999, p. 253].
The Poverty Measurement Project also estimated changes in a relative
poverty measure based on 60 percent of median family disposable income.
However, as O'Dea [2000] has argued, from 1985 to 1995 in New Zealand
the median income fell but the mean income increased.
This is an unusual situation in that means and medians usually move
more or less in parallel. The fact that they [had not moved in parallel
between 1985 and 19951 shows in itself that there have been significant
changes to the income distribution. These disparate trends have
bedevilled discussion of 'povertt' over this period. lf a 'poverty line' is
defined as some percentage of the median [...] then a decline in the
median can result in a lower percentage of families apparently being 'in
povertt', even when the position of those near the bottom end of the
distribution is perhaps worsening [O'Dea, 2000, p. 26].
Thus, as median income fell the poverty line benchmarked against median
income fell also:
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Between 1984 and 1993, median income fell by 17.1 per cent, with
similar declines for each of the bottom five deciles. This dramatic fall in
the benchmark poverty level meant that the incidence of poverty
remained constant between 1984 and 1991, but then fell from 13.7 per
cent to 10.8 per cent in 1993. This fall was due to the substantial
reduction in poverty among single adults, from 25.9 per cent in 1991 to
9.1 per cent in 1993. The poverty line went from marginally above to
marginally below the level of New Zealand Superannuation. Yet most
family groups actually had an increase in their incidence of poverty; for
example, 35.8 per cent of sole parents were poor in 1991, compared
with 46.2 per cent in 1993 [Stephens, 1999, p.254].
The Poverly Measurement Project also estimated that between '1984
and 1993 the overall effectiveness of the tax-benefit system at reducing
poverty had fallen from 88.7 to73.2 percent. The largest falls were in poverty
reduction effectiveness of families with children. The poverty reduction
effectiveness rate for sole-parents fell from 85.4 to 46.6 percent, for
partnered adults with three or more children from 63.6 to 27.2 percent, for
partnered adults with two children from 57.1 to 49.8 percent, and for
partnered adults with one child from 73.9 to 54.1 percent [Stephens, 1999, p.
2531. Poverty reduction effectiveness declined as the number of children in
the family increased.
Poverty lncidence 1998 to 2000
In 1998 families without dependent children were the largest single family-
type in poverly. The poverty incidence increased with the number of children
in the family. The higher poverty incidence for larger families and the ethnic
composition of poverty were related (although segmenting the total
population into ethnic groups could at times obscure the heterogeneity within
such groups lOhapple, 2000, p. 103-106; Baehler, 2002, p. 18i). As well as a
higher incidence of poverty, Maori and Pacific lslander groups had, on
average, larger families, lower employment rates and lower work incomes
[Stephens, 1999, p.254). Further, over a third of beneficiaries were below the
60 percent threshold, compared to ten percent of families with one person
employed and five percent with two employees in the fami[. However,
although the incidence of poverty was low among working families, almost 30
percent of the families below the 60 percent povefi line were working
families [Stephens and Waldegrave, 2001].
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Table 8.4: Incidence and Severity of Poverty (f 997 and 2000)
(a) Before Adjusting lor Housing Costs
Poverty All
Incidence 1997 2O0O
Adults 65+ Children 0-18
1997 2000 1997 2000
Adults 18-64
1997 2000
Market 28.4
Disposable '|-5.7
27.4
16.3
18.2 18.3 76.9 71.2 30.8 29.9
11.0 13.2 30.0 17.9 20.5 23.9
Etficiency 44.7% 40.5"/" 39.6% 27.9"/o 61.00/o 74.9/o 33.4o/o 20.1"/"
Poverty Gap ($)
Market 5,668 6,625 993 1,555
Disposable 598 729 235 341
Efficiency 89.4% 89.0olo 76.30/o 78.1o/o
3,440 1,449 1,630
u 246 354
99.0olo 83.0% 86.3%
3,226
117
96.4o/o
(b) After Adjusting for Housing Costs
Poverty All
Incidence rcg7 20OO
Adults 65+ Children 0-18
1997 2000 1997 2000
Adults 18-64
1997 2000
Market 29.7
Disposable 20.3
Efficiency 31.60lo
Poverty Gap ($)
Market 6,059 7,283 1,059 1,654 3,222 3,438 1,778 2,191
Disposable 1,211 1,589 422 626 146 115 643 848
Efficiency 80.0% 78.2"/" 60.2% 62.2V" 95.5% 96.7Y" 63.80l" 61.3Vo
Source: Wafdegrave, Stephens, and King, 20O3, p.207
Table 8.4 presents findings of the New Zealand Poverty Measurement
project on the poverty incidence and poverty gap for 1997 and 2000. This
table uses data derived from the 1997-98 and 2000-01 HES surveys, which
are centred on September 1997 and December 2000. Thus the 2000-01 HES
data do not provide complete annual data on policy changes such as the 1
April 2000 increase in the partnered rate of superannuation to above 65
percent of the net average ordinary time weekly earnings. The 1997-98 year
is thus listed as 1997 and the 2000-01 year as 2000 [Waldegrave, Stephens,
and King, 2003, p. z07l.The poverty threshold has been updated on a
relative basis (percentage of median family disposable income).
On the basis of market income the poverty incidence before housing
costs for the population as a whole fell from 28.4 to 27.4 percent. There was
also little change in the poverty incidence on the basis of disposable income,
which increased from 15.7 to 16.3 percent. The population group who had
the largest change in their poverty incidence between 1997 and 2000 was
adults 65 and older. The disposable income poverty incidence for this group
30.2 19.5 21.2
21.9 16.7 18.8
27.5"/o 14.4o/o 11.3"/"
75.3 70.6 33.5 33.9
12.3 10.8 33.5 35.0
83.7o/o 84.7o/" 0.Q/" -3.2%
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fell from 30.0 percent in 1997 to 17.9 percent in 2000 due to the policy of
restoring of the pension level to 65 percent of average weekly earnings.
For both adults aged 18 to 64 and children there were little changes to
the market income poverty incidence between 1997 and 2000. However, for
both of these groups the disposable income poverty incidence increased
(from 11.0 to 13.2 percent for adults 18 to 64 and from 20.5 to 23.9 for
children), reflecting a decrease in the poverly reduction effectiveness of the
social assistance system. The effectiveness of the social assistance system
at reducing poverty among adults 18 to 64 fell from 39.6 to 27.9 percent and
for children from 33.4 to 20.1 percent. Possible reasons for this fall in the
poverly reduction etfectiveness for children were the lack of indexation of the
Family Assistance programmes and the exclusion of beneficiary families from
receipt of the Child Tax Credit [St John and Craig, 2004]. The incidence of
poverg was higher for children than for adults aged 18 to 64. Children's
disposable income poverty incidence increased from 20.5 percent to 23.9
percent in 2000.
The poverty incidence and poverty reduction etfectiveness for adults
aged 18 to 64 and children worsened when housing costs were taken into
account. For adults aged 65 and above the poverty incidence and poverty
reduction effectiveness improved when housing costs were taken into
account, possibly reflecting the relatively high rates of home ownership
among this group.
New Zealand's Poverty Incidence Rankings
As shown in table 8.5, Perry [2004] estimated that, based on a poverty
threshold of 60 percent of the equivalised family median income, in 2000-01
New Zealand's child poverly rate (ot 22 percent) was above the European
Union average (of 19 percent) but similar to the rates of Canada and the
United Kingdom (of 23 and 24 percent). Child poverty was notably less than
that of the United States (of 30 percent). Data on Australia was not presented
in this study. With the exception of the United States, the listed Anglo-
American countries thus had similar incidences of child poverty.
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Table 8.5: International Estimates of Child Poverty at 600/o Family Median Income
(2000-01)
United States
Portugal
Spain
lreland
Italy
United Kingdom
Canada
New Zealand (2001)
European Union Average
Greece
France
Netherlands
Germany
Belgium
Sweden
Finland
Denmark
30"/"
27o/"
26Y"
260/o
25"/o
24o/o
23o/o
22Yo
19/o
'l8To
18o/o
16o/o
14"/o
13To
1OYo
6o/o
5o/o
Source: Perry,20O4, p. 41
This result that Anglo-American countries, with the exception of the
United States, have similar incidences of poverty has been found by other
studies. Using the 2000 Luxembourg Income Study and a poverty threshold
of 60 percent of family median income, Fritzell and Ritakallio [2004]
estimated the incidence of poverty at 23.6 percent in the United States, 19.5
percent in the United Kingdom, and 17.1 percent in Canada. Using a slightly
different methodology Waldegrave, Stephens, and King [2003] estimated a
poverty incidence of 16.3 percent in New Zealand. In 1994 Australia had a
poverty incidence comparable to New Zealand. Based on poverty thresholds
of 50 percent of median family equivalised disposable income, the Australian
child poverty rate for 1993-94 was estimated at 11 percent, for 1996-1997
was estimated at 13 percent, and for 1 997-1998 was estimated at 12 percent
[Bradbury, 2003a; Perry, 20041. The New Zealand child poverty rate at this
threshold for 1994 to 1998 was estimated to range from 11 to 14 percent and
for 2001 was estimated at 14 percent [Perry, 2OO4).
Recent UNICEF research on child poverty in OECD countries has
ranked New Zealand (with the fourth highest poverty incidence at 16,3
percent) behind Australia (ninth highest at 14.7 percent), Canada (eighth
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highest at 14.9 percent), and the United Kingdom (seventh highest at 15.4
percent) for rates of child poverty based on a poverly threshold of 50 percent
of equivalised median income for 2001 IUNICEF, 2005]. At 21.9 percent the
United States had the second highest incidence of chiH poverty in the OECD
behind Mexico. These of rates child poverty had fallen from the rates in the
earfy 1990s by 3.1 percent in the United Kingdom, 2.4percent in the United
States, 1.7 percent in Australia, and 0.4 percent in Canada. In New Zealand
over this period child poverty rose 2.0 percent. This study thus confirms that
the Anglo-American countries, with the exception of the United States, have
similar rates of child poverly, particularly when seen in contrast to Nordic
countries such as Denmark (at2.4 percent), Finland (at 2.8 percent), Norway
(at 3.4 percent), and Sweden (at 4.2 percent).
8.4 Living Standards
Living standards measures can indicate which demographic groups forego
consumption of certain items because of their costs. These measures can
thus be used to verity analysis based on income measures. The following
section of this chapter thus discusses data on living standards based on an
Economic Living Standard Index (ELSI) produced by the Ministry of Social
Development. The ELSI scale takes detailed indicators of well-being and
aggregates them into a single score of living standards. Indicators of well-
being are drawn from survey data collected for the purpose of measuring
living standards [Jensen, Krishnan, et al, 2003, pp.72-73]. This scale is an
output measure.
The Economic Living Standard Index, or ELSI, is based on what people
are consuming, their various forms of recreation and social participation,
their family facilities and so on, rather than being calculated from the
resources (income, financial and assets) that enable them to do these
things pensen, Krishnan, et al, 2003, p.741.
40 items are included on the ELSI scale. Data on these items are combined
to give an ELSI score with a range from 0 (very low living standard) to 60
(very high living standard). The range of scores is then converted into seven
score intervals (living standard levels) pensen, Krishnan, et al, 2003, p. 751.
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Incidence of Low Living Standards
Overall a large proportion of the population (80 percent) have living
standards that place them in the "fairly comfortable" (level 4) to "very good"
(level 7) score intervals. However, average living standard scores vary widely
between different types of economic family units. Sole-parents have the
lowest average living standards of all economic family unlt types. This can
partly be explained by the high proportion of sole-parents who rely on an
income-tested benefit for an inCome source [Jensen, Krishnan, et al, 2003,
pp.82-831.
In 2000, 13 percent of all dependent children had living standard levels
of either category one or two, 16 percent had category three, 41 percent had
categories four and five, and 30 percent had categories six and seven. Table
8.6 presents data on the propensity for children to experience constraints in
consumption by living standard level. Children in families with ELSI scores at
the lower end of the scale were more likely to experience constraints on
consumption of child-specific goods and services than children in families
with higher ELSI scores.
For those with scores that place them in the "restricted" or "somewhat
restricted" categories of the scale, it is at least twice as likely that they
will experience postponement of trips to the doctor or dentist or not have
suitable wet weather clothing. lt is also at least twice as likely that books
(including school books) will go unbought, computers or internet access
will be unavailable at home, school outings will be skipped, cultural
lessons and sports involvement will be foregone, and childcare services
will go unpurchased [Jensen, Krishnan, et al, 2003, pp. 82-83].
Overall this research illustrated that beneficiary families, sole-parents,
and Maori and Pacific groups were relatively likely to have low living
standards. Working families had better living standards than beneficiary
families even when family incomes were similar. Employment thus plays an
important role in influencing living standards and variations in living standards
can only be partly explained by income differences.
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Table 8.6: Constraints in Consumption Experienced By Children (2000)
Restricted
Living
Standards
(1 &2)
o/o
Somewhat Comfortable Good Living
Restricted Living StandardLiving Standards (6 & 7)
Standards (4 & 5)
o/o(3)
o/o
Items not obtained and activities not participated in because of cost
Suitable wet weather
clothing for each chiH
A pair of shoes in good
condition
Child's bike
Playstation
Personal computer
lnternet access
Pay for childcare services
Have children's friends over
for a meal
Have enough room for
children's friends to stay the
night
Have children's triends to a
birthday party
31
17
24
29
59
59
28
13
15
14
3
I
23
29
30
13
5
2
3
1
4
9
20
19
I
2
2
2
0
1
2
3
1
0
0
Items of consumption cut back on (a little or a lot) because of cosl
Not gone on school outings 51
Not bought school 38
books/supplies
Not bought books for home 58
Postponed child's visit to the 31
doctor
Postponed child's visit to the 18
dentist
Child went without glasses 9
Child went without cultural 54
lessons
Child's involvement in sports 54
limited
Child wore bad-fitting clothes 57
or shoes
Children share a bed 21
Limited space for children to 45
study or play
23
18
38
13
10
8
41
34
31
18
28
7
5
17
3
4
1
20
13
13
3
12
1
1
3
0
0
4
0
5
Source: Jensen, Krishnan, et al, 2003, p. 83
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Perry l2002l argued that internationally there is a mismatch between
income-based and outcome-based poverty measures typically in the range of
50 to 60 percent. Perry estimated that, based on a poverty threshold of 60
percent of median equivalised fami$ income, in New Zealand the overlap
between income and deprivation measures is 40 percent [Perry, 2002, p.
1091. This mismatch occurs as:
The link between current income and actual living conditions is [...] not
straightforward as there are many factors other than current income that
significantly atfect consumption and therefore current material well-
being. These factors can ditfer significantly from family to family, so that
even when their current incomes and consumption needs are the same
or similar, their living standards differ [Perry,2002, p. 105].
The overlap between the measures is dependent on the level at which
the poverty threshold is set. Increasing the poverty threshold increases the
overlap, although at even a generous poverty threshold (of 70 percent of
median equivalised family income) the mismatch is still significant (in the
order of 50 percent) [Perry, 2002, p. 112]. Measuring income over a longer
period also increases overlap [Perry , 2002, p. 1 13]. Yet in spite of this
mismatch research on living standards can help identify priority groups for
intervention and be used to verify analysis of the effects of government
interventions on the distribution of income.
8.5 Duration of Benefit Receipt
Influencing the rate and incidence of jobless families, poverty, and low living
standards in New Zealand are trends for the duration of receipt of and
repeated spells on main welfare benefits. As Gardiner and Hills [1999, in
O'Dea, 20001 have argued:
It is important to distinguish between at least three groups: the
persistently poor, the recurrently poor and the temporarily poor. [...]
Much current government policy [...] is aimed at getting people who are
currently out of work into work. The extent of recurrent poverty [...]
suggests that policy needs to pay attention not just to the first transition,
off benefit and into work. lt also needs to focus on subsequent
transitions, stopping the same people simply cycling between benefits
and work, much of it low paid [Gardiner and Hills, 1999, in O'Dea, 2000,
p.44.
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The probability of a person's spell on a social welfare benefit ending
decreases as benefit duration increases. This could be due to a wide range
of factors, such as reservations employers may have about hiring long-term
unemployed workers, discouragement that may arise when a person has
been unable to move otf a benefit for a long period, or a composition effect,
where, as the length of time on benefit increases, people with low
probabilities of employment account for greater proportions of those who
receive assistance [Wilson, 1999, p. 66; Wilson, 2002, p. 48].
Wilson [1999] examined administrative data on the duration of receipt of
and numbers of spells on main working-aged social welfare benefits,
excfuding supplementary benefits and New Zealand Superannuation,
between 1993 and 1998 for a cohort of around 250,000 people who were
granted a working aged benefit in 1993. This paper found that:
. For an estimated 54 percent of recipients the duration of receipt of the
first observed spell on a benefit was less than 20 weeks.
. For an estimated 79 percent of recipients the duration of receipt for the
first spell on a benefit was less than one year.
. For an estimated 93 percent of recipients the duration of receipt for the
first spell on a benefit was less than three years.
' For an estimated four percent of recipients the duration of receipt for the
first spell on benefit was at least five years [Wilson, 1999, p. 66].
The duration of the first spell on a benefit varied among the benefit types. lt
was estimated that approximately three percent of Unemployment Benefit
recipients spent all of the five years from 1993 to 1998 receiving a benefit. In
contrast, it was estimated that approximately 26 percent of Domestic
Purposes Beneficiaries, 39 percent of Widows Benefit recipients, 58 percent
of Invalids Benefit recipients, and 15 percent of Sickness Benefit recipients
spent all of the five years receiving a benefit [Wilson, 1999, p. 68].
For those people who transfer to another benefit or return to a benefit
after some period otf a benefit, the duration of the first spell on a benefit
understates the length of time that they spend on a benefit. In terms of the
total time on a benefit an estimated eight percent of the cohort spent all of the
five-year period on a benefit, 33 percent spent three or more of the five years
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on a benefit, and 62 percent spent at least one of the five years on a benefit
[Wilson, 1999, p.67].
An alternative view on the duration of benefit receipt is provided by
comparing the number of people in a cohort that received a benefit at
different points of time. Of those people who entered a benefit in 1993 an
estimated 47 percent of Sickness Benefit recipients, 52 percent of Widows
Benefit recipients, 57 percent of Domestic Purposes Benefit recipients, and
69 percent of lnvalids Benefit recipients were receiving a benefit, whether
continuously or not, at the end of a five-year period. Unemployment Benefit
recipients were the least likely to have remained on or be back on benefit at
the end of a five-year period. However, due to variations in seasonal
employment, receipt of the Unemployment Benefit was strongly cyclical
[Wilson, 1999, p.71].
Gobbi and Rea l2OO2l also found that there were important differences
in the unemployment experiences of different groups for the 1993 cohort.
Males had higher risk of multiple spells of unemployment and spent more
time unemployed in total. Maori and Pacific groups were at risk of prolonged
periods of unemployment, Younger workers had higher risk of becoming
unemployed and experiencing multiple spells of unemployment. However,
duration of unemployment was longer among older workers. Unemployment
Benefit recipients tended to spend shorter periods on a benefit than sickness
and invalid beneficiaries, with recipients of Domestic Purposes Benefits
falling in-between these groups.
8.6 Conclusion
Family structures and labour market outcomes have undergone significant
change in New Zealand. There has been a decline in the proportion of single
income partnered families. There has been an increase in sole-parent
families and partnered families without children. At the family level work has
become more polarised with a growth in both work-rich and work-poor
families. There has been an increase in the labour market participation of
females, particularly in managerial professions, and a decrease in labour
market participation rates of males, particularly blue-collar workers. There is
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a strong relationship between age of the youngest child in the family and the
labour market status of the mother. Participation of mothers increases as the
ages of children in families increase.
The increase in income inequality in New Zealand since the early 1980s
has been one of the highest rates of increase in the world. Overall the key
drivers of the increase in income inequality included changes in wages and
salaries (wages and salaries comprise the large majority of market income),
changes in family composition (especially the growth in sole-parent families
and older families without children), a growing proportion of workers in their
prime earning years and with higher educational qualifications, and changes
in employment outcomes [O'Dea, 2000]. Changes in income inequality are
important for understanding changes to the incidence and depth of poverty.
With increasing income inequality it is possible to have both an increase in
economic growth and poverty. Further, with a more unequal income
distribution the social value of redistribution to those below the poverty line
increases due to the assumed diminishing marginal utility of income [Pigou,
1929, p. 981.
f n New Zealand families with children tended to cluster in the bottom
two-fifths of the income distribution. Among these families low incomes were
also correlated with larger family size, younger children, sole parenthood,
and receipt of a'main welfare benefit. To assess the degree to which the
incomes of these low-income families were inadequate, the chapter
summarised research by the Poverty Measurement Project on the changing
poverty incidence, poverty gap, and poverty reduction effectiveness from
1984 to 1998 and from 1998 to 2001. The 1984 to 1993 period saw a large
increase in poverty, particularly reflecting the 1991 benefit reductions and
declining rates of economic growth. By 1998 rates of pover$ had begun to
fall but between 1998 and 2001 rates of child poverty had begun to increase
again (reflecting falling poverty reduction effectiveness of the tax-benefit
system).
Research on economic llving standards illustrated that beneficiary
families, sole-parents, and Maori and Pacific groups were relatively likely to
have low living standards. Working families had higher living standards than
beneficiary families even when family incomes were similar. Employment
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thus plays an important role in influencing living standards. Trends for the
duration of receipt of main welfare benefits illustrated that sole-parents,
incapacitated people, and widows were the people with the highest duration
of benefit receipt and could thus persistently face low living standards. This
interaction of labour market outcomes and income adequacy outcomes
reinforces the need to address low financial incentives for low-income
families to supply labour (pove$ traps), which are considered in the
following chapter.
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9 Financial Incentives for Labour
Supply
9.1 Introduction
The previous chapter discussed income adequacy and New Zealand's tax-
benefit system and illustrated the interaction between labour market and
income adequacy outcomes. This chapter continues the evaluation of the
tax-benefit system and discusses financial incentives to supply labour. In
comparison to the large amount of recent research on income inequality,
poverty, and living standards, since the release of Prebble and Rebstock
(eds.) [1992] there has been little comprehensive non-government research
undertaken on the financial incentives to work contained in New Zealand's
tax-benefit system (with the exceptions of St John [1996], St John and
Rankin l2OO2l, and Nolan [2OOg and 2004c]). This lacuna reflects the
complexity of the financial incentives for labour supply created by the
interaction of tax-benefit programmes and a lack of independent
microsimulation modelling resources.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In section two the financial
incentives to supply labour created by main welfare benefits and the Family
Assistance programmes are discussed. First the distribution of effective
marginal tax rates over the population as a whole are discussed. From this
discussion it is possible to identity the key groups that face poverty traps
created by the tax-benefit system. The financial incentives facing these key
This chapter draws upon Nolan [2003 and 20Mc], which were based on the 2003-04 tax-
benefit system, but updates individual EMTR profiles and budget constraints for 2004-05 (the
year immediately prior to the introduction of the Working for Families reforms). ln this chapter
the earlier research is drawn upon where more recent data were not available for this study.
groups are then investigated in greater detail through modelling of the budget
constraints and EMTR profiles facing representative families. The financial
incentives to supply labour associated with two other forms of assistance,
accommodation assistance and childcare supplements, are then discussed in
section three. In section four the financial incentives to supply labour in the
New Zealand tax-benefit system are compared with those in other Anglo-
American countries.
9.2 Main Benefits and Family Assistance
The tax-benefit system tailors different financial incentives to work to different
groups in the population. To illustrate the broad variety of financial incentives
to work facing different population groups the financial incentives facing
different groups of people are discussed below. These financial incentives
reflect the proportions by which increases in gross income are reduced by
taxes and the abatement of main welfare benefits and the Family Assistance
Tax Credits.
Effective Marginal Tax Rates
Table 9.1 shows Treasury estimates of the numbers of individuals, excluding
all people aged under 15 and dependents aged over 15, who faced ceftain
EMTRs and who received main benefits, the Family Assistance Tax Credits,
New Zealand Superannuation, and none of these forms of assistance. These
estimates were calculated with TaxMod-A based on 2001 Household
Economic Survey data inflated to 2003-04. A person could be present in
more than one column except when they were in the none column. The
EMTR categories were not divided into even ranges but had instead been
divided into ranges reflecting the frequency with which certain EMTRs
occured, The estimates in table 9.1 were only based on the abatement of
major benefits, thus some EMTRs may have been underestimated (e.9.,
where recipients received Disability Allowances or Special Benefits).
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Table 9.1: Distribution of lndividuals by EMTRs and Benefit Receipt (2003-04)
EMTR Income-Tested Family
Main Benefitn Assistance.
New Zealand None
Superannuation
Less than 16
16 to 16.9
17 to 21.9
22to22.9
23 to 33.9
34 to 34.9
35 to 38.9
39 to 39.9
40 to 40.9
41 to 45.9
46 to 46.9
47 to 47.9
48 to 51.9
52 to 52.9
53 to 79.9
80+
All
35,097
12,121
214,288
24,488
3,250
?:*u
7,266
13,576
3,611
54,874
9,578
25,541
20,126
431,717
2,888
::'"''
66,148
7,290
ii'*
13,406
5,972
13,470
22,509
24,475
24,40'l
12,003
215,894
11,988
291,101
10,323
7,263
18,363
9,559
357,905
18,679
155,944
19,861
460,802
11,7',12
260,393
22,712
46,737
116,505
ii*'
::
'|',12',1,628
n Unemployment Benefit, Domestic Purposes Benefit, Invalids Benefit, Sickness
Benefit, and Widows Benefit
* Family Support Tax Credit, Child Tax Credit, and Family Tax Credit. Excludes
ParentalTax Credit
** Too few observations to disclose
Source: Nolan, 2003. Based on 2000-01 HES data inflated to 2003-04 by TaxMod-A
High EMTRs occurred when people paid both personal income taxes
and faced abatement of social assistance programmes. People who did not
receive social assistance thus generally had lower EMTRs than families who
received assistance. The majority of people who received no social
assistance had EMTRs below 41 percent. These EMTRs were given by the
interaction of the personal income tax scale, the Low Income Earner Rebate,
and the ACC earner levy. Further, recipients of New Zealand Superannuation
(provided irrespective of income to all qualitying residents) also had generally
low EMTRs. New Zealand Superannuation is no longer income-tested and so
has no effect on EMTRs. An estimated 87 percent of New Zealand
Superannuation recipients faced EMTRs below 23 percent. These EMTRs
were given by the interaction of the statutory personal income tax scale, the
Low Income Earner Rebate (which applies to all income (both employment
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and passive income) of superannuitants), and, where applicable, the ACC
earner levy.
Many working families received the Family Assistance Tax Credits
without any other form of assistance so their EMTRs were a combination of
the personal income tax scale, the Low Income Earner Rebate, ACC earner
lew, and the abatement of the Family Assistance programmes. The
distribution of EMTRs among Family Support Recipients was bimodal.
Approximately 39 percent of Family Support recipients faced EMTRs below
23 percent, which indicates that these families did not face Family Assistance
abatement, while approximately 28 percent of Family Assistance recipients
faced EMTRs in the range ol 52 percent and above. The Family Tax Credit
automatically resulted in very high EMTRs of over 100 percent but very few
families qualified for this programme.
For the population who received other forms of government income-
tested transfers the pattern of EMTRS was more complex due to the range of
benefits and supplementary assistance measures, the range of
administrative rules and abatement regimes, and variations in family
circumstances. The majority (an estimated 61 percent) of recipients of
income-tested main benefits faced EMTRs of below 23 percent. These
EMTRs were given by the interaction of the personal income tax scale, the
Low Income Earner Rebate, the ACC earner levy, and the abatement-free
zone for non-benefit earnings. People who faced these EMTRs included both
beneficiaries with declared non-benefit income (and whose non-benefit
incomes were below the threshold at which the benefit started abating) and
beneficiaries without declared non-benefit incomes. The remaining recipients
of income-tested main benefits were distributed reasonably evenly among
the range of EMTRs, with an estimated 9 percent of recipients facing EMTRs
from 23 percent to 40.9 percent, 17 percent facing EMTRs from 41 percent to
51.9 percent, and 13 percent facing EMTRs of 52 percent and above.
Thus for the vast majority of the population the EMTRs created by the
interaction of the personal income tax and social assistance systems were
less than 48 percent. There were, however, a small number of demographic
groups at certain income levels who faced EMTRs in excess of 48 percent.
These groups included a number of recipients of income-tested main benefits
and the Family Assistance programmes. To identify those people who faced
high financial disincentives to work in greater detail, the following section of
this chapter shows the EMTR profiles and budget constraints that faced
different family types at ditferent wage rates in 2004-05 (immediately prior to
Working for Families).
Poverty Traps and Family Structures
The section below discusses the poverty traps facing a sole-parent with two
children, a partnered family with two children and one income, and a
partnered family with two children and two incomes tor 2004-05. (See Nolan
[2003, pp. 11-15, 21-23] for an analysis of the poverty traps facing families
without children in 2003-04.)' The section below first discusses EMTR
profiles and budget constraints of a sole-parent with two young children at
two wage rates. Profiles for this person at a gross hourly wage of $10 and
$15 are compared to illustrate the impact of variations in the wage rate. The
section then discusses the EMTR profiles and budget constraints of
partnered people with two children with and without a second income in the
family. Profiles are shown for a $15 hourly gross wage for the secondary
income earner and it is assumed that the primary income earner earns a
fixed $31,200 gross per-annum (given by 40 hours work per-week at $15
gross per-hour), as an example of a low-wage dual-income family. These
profiles are all based on the taxation and social assistance systems in place
in 2004-05 and include personal income taxes, main welfare benefits, the
ACG earner leyy, and the Family Assistance programmes. They do not
include accommodation and childcare assistance and indirect taxes.
As well as these EMTR profiles and budget constraints this study also
draws upon Treasury estimates of estimates of median wages and the
distribution of hours of work of different family types calculated with TaxMod-
A and using Household Economic Survey data. Estimates for 2003-04 were
cafculated for a range of family types [Nolan, 2003, p. 1 1; Nolan, 2OO4c, p. 8].
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Because there were small numbers of some family types in the Household
Economic Survey data there were few observations of these family types at
certain wage rates. Thus in order to provide a useful number of observations
in this modelling it was necessary to use wage bands of below and above
median wages for different family types rather than single wage rates. Due to
the small numbers of certain family types in the sample this modelling was
based upon some distributions of hours were not able to have data
calculated for them.
Figure 9.1: EMTR Schedule and Budget Constraint of a SoleParent with Two Children
(Aged 3 and 5) and Earning $10 Per'Hour (2(X)4'05)
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Figure 9.1 shows an EMTR profile and budget constraint of a sole-
parent with two children and receiving a $10 per-hour wage. Initially the
EMTRs facing this person were relatively low, due to the $80 abatement-free
zone for the Domestic Purposes Benefit. Once non-benefit earnings
exceeded $80 gross per-week the net Domestic Purposes Benefit abated by
30 percent against increases in gross non-benefit income until non-benefit
In 2003-04, for single people without children the social assistance system provided
relatively few disincentives for increases in hours of work above 30 hours per-week at $10
per-hour (or 20 hours per-week at $15 per-week). There were greater disincentives for small
increases in hours of work at hours below this level due to the abatement of lhe
Unemployment Benefit.
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earnings increased to $180 per-week. This created an EMTR o146.2 percent,
which increased to 57.4 percent when Family Assistance abatement began.
Thus for between eight and 18 hours of work the person lost around half of
every extra dollar earned in taxes and the abatement of Family Assistance.
Gross non-benefit income above $180 per-week reduced the net benefit by
70 percent. This, along with Family Assistance abatement, created an EMTR
of 94.3, which increased to 95.4 percent when Family Assistance abatement
increased to 30 percent. At 20 hours of work this person had a net income of
$446,70 and by 40 hours of work this had increased to $456.40. For these 20
hours of work the person working for $10 gross per-hour received an
effective net wage rate of around 50 cents per-hour. Once the benefit was
fully abated (or the person chose to exit the benefit) the person received the
work-based Child Tax Credit, which created a large negative EMTR and a
kink in the budget constraint. Above this point the EMTRs reflected the
abatement of the Family Assistance programmes and the personal income
tax scale.
This EMTR profile and budget constraint demonstrated relatively good
returns from part-time work. However, once the person earned $80 gross
non-benefit earnings (at 8 hours) there were relatively few financial rewards
from increasing hours of work until the person could exit the benefit, which
was financially worthwhile at around 46 hours of work. This profile thus
illustrates a key trade-off when aiming to improve financial incentives to work
through lowering abatement at lower income levels; lowering this abatement
comes at the economic cost of increasing abatement further up the
distribution of hours of work.
Figure 9.2 shows a similar EMTR profile and budget constraint of a
sole-parent but with a $15 per-hour wage. At the higher wage rate the
number of hours over which social assistance programmes abate was
reduced. Thus while the benefit abatement-free zone and the lower level of
abatement on non-benefit income between $80 and $180 were exhausted
more quickly, so too was the remainder of the Domestic Purposes Benefit
(which became profitable to exit at around 30 hours of work). Thus while
there was relatively less of an incentive for this person to work a small
number of hours the incentives for this person to work around 30 hours or
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above were greater than was the case at the lower wage rate. However,
even at these hours of work the disincentives to supply labour were still
strong, with at least half of every dollar earned being lost in taxes and
abatement of Family Assistance between 36 and 50 hours of work per-week.
Figure 9.2: EMTR Schedule and Budget Constraint of a Sole-Parent with Two Children
(Aged 3 and 5) and Earning $15 Per-Hour (2004-05)
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Nolan [2003 and 2004c] contained data on sole-parents' hours of work
that demonstrated the importance of these poverty traps. The distribution of
working sole-parents earning below median wages was most heavily
concentrated at between 10 and 19 hours of work per-week, although due to
the small sample size the numbers of working sole-parents in many of the
bands of hours of work were unable to be calculated. The distribution of sole-
parents earning wages above the median was bimodal, with a mode at
between 10 and 19 hours and a larger mode between 30 and 50 hours. Such
distributions were consistent with the conclusion above that of those sole-
parents who work financial incentives for part-time work were relatively
strong. Further, the higher concentration of sole-parents with wages above
the median in work above thirty hours per-week was consistent with the
finding that for sole-parents on $15 per-week the financial incentives to work
improved when exiting the Domestic Purposes Benefit became financially
o 2 4 6 I t0 12 14 t6 18 20 22 2a X 28 30 32 34 36 S 40 42 a1
206
Net Household Income
worthwhile at around 30 hours of work per-week. As a proportion of total
individuals in work the number of sole-parents in work was low.
Figure 9.3: EMTR Schedule and Budget Constraint of a Primary Earner with Two
Children (Aged 3 and 5) and Earning $15 Per-Hour (2004'05)
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Figure 9.3 shows the EMTR profile and budget constraint of a person
with a non-working spouse and two children under 13 and with a wage rate of
$15 per-hour. Initially the EMTRs facing this person were low (due to the
abatement-free zone of the Unemployment Benefit). Once the person's total
gross income (including benefit income) increased to above $20,356 they
faced Family Assistance abatement of 30 percent. Due to the failure to index
the Family Assistance abatement thresholds and the indexation of main
welfare benefits with inflation, recipients of main benefits with even small
levels of part-time income increasingly faced Family Assistance abatement.
The level of the earnings' disregard had also not been indexed for inflation
and so with grovuth in wage rates over time had provided relief from main
benefit abatement for fewer numbers of hours of work. Thus at around six
hours of work this person's gross non-benefit earnings exceeded $80 and
they faced abatement of the Unemployment Benefit and EMTRs of 88.3 to
95.4 percent until the Unemployment Benefit was fully exhausted or the
person chose to exit the benefit. At six hours of work this family had a net
income of $430, which increased to around $454 at around 30 hours of work.
 21 6 38 t0 42 +t 46
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Over these 24 hours of work the person with a gross wage rate of $15 per-
hour received an etfective net wage rate of around $1 per-hour. Once the
person exited the benefit they received the work-based Child Tax Credit,
which created a large negative EMTR and a kink in the budget constraint.
Above this point the EMTRs reflected the abatement of the Family
Assistance programmes and the personal income tax scale.
This EMTR profile demonstrated relatively poor incentives for part-time
work (except at small hours of work per-week). For this person increases in
income from work from around six hours of work to around 30 hours of work
led to little increase in net income. (lf the person's wage rate fell to $10 per-
hour, small increases in income from work from around 8 hours of work to
around 45 hours of work led to little increase in net income.) Thus for this
person at a $15 per-hour wage rate there were small incentives for working
small numbers of hours and much greater incentives for increasing hours of
work when working for more than 30 hours per-week.
Nolan [2003 and 2004c] also contained data on partnered parents'
hours of work that demonstrated the importance of these poverty traps. For
those workers receiving below median wage and with multiple children and
non-working spouses the hours of work were concentrated at between 10 to
19 hours and, more heavily, at between 40 to 49 hours of work. This
concentration of hours of work at above 40 hours was consistent with the
finding above that financial incentives for this family type improved when the
Unemployment Benefit was fully abated. For those workers in this family type
and receiving above median wages their hours of work were also
concentrated at above 40 hours. Again this was consistent with the finding
that financial incentives for this family type improved when the
Unemployment Benefit was fully abated. As a proportion of total individuals in
work the number of workers with multiple children and non-working spouses
was relatively low (although higher than sole-parents).
Figure 9.4 shows the EMTR profile and budget constraint of a person
with a wage rate of $15 per-hour and with a working spouse (with an
assumed fixed income of $31 ,200) and two children under 13. This person
faced relatively high EMTRs as soon as they began to work. The level of the
spouse's income meant that the family had already exited the Unemployment
Benefit and so did not face benefit abatement. (With a lower spouse's income
the secondary earner may also face benefit abatement.) As the family had
already exited the benefit and as the primary earner worked for more than 30
hours per-week, the family already received the work-based Child Tax Credit.
The secondary earner's EMTR profile was thus a combination of the
abatement of the Family Assistance programmes of 30 percent (based on
joint income) and the personal income tax scale (based on individual
income).
Figure 9.4: EMTR Schedule and Budget Constraint of a Secondary Earner and Two
Children (Aged 3 and 5) and Earning $15 Per-Hour (2004-05)
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For this person there was relatively little incentive for work at less than
15 hours per-week. Below this point almost half of every dollar earned was
lost in taxes and the abatement of Family Assistance. At a $15 per-hour
wage rate it was only by working around 15 hours per-week that the person
could earn an income that exceeded the income levels over which the
abatement of the Family Assistance programmes occurred. The person
therefore had stronger incentives to increase their hours of work once they
were working over 15 hours per-week. There were therefore relatively strong
disincentives for part-time work and these disincentives decreased when the
person faced full-time work. lf the fixed income of the spouse increased then
the other worker would have reached the point at which the Family
Assistance programmes were fully exhausted sooner. Likewise, if the fixed
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income of the spouse decreased then reaching this point would have taken a
larger number of hours of work. Thus as the spouse's income increased the
financial incentives for the other person to supply labour increased also.
Again these poverty traps can be seen in the light of data on the
distribution of hours of work [Nolan, 2003 and 2004c]. Data show that the
distributions of hours of work of partnered workers (both with wages below
and above the median) and multiple children and working partners were
unimodal, with modes at around 40 to 49 hours. This concentration of hours
of work at above 40 hours was consistent with the finding above that financial
incentives for this family type improved when the Unemployment Benefit was
fully abated. The correlation between high EMTRs and low numbers of
people in certain hours of work appeared, however, less clear in the cases of
two-income families than in the cases of single-income families because in
two-income families the financial incentives facing secondary earners vary
according to the incomes of primary earners. The number of workers with
multiple children and working spouses was a relatively large proportion of the
total individuals in work.
Changing the numbers and ages of children in the family have some
impact on the poverty traps identified in the cases above. As the number of
children in the family increased the level of assistance paid to the family also
increased. As a consequence of this increase the abatement of assistance
took place over a larger number of hours of work. Likewise, when the ages of
the children increased the level of assistance paid to the family increased
and the abatement of assistance also took place over a larger number of
hours of work. Poverty traps were, therefore, most likely to affect large
families with older children.
9.3 Accommodation and Childcare Assistance
Due to the ditficulty of accurately incorporating issues surrounding
accommodation and childcare costs into the type of analysis above, these
two factors have been treated separately in this chapter. However, this
should not be seen as reducing the importance of these factors.
Accommodation costs have been identified as an important indicator of
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poverty and low living standards [Stephens and Waldegrave, 2001].
Childcare costs are an important cost associated with working and have
particular implications for the labour market participation of caregivers.
lssues surrounding accommodation and childcare costs are difficult to
accurately incorporate into the analysis above for two reasons. Firstly,
considerable variability exists among the families who face these costs.
Accommodation costs, for example, vary widely among and within different
regions of the country [Roper and Greenland, 2002, pp. 52, 57-59]. Families
also differ in the degree to which they can access informal childcare provided
by other family members (such as grandparents). Modelling these costs
accurately requires information that is more detailed than that captured by
the Household Economic Survey or during routine programme administration.
Indeed, it has been estimated that the Treasury's arithmetic microsimulation
model (TaxMod-A) under-predicts the number of families who receive the
Accommodation Supplement by around 60 percent lKalb, Cai, and Tuckwell,
2005, p. 41. Secondly, the nature of accommodation and childcare costs are
such that they are both largely endogenous, which means that their
consumption to some degree reflects other factors, such as the degree to
which people choose to participate in the labour market.
The following discussion largely focuses on those people who currently
receive assistance for accommodation, childcare, or both types of cost.
However, the assumption that receipt of income support is an indicator of
need is limited as take-up of assistance among the needy population is likely
to be less than 100 percent [Atkinson, 1989a, p. 194. Not all low-income
families in need of accommodation assistance would, for instance, receive
public assistance for their accommodation costs (lncome Related Rentals
and the Accommodation Supplement). Further, due to fraudulent behaviour
and overpayments due to administrative error not all families who take-up
assistance would be in need. Receipt of assistance may also reflect the
potential for moral hazard associated with the provision of such assistance.
For example, some people may alter their circumstances in ways viewed as
undesirable by policymakers (e.9., place themselves in positions of need) in
order to remain eligible for assistance [Sen, 1995, p. 1 1].
z',|.1
The two main areas of publicly funded accommodation assistance are
the Income Related Rentals and Accommodation Supplement programmes.
These programmes address ditferent needs (with Income Related Rentals
only being available to state house tenants while Accommodation
Supplement payments are available for both public and private
accommodation) and ditfer in terms of their generosity (with Income Related
Rentals generally being the more generous of the two programmes). The
Accommodation Supplement is the main form of accommodation assistance
for non-benef iciaries.
Both forms of accommodation assistance tended to be targeted towards
beneficiaries. As at March 2002, the largest numbers of people receiving
assistance from Income Related Rentals were beneficiaries (as these people
make up 88 percent of tenants in state houses) and the large maiority (91
percent) of Accommodation Supplement recipients were beneficiaries [Roper
and Greenland,2002, pp. 55-561. Disincentives associated with the receipt of
these programmes therefore mostly faced beneficiaries. Until 1 October
2004, for recipients of main benefits the Accommodation Supplement
reduced by 25 cents per dollar for the first $80 of non-benefit income. Above
the $80 threshold the Accommodation Supplement was not reduced until the
recipient was no longer a beneficiary. The abatement then followed the
abatement rules for non-beneficiaries. Prior to Working for Families, for non-
beneficiaries, the supplement abated at 25 percent when income exceeded
the rate of the applicable gross Invalids Benefit plus an add-on of $17.92
(which was established to compensate for income tax reductions in 1996 and
1e98).
The Childcare Subsidy provides financial assistance to low-income
families with a dependent child under the age of five to obtain access to
childcare services. The OSCAR Subsidy helps low-income families to pay for
before and after school programmes and school holiday programmes for
children aged five to 13. The 2001 Census estimated that approximately
197,000 families had a child under five. The majority (73 percent) of these
families were two-parent families but a sizeable number (23.5 percent) were
sole mother families. Labour force participation of mothers tended to increase
with the age of children, particularly when the youngest child was older than
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one. Half of the partnered mothers with a youngest child over five were
employed and 29 percent of sole mothers with a youngest child over five
were employed. There was little recorded difference in the hours of work
between sole and partnered mothers. The most common hours of work for
mothers were recorded as 30 hours or more per-week. As with
accommodation assistance, the majority of childcare assistance went to
recipients of main benefits. Incentives to work associated with the receipt of
these programmes therefore mostly faced beneficiaries (and Domestic
Purposes Beneficiaries in particular).
Overall the disincentives associated with the Accommodation
Supplement were likely to mostly face childless beneficiaries but a significant
proportion of these recipients were also sole-parents (particularly Domestic
Purposes Benefit recipients), who were the group that accounted for the
majority of (and thus may have mostly received support for work effort from)
childcare assistance.
9.4 Comparison with Other Anglo-American
Countries
Table 9.2 compares financial incentives in New Zealand with those in the
other four Anglo-American countries for primary earners (sole and partnered)
and secondary earners at various points in the income distribution [Nolan,
Stephens, Callister, 20051. In the five countries replacement rates including
housing assistance (based on the ratio of assistance when unemployed to
average net income from work) were higher for partnered families than for
sole-parent families, with the greatest ditferences between the sole and
partnered rates occurring in Australia and the United Kingdom. For both sole
and partnered caregivers replacement rates were highest in the United
Kingdom and New Zealand and lowest in the United States. Further, both
sole and partnered caregivers earning an income of half the average
production worker income faced the highest average tax rates net of tax
credits in the United States and lowest in the United Kingdom. At full average
production worker income the average tax rates net of tax credits facing sole
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and partnered workers in the United Kingdom were still lowest. At this higher
income level the highest average tax rates net of tax credits were those
facing families in New Zealand and the next highest were those in Australia.
Table 9.2: Comparison of Anglo-American Financial lncentives for Labour Supply
Zealand Kingdom States
Sole-Parent Family (Two Children)
Replacement Rate 56 55 62 64 35
Average Tax Rate
lz Average Production -U.8 -35.2 -38.8 -69.4 -21'O
Worker lncome
Average Production 13.6 10.4 18.8 8.8 '14.7
Worker lncome
Average Etfective Marginal Tax Rate
0 to 1/z Average 51.2 61.7 60.4 47.0 39.4
Production Worker
lncome
1/a to Average Production 72.O 56,9 76.4 82.4 50.5
Worker lncome
Partnered Family (Two Children)
Replacement Rate 66 58 67 73 41
Average Tax Rate
/z Average Production -42.7 -37.9 -36.7 -65.4 -30.3
Worker lncome
Average Production 13.8 11.4 18.8 9.2 11.5
Worker lncome
Secondary Earner Average Etfective MarginalTax Rate'
0to1/z Average 45 48.2 47.3 52.0 23.0
Production Worker
lncome
% to Average Production 31.5 39.8 30.4 32.O 26.0
Worker lncome
' Primary earner assumed to earn 0.67 percent of Average Production Worker Income
Source: Nolan, Stephens, and Callister, 2005. Derived from OECD,2004b
Average etfective marginal tax rates show the proportion of eltra
earnings lost in direct taxes and abatement of income-related benefits and
housing assistance. Along with the lower replacement rates the lower figures
for average effective marginal tax rates for the United States provide an
explanation for that country's high employment rate for sole-parents. For
partnered families in the United States the second earners' marginal tax rates
were also relatively low, encouraging labour force participation, whereas in
the other four countries roughly half of any earnings of the secondary earner
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were lost on initial entry into the work force, even before childcare and
transport costs [Nolan, Stephens, and Callister, 2005].
Reflecting the largely free travel of citizens between New Zealand and
Australia (under the Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement 1973) these
countries share large segments of their labour markets. Financial
disincentives for labour supply (reflected in replacement rates, average tax
rates, and average etfective marginal tax rates) at the proportions of average
production worker income above were higher in New Zealand than in
Australia. Yet New Zealand's labour force participation rates of sole and
partnered caregivers were higher than those of Australia, This higher labour
force participation was likely to reflect a relatively high proportion of low-wage
workers (increasing average replacement rates) and low generosity of family
and employment tax credits (increasing average tax rates).
9.5 Conclusion
This chapter evaluated the financial incentives to supply labour present in
New Zealand's tax-benefit system. In this system financial incentives to
supply labour ditfer among different groups in the population. For the majority
of the population the EMTRs created by the interaction of the personal
income tax and social assistance systems were less than 48 percent. There
were, however, a small number of demographic groups at certain income
levels who faced EMTRs of 48 percent or above. These groups included a
number of people who received income-tested main benefits, the Family
Assistance programmes, or some combination of all of these programmes.
For all family types the lower the hourly wage the greater the
significance of the abatement of the social assistance and the abatement-
free zone for financial incentives. While previous research has highlighted
the low returns from work for sole-parents at low wages [Green, 2001, p. 60]
this chapter demonstrated that prior to Working for Families low-wage single-
income couples with children also faced significant discouragement to work.
ln New Zealand recent economic growth has been underpinned by growth in labour
utilisation, while in Australia economic growth has to a greater degree been driven by
increased labour productivity.
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Low-wage families with children required two income earners if they were to
have market incomes sufficient to allow them to escape the povefty traps
present in the social assistance system.
Accommodation and childcare assistance were treated separately in
this chapter. The disincentives for small increases in hours of work that faced
recipients of the Unemployment Benefit and the Domestic Purposes Benefit
would thus have been understated, as disincentives associated with the
receipt of the Accommodation Supplement mostly faced recipients of main
social welfare benefits. In contrast the support for work etfort from the receipt
of the Childcare and OSCAR Subsidies also mostly faced recipients of main
social welfare benefits. Overall the disincentives associated with the
Accommodation Supplement were likely to have mostly faced childless
recipients of main social welfare benefits but a significant proportion of these
recipients were also sole-parents (particularly Domestic Purposes Benefit
recipients) who were the group accounting for the majority of, and thus may
have mostly faced any incentives for work associated with, childcare
assistance.
Financial incentives for labour supply measured as proportions of
average production worker income were weaker in New Zealand than in
Australia, yet of these countries labour force participation rates of sole and
partnered caregivers were higher in New Zealand. This higher labour force
participation in New Zealand was likely to reflect a relatively high proportion
of low-wage workers (increasing average replacement rates) and low
generosity of family and employment tax credits (increasing average tax
rates).
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10 Evaluating the Working for
Families Reforms
10.1 Introduction
This chapter evaluates the Labour-led government's response to the policy
issues identified in earlier chapters in the form of the Working for Families
reforms. These reforms are summarised below. In section two of the chapter
the impact of Working for Families on headcount poverty rates and the
distribution of the gains from these reforms are discussed. The impact of
Working for Families on the EMTR profiles and budget constraints of three
family types and on couples' incentives to work are discussed in section
three. In section four the chapter then discusses the impact of Working for
Families on the structure and relative generosity of the family and
employment tax credits going to these family types. Section five contains a
discussion of the administrative implications of the reforms.
The Working for Families Reforms
On 27 May 2004 the Minister of Social Development announced a number of
tax-benefit reforms (collectively know as Working for Families) targeting low-
wage families with children. Key features of the package were:
. October 2004: remove abatement of Accommodation Supplement
during the $80 gross per-week earnings' disregard for main benefit
abatement; increase the thresholds at which non-beneficiary families'
Accommodation Supplement begins to abate; and increase Childcare
and OSCAR Subsidy rates.
' April 2005: increase Family Support Rates (925 per-week for the eldest
child and $15 per-week for additional children); remove child
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component of main benefits; and increase Accommodation Supplement
areas from three to four, with increases in the maximum rates of
assistance in some areas.
October 2005: further increases in Childcare and OSCAR Subsidy
rates.
. April 2006: replace tne $15 per-child Child Tax Credit with an In-Work
Payment of $60 per-week (with $15 per-child top-up for the fourth and
additional children) available to families not receiving a main benefit and
working 30 hours per-week if a couple or 20 hours per-week if single;
remove abatement of Family Assistance on incomes between $20,356
and $27,500; and increase the Family Tax Credit, from providing a
guaranteed minimum family income of $15,080 net to providing $17,000
net.
. April 2007: increase Family Support rates by $t 0 per-child per-week.
From 1 April 2007 the Family Assistance programmes are also to be indexed
to inflation, with the rates and thresholds increasing when Consumer Price
Index increases reach a total of five percent.
The Labour-led government has also announced an intention to
introduce single core benefit reforms. The single core benefit was legislated
for by Labour in 1989 but not implemented. The idea of a single core benefit
was also favoured by the former National Prime Minister Jenny Shipley
[Stephens, 1999, p. 2571. Under such a system recipients wou]d receive
supplementary assistance on the basis of their need rather than benefit
category. This proposal has been signalled for implementation after 1 April
2007. Few details are currently available on the single core benefit proposal.
This proposal is thus not discussed in this study.
10.2 Headcount Poverty Rates
Working for Families and Headcount Poverty Rates
A primary objective of the Working for Families reforms is to reduce the
incidence of poverty, particularly child poverty, in New Zealand. Perry 120041
estimated the reduction in headcount poverty rates from Working for Families
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with a non-behavioural microsimulation model (TaxMod-A) and assuming
Working for Families would be implemented fully and on schedule. Perry's
l2OO4, p. 351 estimates of the impact of Working for Families on headcount
rates of poverty are shown in table 10.1. These rates are both for children
and the population as a whole and use poverty thresholds of 50 percent and
60 percent of the equivalised median family annual income. These estimates
are based on the Revised Jensen Scale, which converts actual family
incomes into hypothetical equivalised incomes reflecting family size and the
ages and numbers of children [Perry, 2004, p. 25]. These estimates assume
full take-up of assistance and no changes in labour market behaviour in
response to Working for Families.
Table 10.1: Estimated lmpact of Working for Families on Headcount Poverty Rates
Children
Threshold (1998 Base\ 50% Family
Median
Whole PoPulation
60% Family 50% FamilY 60% FamilYMedian Median Median
Threshold in Equivalised
Dollars Per-Annum (June
2005 dollars)
Estimated Pre-Reform
Rate for 31 March 2005
After Phase 1
After Full lmplementation
Reduction in Measured
Poverty after Full
lmplementation
(Proportional Decrease)
$10,750
14.7"/o
9.3%
4.3Yo
71.Oo/o
$12,900
29.OY"
24.2%
20.5To
29.0o/"
$10,750
9.3%
7.3To
5.5"/"
41.00h
$12,900
17.9Yo
15.8%
13.9%
22.O/o
Source: Perry, 2004, p. 35
The fully implemented Working for Families reforms were estimated to
lower the child headcount poverty rate by around 70 percent using the 50
percent poverty threshold and by around 30 percent using the 60 percent
poverty threshold. The reduction in total family headcount povefi was
estimated as less than the reduction in child headcount poverty. Working for
Families was estlmated to lower the total family headcount poverty rate by
around 40 percent using the 50 percent poverty threshold and by around 20
percent using the 60 percent povefi threshold [Perry, 2004, p. 35]. Perry
[2004] argues that the greater reduction in the child headcount poverty rate
reflects the child-focus of Working for Families, as families without children (a
large proportion of allfamilies in poverty) do not receive increased assistance
from the modelled changes. However, given limitations of TaxMod-A and
HES data, Perry [2004] does not model changes to the Accommodation
Supplement and childcare assistance. lt is unclear whether excluding this
assistance would change the balance between the reduction in child and
family headcount poverty, ES while some of the increases in the
Accommodation Supplement would go to families without children the
reduction in child headcount poverty may also increase due to the increase in
childcare assistance.
Although these estimates do not account for poverty depth (which
would require attributing greater weight to reductions in povefi facing
families further below the poverty threshold) the increased poverty reduction
at the 50 percent threshold in comparison to the 60 percent threshold
indicates that this reform package is targeted towards people further below
the poverty threshold [Perry, 2004, p. 36]. This result also partly reflects the
equivalence scale used to model these changes. The Revised Jensen Scale
increases the cost functions of families with multiple children, shifting them to
lower levels in the hypothetical equivalised income distribution. As the levels
of assistance provided by Working for Families increase as the numbers of
children in the family increase, this targeting of assistance towards families
further below the equivalised poverty threshold partly reflects this downwards
re-ranking of families with multiple children.
Distribution of Gains lrom Working for Families
Often in the design of tax-benefit reforms there is a trade-otf between
reducing the headcount poverty rate and the etficiency with which income
transfers are targeted to low-income families (reflecting spill-over to the pre-
transfer poor and non-poor). The degree of spill-over to the non-poor from
Working for Families has been one criticism of these reforms [Dwyer, 2005,
pp. 43-441. Based on information contained in reports to Cabinet, Dwyer
[2005, p. 43] argued that around half of the expenditure on Working for
See Nolan [2003, pp. 35-34 for a discussion of difficulties associated with modelling these
forms of assistance.
Families would go to those families with net unequivalised incomes in the top
six income deciles.
Table 10.2 shows more detailed Treasury non-behavioural estimates of
the distribution of the gains from Working for Families by income decile for
market and disposable income (both equivalised and unequivalised).
Incomes have been equivalised using the Whiteford geometric scale. On the
basis of equivalised market income, a little over 55 percent of expenditure
goes to family in the bottom five deciles and almost 80 percent of expenditure
goes to families in the bottom six deciles. Deciles one to seven have similar
numbers of families who gain, with average gains ranging from around
$1,800 for decile three to around $4,600 for decile six. Further, on the basis
of equivalised disposable income, a little over 60 percent of expenditure goes
to families in the bottom five deciles. Almost 85 percent of expenditure goes
to the bottom six deciles on the basis of equivalised disposable income. The
decile with the largest number of gainers is decile four, with 106,000 families
gaining on average around $3,000 per-annum.
Table 10.2: Distribution of Static Financial Gains from WFF
Market Income
Income Gaining TotalDecile House- Uneqvl
holds 
- 
Gain ($M)
Uneqvl
Disposable Income
Total Gaining TotalEqwl Hous€- Uneqvl
Gain ($M) holds - Gain ($M)
Uneqvl
Gaining TotalHouse- Equvl
holds 
- 
Gain ($M)
Equvl
Gaining
House-
holds 
-
Eqwl
One
Two
Three
Four
Five
Six
Seven
Eight
Nine
Ten
Total
10,000
82,000
52,000
46,000
48,000
46,000
48,000
58,000
16,000
4,000
410,000
17
198
90
115
149
181
215
175
20
I
1,167
48,000 114
50,000 110
48,000 86
46,000 133
56,000 200
60,000 27s
58,000 203
34,000 u
10,000 4
4,000 5
410,000 1,167
8,000 20
16,000 11
24,000 10
92,000 171
72,OW 208
&$,000 260
54,000 257
58,000 184
18,000 38
4,000 I
410,000 1,167
8,000 20
24,000 46
62,000 167
106,000 316
54,000 171
66,000 271
56,000 155
20,000 13
10,000 
:
410,000 '1,167
'Too few observations to disclose
Source: TaxMod-A based on 2000-01 HES weighted up to 2004-05 income distribution
Spill-over to the non-poor is a feature of social assistance provided
through the tax system. However, the targeting efficiency of tax-assistance
that directly increases families' net incomes (e.9., refundable or non-
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refundable tax rebates) tends to have higher targeting efficiency than
assistance that reduces gross taxable incomes (e.9., allowing partnered
families to split gross taxable income between two spouses). For example,
with income splitting any return a low-wage worker receives from a policy that
reduces gross taxable income would be less than the return for a high-wage
worker, as high wage workers would receive a larger reduction in marginal
tax rates. Nolan and Fairbrother [2005, p. 21] illustrated that assistance
provided in the form of family and employment tax credits (the Working for
Families reforms) would be more effectively targeted to lower income families
than assistance provided through the personal income tax scale (in the form
of income splitting).
10.3 EMTR Profiles
Headcount poverty rates and spill-over to the pre-transfer poor and non-poor
may be simultaneously reduced if income transfers are set at a level
sutficient to raise all family incomes above the poverty line but with a hundred
percent effective marginal tax rate on earnings above this threshold until
assistance is fully abated. Poverty reduction and targeting efficiency
outcomes thus interact with financial incentives to supply labour. Further, the
estimates contained in the discussions above all assumed no labour supply
behavioural responses from the Working for Families reforms. The
distribution of financial incentives to supply labour and the likely behavioural
responses from these reforms are considered below.
The Working for Families reforms have been uiticised for their
aggregate impact on financial incentives to work. Dwyer [2005, p. vii] cites
Treasury estimates that the mean EMTR in 2007-08 will be 29.7 percent with
the fully implemented Working for Families compared to 28.6 without
Working for Families. Yet the distribution of EMTRs among the population is
likely to provide a more accurate evaluation of the efficiency effects of tax-
benefit reforms than the mean EMTR, due to variations in responsiveness to
financial incentives for labour supply among the population (e.9., caregivers'
decisions on participation are relatively responsive to financial incentives to
supply labour). The following sections illustrate the distribution of financial
incentives for labour supply facing representative families for up to 50 hours
of work with EMTR profiles and budget constraints.
A Sole-Parent with Two Children and Earning $10.00 Gross Per-Hour
The etfects of Working for Families on financial incentives to supply labour
facing a sole-parent earning $10 per-hour are illustrated in figures 10.1 and
10.2. In these figures the sole-parent is assumed to have two children under
13. Figure 10.1 shows a budget constraint and EMTR profile of this sole-
parent after the Working for Families reforms. Figure 10.2 compares the
EMTR profiles for this person before and after Working for Families. These
profiles assume Working for Families is implemented fully and on schedule.
They contain personal income taxes, main welfare benefits, the Family
Assistance programmes, and the ACC earner ler4r, but not accommodation
assistance, childcare subsidies, and indirect taxes.
Figure 10.1: Post-Working for Families Budget Constraint and EMTR Profile of a Sole-
Parent with Two Children (Aged 3 and 5) and Earning $10.00 Per'Hour
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Figure 10.2: lmpact of Working for Families on the EMTR Profile of a Sole-Parent with
Two Children (Aged 3 and 5) and Earning $10.00 Per-Hour
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The increase in the Family Tax Credit and the replacement of the Child
Tax Credit with the In-Work Payment encourage this sole-parent to exit the
Domestic Purposes Benefit at an earlier number of hours than prior to the
Working for Families reforms. However, the labour supply outcomes of tax-
benefit reforms should not be evaluated solely in relation to incentives to exit
a main welfare benefit (the transition between employment and
unemployment) but should be evaluated in relation to the income and
substitution etfects that they create. These income and substitution effects
influence financial incentives for both participating in the labour market and
changing hours of work.
The removal of Family Assistance abatement against gross joint
incomes below $27,500 and increases in assistance provided by the Family
Support programme create an income effect discouraging labour supply and
a substitution etfect encouraging labour supply. Beneficiaries would be
unlikely to face abatement of Family Support until after they have exited the
main welfare benefit, The work-based In-Work Payment and Family Tax
Credit may encourage sole-parents who work less than 24 hours per-week
(the point at which exiting the Domestic Purposes Benefit becomes
financially worthwhile) to increase their hours of work to qualify for these
programmes. Sole-parents with hours of work above this point may, however,
o 2 4 G 8.t0 12 14 16 1A202224202€ 3032343034t042.44'4€50
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reduce their hours of work to around this point as they would lace income
and substitution effects discouraging labour supply.
This sole-parent would still face significant poverty traps discouraging
labour supply due to the dollar-for-dollar abatement of the Family Tax Credit
against increases in net income, which, along with the ACC earner levy,
leads to EMTRs in excess of 100 percent. While this person would have
faced a poverly trap from 18 to 46 hours of work prior to reform, following
reform a poverty trap would apply from around 18 to 40 hours of work. At 18
hours of work this person would receive a net income of around $503 per-
week and at 40 hours of work this person would receive a net income of
around $529. With a gross wage of $10 this person would receive an
average etfective net wage of around $1.20 over these 22 hours of work.
However, financial incentives to work for more than 40 hours per-week have
improved for this person.
A Partnered Person with a Non-Working Spouse and Two Children and
Earning $15.00 Gross Per-Hour
The effects of Working for Families on financial incentives to supply labour
facing a partnered person earning $15 per-hour and with a non-working
spouse are illustrated in figures 10.3 and 10.4. In these figures the person is
assumed to have two children under 13. Figure 10.3 shows a budget
constraint and EMTR profile of this partnered parent after the Working for
Families reforms. Figure 10.4 compares the EMTR profiles of this person
before and after Working for Families. These profiles assume Working for
Families is implemented fully and on schedule. They contain personal
income taxes, main welfare benefits, the Family Assistance programmes,
and the ACC earner levy, but not accommodation assistance, childcare
subsidies, and indirect taxes.
The removal of Family Assistance abatement on gross joint incomes
below $27,500 creates a substitution etfect improving financial incentives to
work facing this partnered parent. This would be reflected in a slight
reduction in the poverty traps facing this parent due to the reduction in
EMTRs facing Unemployment Benefit recipients with non-benefit earnings
above $80 per-week of around two percent. Countering this is an income
effect from the increased levels of Family Assistance that would discourage
these people from supplying labour.
Figure 10.3: Post-Working for Families Budget Constraint and EMTR Profile of a
Primary Earner with Two Children (Aged 3 and 5) and Earning $15.00 Per-Hour
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Payment. The additional assistance at 30 hours of work may encourage
some families to increase their hours of work in order to become eligible for
this assistance. However, for families above this threshold the increased
levels of assistance would create an income effect discouraging labour
supply. The abatement of this assistance at higher income levels would also
create a substitution effect discouraging labour supply,
A Partnered Person with a Working Spouse and Two Children and
Earning $15.00 Gross Per-Hour
The etfects of Working for Families on financial incentives to supply labour
facing a partnered person earning $15 per-hour and with a working spouse
are illustrated in figures 10.5 and 10.6. In these figures the person is
assumed to have two children under 13. The person's spouse is assumed to
earn a fixed income of $600 per-week ($3t 
'eoo 
per-annum). Figure 10'5
shows a budget constraint and EMTR profile of this partnered parent after the
Working for Families reforms. Figure 10.6 compares the EMTR profiles for
this person before and after Working for Families. These profiles assume
Working for Families is implemented fully and on schedule. They contain
personal income taxes, main welfare benefits, the Family Assistance
programmes, and the ACC earner levy, but not accommodation assistance,
childcare subsidies, and indirect taxes.
The removal of Family Assistance abatement at gross joint incomes
below $27,500 and the increase in the levels of assistance provided by the
Family Assistance programmes mean that the abatement of this assistance
has increased higher into the income distribution. This is shown in the case
of the secondary earner earning $t 5 gross per-hour with two children.
Following the Working for Families reforms the family continues to receive
the Family Assistance programmes until the secondary earner increases their
hours of work to above 42 hours per-week. Prior to reform the family's
assistance was fully abated by 15 hours of work. As the secondary earner
faces abatement of assistance over a longer range of hours of work the
financial incentives to work facing this person have worsened, with increased
levels of assistance providing an income effect and increased abatement
creating a substitution etfect discouraging labour supply.
Figure 10,5: lmpact ol Working for Families on the EMTR Profile of a Secondary Earner
with Two Children (Aged 3 and 5) and Earning $15.00 Per'Hour
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Figure 10.6: lmpact of Working for Families on the EMTR Profile of a Secondary Earner
with Two Children (Aged 3 and 5) and Earning $15.00 Per'Hour
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Given the assumptions regarding the primary earne/s income, Working
for Families does not improve incentives for secondary income earners to
enter the labour market and increases the disincentives they face when they
increase their hours of work up to around 40 hours per-week. (Reducing the
primary earner's fixed income or the secondary earne/s wage rate would
extend this increase in disincentives.) The impact of the reforms on
secondary earners was a particular concern of the Department of Labour
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[Cullen and Maharey, 2004, p. 24].Based on experiences with work-based
income tax assistance in overseas jurisdictions, such as the Earned Income
Tax Credit in the United States, this increase in EMTRs will be likely to
encourage secondary earners to drop out the labour market, rather than
working or registering for unemployment assistance, and lead to some
families in this income range choosing to reduce their market incomes [Eissa
and Hoynes, 2OO4l. Working for Families effectively subsidises some
secondary earners to stay at home.
Microsimulation Estimates of Secondary Earners' Incentives to Work
The discussion above illustrated that the impact of Working for Families on
secondary earners in partnered families is an issue of particular interest.
Johnson [2005, p. 78] contained data on the impact of Working for Families
on average EMTRs facing different family types that illustrated that for
partnered families with children the average EMTRs rose by five percent,
with the largest increase being for single-income families (of seven percent)
and followed by dual-income partnered families (of four percent). For sole-
parent families with children he reported that Working for Families led to no
change in the average EMTR, This average was composed of an increase in
the average EMTR facing sole-parents in full-time work (of four percent) and
decreases in the average EMTRs of sole-parents in part-time work (of five
percent) and out of work (of one percent).
To illustrate the changing distribution of EMTRs facing partnered
families due to Working for Families in greater detail, table 10.3 contains
Treasury's TaxMod-A estimates of primary and secondary earners' average
marginal tax rates (MTRs) and effective marginal tax rates (ElJTRs) following
these reforms [Nolan and Fairbrother, 2005]. These estimates do not include
changes to accommodation or childcare assistance. Following Working for
Families there is no change in the average MTRs and EMTRs facing families
without children due to the targeting of the package towards families with
children and the exclusion of the Accommodation Supplement changes
(some of which would be received by families without children) from the
modelling due to difficulties in modelling this form of assistance [Nolan, 2003,
p.351.
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Table 10.3: Working for Families and Couples' Financial Incentives to Work
0 Children
Workers in Family
Average o 1
1 Child
Workers in Family
012
Multiple Children
Workers in Family
012
Primary
MTR
Secondary
MTR
Primary
EMTR
Secondary
EMTR
Source: TaxMod-A based on 200-01 HES weighted up to 2004-05 income distribution
Table 10.4: Financial Incentives to Work for Low-Wage and High-Wage Couples
(Fully lmplemented Working for Families)
31
24
29 16 31
23 17 12
37 23 49
31 25 35
16 33
17 12
18 45
19 29
20 29 30
20 13 25
26 34 33
26 22 29
Primary
Average 0 lChild MultipleChildren Children
Spouse
0 1 child
Children
Multiple
Children
Below
Median
Wage
MTR
EMTR
25
52
35
45
24
49
35
39
22
27
32
34
20
25
28
29
19
39
24
32
20
30
26
32
Above MTR
MedianWage EMTR
Source: TaxMod-A based on 200-01 HES weighted up to 2004-05 income distribution
People in partnered families with children and without workers face a
fall in their average EMTRs. This fall reflects the reduction in the level of the
main benefit (with the removal of the child component of the benefit) and the
increase in the abatement threshold for Family Assistance. The reduction in
the abatement of the Accommodation Supplement facing beneficiaries would
reduce these EMTRs further. The EMTRs facing partnered families with
children with workers increase following the reforms. Increasing levels of
assistance and reducing abatement of assistance at lower income levels
means assistance abates higher into the income distribution. In table 10.4 the
MTRs and EMTRs are broken down into below and above median wage
groups. Average EMTRs for partnered families with children in both the
below median wage and above median wage groups increase following
Working for Families. This increase reflects the increase in EMTRs facing
partnered families with workers following the reforms. The largest increases
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in EMTRs are for the below median wage group (particularly below median
wage secondary earners).
This discussion of financial incentives to supply labour can also be seen
in the light of behavioural estimates of labour supply responses to the
Working for Families reforms prepared using TaxMod-B (based on the
Melbourne Institute Tax and Transfer Simulator (see Creedy, Duncan, et al
l2}02l for a description of this model)) [Kalb, Cai, and Tuckwell, 2005]. The
estimated behavioural responses from Working for Families for sole-parents
were 1.94 percent of the total sole-parent population moving into the labour
market, 0.03 percent exiting the labour market, and an increase in the
average number of hours of work per-week increasing by 0.71 percent as a
result of the reforms. Sole-parents' labour market participation and hours of
work were thus estimated to increase following these reforms. For single
childless women, 0.12 percent of the total single chiHless women population
were estimated to enter the labour market, 0.06 were estimated to exit the
labour market, and average hours of weekly work were estimated to fall by
0.02 percent. Single childless women's labour market participation, but not
hours of work, was thus estimated to increase following these reforms.
All other population groups had negative estimated labour supply
responses. The behavioural responses of married women with and without
children were estimated to include 0.20 percent moving into the labour
market, 0.63 percent exiting the labour market, and average weekly hours of
work falling 0.18 percent. The behavioural responses of married men with
and without children were estimated to include 0.29 percent moving into the
labour market, 0.38 percent exiting the labour market, and average weekly
hours of work falling 0.09 percent. The behavioural responses of single
childless men were estimated to include 0.06 percent moving into the labour
market, 0.23 percent exiting the labour market, and average weekly hours of
work falling 0.09 percent. Married women with and without children were thus
identified as the population group who would be likely to have the strongest
reduction in labour market participation and hours of work as a result of the
Working for Families reforms.
Johnson [2005] argued that this pattern of EMTRs could encourage
some two-income families to become one-income families and create partner
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penalties (where there are ditferences between the levels of assistance
received by a partnered and sole family in otherwise similar circumstances).
Although, as Johnson argues, few families will be likely to dissolve or not
form in order to receive increased levels of assistance, this issue is likely to
increase in prominence given the increasing proportion of Family Assistance
expenditure going to partnered families (increasing from approximately one
third to one half of Family Assistance recipients) following Working for
Families [Johnson,2005, p. vii].
10.4 Generosity of Family and Employment Tax
Credits
ln New Zealand in 2004-05 the assistance provided by family and
employment tax credits was the least generous of five Anglo-American
countries. The following section discusses how the structure and relative
generosity of New Zealand's fami$ and employment tax credits will change
after Working for Families. The figures in this section are for the 2007-08
income tax year and assume that the Working for Families package is
implemented fully and according to schedule. However, in these figures main
welfare benefits, wage rates, and family and employment tax credits have not
been indexed for inflation. Further, programmes in jurisdictions other than
New Zealand have been assumed to remain unchanged from their 2004-05
parameters.
Assistance to a Sole-Parent with Two Children and Earning $10.00
Gross Per-Hour
The etfect of the Working for Families package on the family and
employment tax credits provided to a sole-parent with two young children and
earning a wage rate of $10.00 is shown in figure 10.7. ln 2007-OB at zero
hours of work this person would receive an unabated Family Support
payment of $7,644 per-annum for their two children. Further, due to the
removal of the child component of the main benefit, the increase in the
Family Tax Credit, and the replacement of the Child Tax Credit with an In-
Work Payment, the Working for Families package has also influenced the
number of hours of work at which the person would be likely to exit the
benefit. The combined effect of these the reforms is that the person would be
likely to exit the Domestic Purposes Benefit at 25 hours of work (as opposed
to 46 hours of work prior to reform).
Figure 10.7: Family and Employment Tax Credits for a Sole-Parent with Two Children
(Aged 3 and 5) and Earning $10.00 Per-Hour
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When the person exits the benefit they would be eligible for a Family
Tax Credit payment of $118 per-week and an ln-Work Payment of $60 per-
week. Although this person would be eligible for in-work assistance if they
were to exit the benefit at 20 hours per-week of work, they would be unlikely
to do so before 25 hours of work as before this point the value of the
remaining abated Domestic Purposes Benefit would exceed the value of the
in-work assistance. The Family Tax Credit abates dollar for dollar against
increases in net income and would be fully exhausted at around 40 hours of
work (this is reflected in the povefi trap illustrated in figure 10.1). For
abatement purposes the payments of the In-Work Payment will be added to
Family Support payments and the total level of assistance will abate under
the Family Support abatement regime. At a wage rate of $10 gross per-hour
the person will be required to work around 53 hours before facing the 30
percent abatement of Family Support and the In-Work Payment.
At low hours of work the generosity of assistance in New Zealand to this
sole-parent would increase to about the levels of Canada following Working
for Families. At above 40 hours of work per-week the level of assistance to
2U
this person would increase to about the levels of the United States. The
levels of family and employment tax credits provided to this low-wage sole-
parent in New Zealand would still be generally less generous than the levels
of assistance provided in Australia and the United Kingdom, although the
differences would have narrowed.
Assistance to a Partnered Person with a Non-Working Spouse and Two
Children and Earning $15.00 Gross Per-Hour
The effect of the Working for Families package on the family and
employment tax credits provided to a partnered person with two young
children and a non-working spouse and earning a wage rate of $15.00 is
shown in figure 10.8. In 2007-08 al zero hours of work this person would
receive an unabated Fami[ Support payment of $7,644 for their two children.
Figure 10.8: Family and Employment Tax Gredits for a Primary Earner with Two
Children (Aged 3 and 5) and Earning NZ$l5.00 Per-Hour
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Further, due to the removal of the child component of the main benefit
and the replacement of the Child Tax Credit with an In-Work Payment, the
Working for Families package has also influenced the number of hours of
work at which the person would be likely to exit the benefit. The combined
effect of these reforms is that the person would be likely to exit the
Unemployment Benefit at 30 hours of work. At 30 hours of work the person
would be eligible for an In-Work Payment of $3,120 per-annum. At this wage
rate and with these hours of work this person would not be eligible for the
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Family Tax Credit. For abatement purposes payments of the In-Work
Payment would be added to Family Support payments and the total level of
assistance would abate under the Family Support abatement regime. When
the person increases their hours of work to around 36 hours their family
gross income would increase to above $27,500 and the Family Assistance
programmes begin to abate at 30 percent.
At low hours of work the generosity of assistance in New Zealand to this
primary earner would increase to about the levels of Canada following
Working for Families. Both of these countries would be more generous than
the United States. The generosity of assistance in the United States
increases as the Earned Income Tax Credit phases in and by 20 hours of
work per-week New Zealand, Canada, and the United States would provide
similar levels of assistance to this primary earner. The levels of family and
employment tax credits provided to this primary earner in New Zealand would
still be generally less generous than the levels of assistance provided in
Australia and the United Kingdom, although the differences would have
narrowed.
Assistance to a Partnered Person with a Working Spouse and Two
Children and Earning $15.00 Gross Per-Hour
The effect of the Working for Families package on the family and
employment tax credits provided to a partnered person with two young
children and a working spouse and earning a wage rate of $15.00 is shown in
figure 10.9. lt is assumed that the primary earner earns a fixed income of
$600 per-week ($gt,eOO per-annum). With this assumed income of the
primary earner the family is already no longer receiving a main welfare
benefit (and is thus eligible for the work-based Family Assistance
programmes) and faces abatement of their Family Assistance entitlement.
Following Working for Families the higher levels of assistance provided
by the Family Assistance programmes and the lower levels of abatement at
lower income levels mean that the range of income over which the Family
Assistance programmes abate increases. The family thus continues to
receive Family Assistance (and face abatement of these programmes) until
relatively high hours of work (this is reflected in increased disincentives to
work illustrated in figure 10.6). However, in comparison to the other four
Anglo-American countries, assistance in New Zealand is exhausted at
relatively low levels of earned income. With the exception of families at
relatively high income levels, following the Working for Families reforms the
generosity of assistance increases to the levels of Canada and the United
States. Again the levels of assistance provided in New Zealand would still be
less generous than the levels of assistance provided in Australia and the
United Kingdom, although the ditferences would have narrowed.
Figure 10.9: Family and Employment Tax Credits for a Secondary Earner with Two
Children (Aged 3 and 5) and Earning NZ$l5.00 Per'Hour
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10.5 Administration and Compliance
The Working for Families reforms will change the balance in the tax-benefit
system, with expenditure moving from main welfare benefits and towards
supplementary assistance such as the Family Assistance programmes and
Accommodation Supplement. An advantage of this shift in this balance in the
system is that when a family moves otf a main benefit they could potentially
continue to receive assistance. However, this would also mean that the take-
up and administration of supplementary assistance would play a larger role in
determining outcomes of these programmes. The assistance that families
receive would depend to a greater degree on programmes' administration
and their knowledge of their entitlements. This shift would also make it easier
for governments to increase or reduce tax-benefit expenditure, with cuts in
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expenditure, for example, being possible through administrative measures to
tighten eligibility and not requiring legislative change. The greater receipt of
supplementary assistance by families in work could also have implications for
the current allocation of responsibility between administrative agencies, with
the Ministry of Social Development administering assistance like the
Accommodation Supplement and the Inland Revenue Department assistance
like Family Assistance. There could be increased demand for efforts to
combine the administration of assistance, as has been done in both Australia
and the United Kingdom in recent years.
An important feature of the Working for Families reforms is the
extension of hours-based work tests to the ln-Work Payment (formerly the
Child Tax Credit) as well as the Family Tax Credit. An hours-based work test
creates notches in budget constraints, which could lead to changes in the
distribution of hours of work. Basing assistance on a prescribed numbers of
hours of work would be inconsistent with the market-based setting of
employment conditions, as the flexibility in setting hours of work in
employment contracts would be reduced. In the context of deregulated labour
markets a feature of many employment contracts is that an employee's hours
of work may vary with seasonal or economic conditions. The use of an hours-
based threshold requires determining how these fluctuations in hours of work
should be treated in the assessment of entitlement. Having thresholds based
on work hours (in association with abatement based on income) is likely to
increase the complexity of a programme's administration and may lead to
greater uncertainty regarding the level of assistance available when making
the transition from benefit to work and when hours of work and earned
incomes fluctuate.
A key constraint upon the use of thresholds for paying and abating
assistance is the ability to monitor and enforce these thresholds. An hours-
based threshold would also be vulnerable to fraud as the income tax system
is not able to easily monitor recipients' hours of work and compliance would
not be audited independently of the general taxpayer audit process. Currently
the administration of the Family Assistance programmes heavily relies on
voluntary compliance. Information on incomes is more readily available than
information on hours. Collecting information on hours would be likely to
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increase the costs facing recipients and their employers of complying with the
tax-benefit system, which could discourage some employers from hiring low-
wage workers. Information on hours is also more ditficult to audit than
information on incomes. Either a large reliance upon voluntary compliance is
required (potentially exposing the programme to fraud (adverse selection)) or
the intensity of the administration of the programmes would be required to
increase (which would be contrary with current etforts for simplifying the
administration of the tax system and lowering business compliance costs).
Monitoring compliance with this test would not be likely to be an etficient use
of Inland Revenue Department resources.
10.6 Possible Further Reforms
While Working for Families represents significant income redistribution
towards families with children, little change will be made to the overall design
of the Family Assistance programmes, some of which have remained largely
unchanged since 1986. Working for Families does not address the need to
reform the Family Assistance programmes in the light of important social and
economic changes that have taken place over the last two decades, such as
the breakdown of the breadwinner model of social arrangements and the
liberalisation of the labour market. The remainder of this chapter thus
considers a number of improvements to Working for Families.
A number of alternative reforms have been recommended by various
commentators. The New Zealand Child Povefi Action Group has, for
example, argued that Family Assistance programmes should not be targeted
on the basis of work effort and that the chiH component of main welfare
benefits should be restored [St John and Craig, 2004]. These
recommendations reflect a concern with immediately reducing child poverly.
However, the relatively low degree of targeting of the Family Support
programme would mean that increasing the generosity of this programme to
offset any losses to low-wage families from the removal of the Family Tax
Credit and Child Tax Credit would lead to a significant increase in fiscal costs
of the Family Assistance programmes. This approach would also fail to
reduce the poverty traps facing lowwage families created by the abatement
of main welfare benefits. In a context of largely market based setting of wage
rates and where the breadwinner model of social arrangements is decreasing
in importance, wage subsidies such as employment tax credits play an
important social policy role. Assistance to low-wage working families
compensates these families for the additional costs they face when in work.
The New Zealand National PaO has, in contrast, recommended
providing financial relief through reductions in personal income taxes. In
order to reduce the disincentives for labour supply facing secondary earners
the National PaO has also recommended not implementing the final
increase in the Family Support Tax Credit in 2007-08, which would free fiscal
resources for income tax reductions. However, while tax reductions may
improve financial incentives to supply labour (depending on the precise
income and substitution etfects of the tax reductions, as tax reductions may
worsen financial incentives for some groups when reductions in average tax
rates dominate reductions in marginal tax rates) such reductions would lack
the targeting etficiency of family and employment tax credits, which can be
closely targeted to need on the basis of family structure, and would thus
either compromise income adequacy objectives or would incur a larger fiscal
cost. Such recommendations also do not address the appropriate structure of
the Family Assistance programmes.
The remainder of this chapter thus discusses a number of alternative
options for reform to Family Assistance. This study has identified a number of
reforms aiming to incrementally improve the structure of the Family
Assistance programmes (through removing the hours-based work test from
the In-Work Payment and removing the Family Tax Credit). These reforms
are discussed in greater detail below. As well as these incremental reforms
this study has identified a number of structural reforms. These possible
structural reforms include:
. Raising the thresholds for abatement to compensate for credit corrosion
up to 1 April 2007.
. Lowering the rate at which Family Assistance abates.
. Increasing the rates of Family Support for younger children relative to
the rates for older children.
. Extending in-work assistance to families without children.
r Extending the Parental Tax Credit to all low-income families with a
newborn child.
The first two structural reforms are discussed in the following sections of this
chapter. The three later structural reforms are not discussed in this chapter
but are instead discussed in the context of the overall conclusions of the
study in the following chapter.
Simplifying the Structure of the Family Assistance Programmes
Two largely incremental changes to the Working for Families reforms are
considered below. As with the Working for Families reforms, the levels of
assistance provided by the Family Assistance programmes and the
programmes' abatement thresholds would be increased and indexed for
inflation, abatement of the Family Assistance programmes below $27,500
would be removed, and the In-Work Payment would be increased as
proposed. However, unlike Working for Families eligibility for the In-Work
Payment would not require satisfying an hours-based work test and the
Family Tax Credit would be removed. The use of an hours-based threshold is
inconsistent with the market-based setting of employment conditions and
would create significant administration and compliance costs. The Family Tax
Credit, with its tight targeting by income and family status, tends to be
unresponsive to fluctuations in recipients' clrcumstances, such as wage
rates, hours of work, number of children, and civil status. Given the tight
targeting of the Family Tax Credit this programme is likely to be mostly
received by low-wage sole-parent families. The hours-based eligibility
threshold for the In-Work Payment is most likely to affect primary earners in
partnered families. The impacts of these reforms on the EMTR profiles for
two family types are thus discussed below. The first family type is a sole-
parent with two children under 13 and earning $10 gross per-hour. The
second profile is for a primary earner with two children aged under 13 and
earning $15 gross per-hour. These reforms are most likely to affect the first
earners in families and so the EMTR profiles for a secondary income earner
are not discussed below.
The EMTR profile of a sole-parent with two children and earning a wage
rate of $10 per-hour is shown in figure 10.10. Following the Working for
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Families reforms the sole-parent would be encouraged to exit the Domestic
Purposes Benefit at around 24 hours of work due to the increase in the work-
based Fami$ Assistance programmes. However, due to the dollar-for-dollar
abatement of the Family Tax Credit there would be little relief from the
povefi traps faclng this person. lf the Family Tax Gredit was removed then
the person would exit the benefit at a higher number of hours of work per-
week. However, the poverly traps facing this person would have reduced as
they would only face abatement of the Domestic Purposes Benefit. The
Family Tax Credit makes a larger contribution to poverty traps than
abatement of the Domestic Purposes Benefit.
Figure 10.10: EMTR Profiles of a Sole-Parent ($10 Gross Per-Hour) Prior to Working for
Families, Post Working for Families, and Post Alternative Reform
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The removal of the Family Tax Credit would mean that some sole-
parents at low wages would have smaller net incomes at certain hours of
work relative to the post-Working for Families static income distribution. At
around 25 hours of work the sole-parenfs net income would increase to
around $530 following Working for Families (in comparison to around $450
prior to Working for Families). Following the alternative reform their net
weekly income would be around $514 at these hours of work. However, this
difference would narrow so that at around 38 hours of work the family net
income would be around $5ZO following the alternative reform (following
Working for Families the net income would around $530 at these hours of
o 2 4 6 e 10.i2 14 16 la2022242A?€9O5234 36382t0Q.4,4 fi4€50
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work) and from just over 40 hours of work the family would have a net
income following the alternative reform at least equal to their net income
following Working for Families. Only a small number of families would be
likely to experience any reduction in net income relative to the Working for
Families reforms and any behavioural responses from the improvement in
financial incentives to supply labour may offset these static losses.
Figure 10.11: EMTR Profiles of a Primary Earner ($15 Gross Per-Hour) Prior to Working
for Families, Post Working for Families, and Post Alternative Reform
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The EMTR profile of a primary earner with two children and earning a
wage rate of $15 per-hour is shown in figure 10.11. The removal of the
hours-based work test improves the EMTR profile of this family. This
improvement in the financial incentives to supply labour would not require
any reduction in the family's income. At 26 hours of work the family's net
income would be $521 following the alternative reforms and $Stg following
Working for Families. At 29 hours the family's net income would be $556
following the alternative reforms and $521 following Working for Families.
The rationale for introducing an hours-based threshold was to exclude high-
wage but low-income workers from assistance. The Government has
provided no explanation for the selection of this hours-based threshold at 30
hours per-week for partnered and 20 hours per-week for sole-parent families.
As Nolan [2004c] demonstrated setting the hours-based threshold at 30
hours may exclude recipients at moderate wages from assistance, although
there may be few high-wage and low-hour individuals excluded from
assistance by this threshold as these programmes are already heavi[
targeted on the basis of income.
Increasing Abatement Threshold and Lowering Abatement Rate
In real terms the $27,000 threshold for 30 percent abatement in 1988-89 was
equivalent to approximately $40,000 in 2004-05. This effective shift in the
threshold increased the numbers of people facing higher abatement of their
Family Assistance entitlement. Further, since 1 April 1989 the highest
abatement rate has remained at 30 percent, which contrasts with jurisdictions
such as Australia where the rate has been lowered over several years to 20
percent.
During the 2005 general election campaign the New Zealand Labour
Party proposed increasing the Family Assistance abatement threshold to
$35,000 and lowering the rate of abatement of Family Assistance to 20
percent. The effect of these proposals on the secondary earner in a
partnered family with two children under 13 is modelled below. Emphasis is
given to secondary earners in partnered families as these are the people
most likely to be atfected by the change in financial incentives to supply
labour from these proposals. In contrast there would be liftle change in the
EMTRs facing recipients of main welfare benefits as they will be unlikely to
have gross incomes in excess of $27,500 and any change in EMTRs facing
beneficiaries with total (benefit plus earned) gross income above this
threshold would be small as Family Assistance abatement is levied on
changes in gross incomes after benefit abatement. In the modelling below it
is assumed that the primary earner has a fixed income of $600 per-week and
that the secondary earner receives a wage rate of $15 per-hour. The figure
illustrates the fully enacted Working for Families package and the Working for
Families package with the two additional Labour proposals in 2007.
Increasing the abatement threshold and lowering the abatement rate
would both increase the income range over which Family Assistance would
be received and abated. This policy would affect those families receiving
Family Assistance and with joint incomes above $27,500. For families with
joint incomes between $27,500 and $35,000 there would be substitution
effects (from the rate of abatement falling from 30 to 0 percent) encouraging
work and income etfects (from the higher abated value of assistance)
discouraging labour supply. The overall etfect on these families' labour
supply would thus depend on which etfect dominates. For families with joint
incomes above $35,000 but below the previous (before the Labour policy
change) point at which Family Assistance would be fully abated there would
be substitution effects (from the rate of abatement falling from 30 to 20
percent) encouraging labour supply and income effects (from the higher
abated value of assistance) discouraging labour supply, Again the overall
effect on these families' labour supply would thus depend on which effect
dominates. For families with joint incomes above the previous point at which
Family Assistance would be fully abated and below the new point of full
abatement there would be substitution and income effects discouraging
labour supply. The Labour proposals would thus reduce the financial
disincentives to work facing low-wage secondary earners but this would
come at a cost of discouraging some higher-wage secondary earners' labour
supply.
Figure 10.12: EMTR Profiles of a Secondary Earner ($15 Gross Per-Hour) Post Working
lor Famllies and Post Alternative Reform
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10.7 Conclusion
This chapter evaluated the Working for Families reforms. A key feature of
these reforms is the shifting of the child component of main benefits into the
Family Support Tax Credit. This policy change, along with the Single Benefit
reforms, which are proposed for implementation in 2007, represents a
significant shift in the balance of the tax-benefit system towards
supplementary assistance. The eventual indexation of the Family Assistance
Tax Credits will mean that, unlike after the benefit cuts of 1991, the annual
increase in main benefits for inflation will not alter this balance in the tax-
benefit system.
The design of tax-benefit programmes targeted by income generally
requires trade-offs to be made between objectives for povefi reduction,
targeting efficiency, and financial incentives to supply labour. The Working for
Families reforms will make a significant reduction in the rate of child poverty
in New Zealand. In comparison to other Anglo-American countries, the
Working for Families reforms represent a significant increase in the
generosity of family and employment tax credits in New Zealand. This
increase in generosity is, however, reflected in increased disincentives for
individuals to work at higher joint hours of work or wage rates. The greater
the generosity of assistance then the longer the range of incomes over which
abatement takes place. As shown by the impact of Working for Families on
EMTR profiles and couples' financial incentives to supply labour, following
Working for Families the incentives for sole-parents to supply labour are
likely to be improved but some secondary earners will be likely to face larger
disincentives for labour supply.
Following Working for Families there is likely to be an increase in the
compliance and administration costs of the ta,x-benefit system due to the use
of an hours-based eligibility criterion. Further, the greater receipt of
supplementary assistance by families in work may lead to greater demand for
increased etforts to combine the administration of assistance of tax-based
and we lf are-based supplementary assistance prog ram mes.
Overall the Working for Families reforms represent a significant
investment in families with children but little change will be made to the
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overall design of the Family Assistance programmes, some of which have
remained largely unchanged since 1986. The remainder of this chapter thus
discussed a number of alternative options for reform to Fami[ Assistance.
Removing the Family Tax Credit would provide sole-parents who take-up this
programme with relief from the poverty traps that it creates, although this
could lead to some sole-parents delaying their exit from the Domestic
Purposes Benefit and could lower the level of assistance they receive from
Working for Families. Removing the hours-based eligibility threshold for the
In-Work Payment would improve financial incentives for some primary
earners to supply labour and would not lead to any fall in recipients'
assistance from Working for Families. Increasing the threshold at which the
Family Assistance programmes abate and lowering the rate of abatement
would improve financial incentives for low-wage secondary earners to supply
labour, but would come at an economic cost of shifting disincentives for
labour supply onto secondary earners at higher points in the income
distribution. A number of other possible changes to Working for Families are
discussed in the context of the overall conclusions of the study in the
following chapter.
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11 Conclusion
1 1 .1 Introduction
This study reviewed methods for measuring the effectiveness of family and
employment tax credits, evaluated the Working for Families reforms, and
considered possible improvements to Working for Families. Questions that
this study considered were:
. What roles should family and employment tax credits play in tax-benefit
systems?
. How should family and employment tax credits be designed? Should
eligibility for assistance reflect work effort as opposed to family
structure?
. What lessons do historical and comparative perspectives on Working
for Families provide?
. Will New Zealand's Working for Families reforms achieve the optimal
design and role of family and employment tax credits?
. What improvements, if any, could be made to the Working for Families
reforms?
These questions are each discussed in the following sections of this chapter
and are central to understanding what works to improve social policy
outcomes in New Zealand.
The origins of New Zealand's tax-benefit system were in an economic
and social environment of low and generally short-term unemployment and
where couples with children and a single male breadwinner were the most
common family type. Over the past two decades work patterns and family
structures have changed significantly. New Zealand has had one of the
highest rates of increase in income inequality in the world and concern has
increasingly been expressed regarding the need to alleviate child poverty.
New Zealand, like many other OECD countries, has experienced significant
changes in family structures, including the breakdown of the breadwinner
model of social arrangements, increasing numbers of sole-parent families,
and increasing numbers of dual-income families. This increasing population
heterogeneity and the growth in part-time and part-year work has increased
the complexity of designing tax-benefit programmes to ensure families with
children have adequate incomes while improving financial incentives to work
(resolving Beveridge's dilemma).
Although the social assistance and income tax systems were largely
devised as separate systems large proportions of the population are now
affected by both systems simultaneously. There has been a shift towards
targeted expenditure on the working-aged. The greater targeting of social
assistance expenditure has resulted in increasing poverty traps tacing low-
wage families with children. Although income tax policies have emphasised a
broad based and low rate approach to income taxation, relatively little
emphasis has been given to systematically lowering effective marginal tax
rates at low income levels. These policy shifts have occurred in tandem with
increasing market'based setting of wage rates and the decline of full
employment (largely of male primary caregivers).
The five Anglo-American countries have responded to issues such as
these through establishing or redesigning family and employment tax credits.
Of these five countries New Zealand has been the laggard in this policy
domain, although such reforms are now underway with the Working for
Families package. Expanding the social policy role of the income tax system
in this way will further increase the degree to which the social assistance and
income tax systems simultaneously atfect the same people. A greater
understanding of the relative etfectiveness of family and employment tax
credits, as opposed to traditional welfare programmes or personal income
taxes, at achieving policy outcomes will thus be necessary for effectively
understanding what works to change social policy outcomes.
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11.2 The Role of Family and Employment Tax
Credits
Income taxes, family and employment tax credits, and main welfare benefits
should be seen as different components of a unified tax-benefit system.
However, any approach taken to evaluating actual or possible tax-benefit
reforms must also recognise the relative advantages of tax-based and
welfare-based assistance and the role that individual programmes should
play in the broader tax-benefit system. Tax-based and welfare-based social
assistance programmes differ in the extent to which they can accurately
assess entitlement, respond to recipients' changing circumstances, and
ensure compliance and participation in programmes. Growing international
support for tax-based social assistance programmes reflects the belief that
assistance provided through the tax system avoids some of the limitations of
traditional social welfare programmes.
Evidence on the Earned Income Tax Credit in the United States, for
example, indicates that take-up rates of this assistance are relatively high
due to the relatively low stigma associated with receiving assistance through
the tax system and the high proportion of recipients taking up assistance at
the end of the income tax year. What evidence there is on the take-up of the
Family Assistance programmes in New Zealand indicates that take-up of
these programmes is likely to be relatively high also. Reflecting the
increasing emphasis on the regular and ongoing information transfer
between government agencies in New Zealand, this country is unusual
among Anglo-American countries in having a relatively high take-up of
assistance during the income tax year. These high rates of take-up in the
Untied States and New Zealand contrast with countries like the United
Kingdom, where take-up of assistance is relatively low.
Nevertheless there are, however, a number of limitations to the use of
tax-based social assistance, such as the relatively low flexibility in responding
to recipients' changing circumstances, the requirement for relatively narrow
definitions of income and the income sharing unit, and the requirement for
relatively clear-cut and non-discretionary eligibility criteria. As further
evidence on the Earned Income Tax Credit indicates, this programme has
also been vulnerable to taxpayer fraud with 27.0 to 31.7 percent of the claims
made in 1999 being either overpayments to eligible recipients or payments to
ineligible recipients flnland Revenue Service, 2002, p. 3]. Little information is
available on taxpayer fraud in relation to New Zealand's Family Assistance
programme. lssues such as take-up and taxpayer fraud are likely to increase
in importance in the New Zealand tax-benefit system following the expansion
of the Family Assistance programmes as part of the Working for Families
reforms.
Four key policy objectives have motivated the use of family and
employment tax credits in the Anglo-American countries. These programmes
have been used to improve financial incentives to work ('make work pay'),
reduce poverty (particularly child poverty), compensate families for the costs
of children, and support single-income partnered families. These four
objectives are each discussed below.
The shift towards market-based setting of wage rates in New Zealand
has meant that employment and family tax credits now play an important role
in ensuring that low-wage families have adequate incomes. A major rationale
for the use of employment and family tax credits has been to provide
assistance to families with children without the negative financial incentives
for labour supply associated with traditional welfare-based programmes. Yet
this simple view of the financial incentives associated with tax-based
assistance needs to be tempered in the light of the empirical evidence on the
financial incentives that arise from these programmes. Evidence on the
labour supply effects of employment tax credits indicates that these
programmes involve a trade-off between increasing the labour supply of sole-
parents and decreasing the labour supply of secondary earners. This
decrease of labour supply of caregivers in couples reflects the use of joint
income as the basis for assessing entitlement. Assessing entitlement on joint
income encourages some secondary eamers to drop out of the labour
market, rather than working or registering for unemployment assistance, and
leads to some families choosing to reduce their earned incomes. Basing
entitlement on joint income means secondary earners generally face higher
etfective marginal tax rates from their first dollar of income than primary
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earners and when secondary earners reduce their earned incomes there is
little reduction (or an increase) in joint income. Some secondary earners are
etfectively subsidised to stay at home [Eissa and Hoynes, 2004].
Further, there are important ditferences in the designs of employment
tax credits among the five Anglo-American countries. This study has
illustrated two broad approaches to the designs of these tax credits. The
United States seeks to improve financial incentives to work through providing
an earning subsidy up to a threshold. In contrast both New Zealand and the
United Kingdom assess work etfort on the basis of hours of work and, in New
Zealand, exclude recipients of main welfare benefits from receipt of
employment tax credits. A subsidy that increases with earnings up to a
threshold improves incentives to increase hours of work but may be criticised
on vertical equity grounds. However, hours-based thresholds create
discontinuities in budget constraints that can distort distributions of hours of
work, could be inflexible in the light of market-based employment contracts
that require hours of work to vary, and could create significant administrative
and compliance burdens. The increased emphasis on hours-based eligibility
thresholds in New Zealand thus appears inconsistent with the liberalisation of
the labour market, which has been associated with increasing part-time and
casual work, variations in weekly hours of work, variations in wage rates, and
participation rates of women.
New Zealand is also unusual among Anglo-American countries in
providing employment tax credits to only families with children. Employment
tax credits in both the United Kingdom and the United States are available to
low-wage working families without children. This narrow role of employment
tax credits in New Zealand retlects the weight given to fiscal objectives in the
design of the Family Assistance programmes. This dominance of fiscal
objectives is also reflected in the relatively low rates of generosity of
programmes in New Zealand. As this study demonstrated, of five Anglo-
American countries in 2004-05 New Zealand provided the least generous
family and employment tax credits to low-wage families with children.
ln New Zealand poverty among families with children and working
families has increased. One factor in the increasing poverty among families
with children has been the fall in the poverty reduction etfectiveness of the
tax-benefit system, which has partly reflected the decline in value of Family
Assistance programmes due to their lack of indexation for inflation. This
study has illustrated, however, that as well as reducing the generosity of
assistance the failure to index the levels of assistance and thresholds for
abatement has been likely to lead to the incidence of pover$ traps among
families with children increasing. Income adequacy outcomes should thus be
seen in coniunction with financial incentives for labour supply. lt is in this
context that reform to family and employment tax credits is being used in
New Zealand to directly alleviate poverty and improve caregivers'
(particularly sole-parents') financial incentives to supply labour (as part of a
broader poverty reduction strategy). However, the current work focus of the
Fami[ Assistance programmes should not be overstated. Expenditure on the
work-based Family Assistance programmes is marginal in comparison to
expenditure on the Family Support Tax Credit, which is available to families
in and not in work.
New Zealand is unusual among Anglo-American countries in not
providing base levels of assistance that go high into the income distribution in
order to compensate families with children for the additional costs they face
relative to families without children. This absence of base levels of assistance
illustrates the shltt in New Zealand away from a policy objective of ensuring
horizontal equity between families with and without children. For much of the
second half of the twentieth century the universal Family Benefit was
provided to account for additional costs facing families without children and to
provide caregivers with an independent source of income. However, the
universal Family Benefit was not indexed for inflation so that by its removal in
1991 its role in the tax-benefit system had become a largely token one. As
well as the Family Benefit a number of small tax rebates that aimed to assist
low-income families were established during the 1970s and early-1980s.
These rebates were limited to working families and were largely paid to
principal income earners and did not vary according to the number of children
in the family. These rebates were replaced by the Family Assistance Tax
Credits in 1986.
In the late 1990s there was an attempt to extend the objectives of the
Family Assistance programmes to include the provision of support to working
253
families with newborn children through introducing the Parental Tax Credit.
Influencing the establishment of this programme were etforts to reduce
political demand for paid parental leave policies. However, with the
subsequent establishment of paid parental leave policies the rationale for and
role of this programme, and the exclusion of beneficiary families from this
assistance, could be questioned. Policymakers have given little consideration
to whether this programme requires restructuring or removal or the pafticular
role that this programme should play in New Zealand's tax-benefit system.
In New Zealand there is increasing voice being given to redesigning
family and employment tax credits as a vehicle for partially introducing family
based taxation to help arrest the decline in single-income partnered families
with children. Programmes with similar objectives are present in other Anglo-
American tax-benefit systems, such as the Family Tax Benefit Part B in
Australia and features of the income tax system (tax exemptions) in Canada
and the United States. (ln the United States it is also possible for some
families to opt for joint taxation.) However, these policies conflict with policy
objectives for increasing caregivers' labour supply and tend to have low
targeting efficiency. lf these policies were adopted in New Zealand they
would thus be likely to require trade-offs to be made with other important
policy objectives. Further, the trend among OECD countries has been to
redesign or remove such programmes to improve caregivers' financial
incentives for labour supply. There is thus little rationale for extending the
Family Assistance programmes in this direction in New Zealand.
11.3 Designing Family and Employment Tax
Credits
The section above identified a range of possible roles for family and
employment tax credits. The effectiveness of family and employment tax
credits in filling these roles will, however, largely reflect their designs.
Designs of family and employment tax credits in five Anglo-American
countries indicate a range of ditferent approaches taken to reconciling policy
objectives. Among the Anglo-American countries the designs of family tax
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credits ditfer in the degree to which they are based on family structure. ln
Canada, for example, family tax credits are heavily targeted on the basis of
fami$ structure. Australia and Canada place little emphasis on employment
tax credits, although provincial-level employment tax credits and federal-level
unemployment insurance programmes are also provided in Canada. The
emphasis given to providing assistance on the basis of family structure in
Australia is reflected in the relatively low labour participation of caregivers in
this country.
In New Zealand the structure of the Family Assistance Tax Credits prior
to the Working for Families reforms largely reflected the structure of
assistance introduced in 1986. Since their 1986 establishment the roles of
the Family Assistance programmes have been to provide supplementary
assistance targeted on the basis of family structure and income (the Family
Support Tax Credit) and targeted on the basis of family structure, income,
and work effort (the Family Tax Credit and then the Child Tax Credit and
Parental Tax Credit). There have, however, have been long periods of little
change in the design of the Family Assistance programmes. Apart from
increases in levels of assistance and abatement thresholds, the Family Tax
Credit is largely identical to the programme established in 1986. The
rationale for the Family Tax Credit was to provide a negative income tax type
programme (with an income guarantee that abates at 100 percent against
changes in annual joint taxable income) for working families with children.
Take-up of this programme during the income tax year is based on annual
joint taxable income, work status, hours of work, and family status projected
forward.
The tight targeting of the Family Tax Credit means that under-payments
or over-payments are relatively likely for this programme. Since this
programme's establishment in 1986, liberalisation of the labour market has
been reflected in greater part-time and part-year work and family structures
have become less stable and more heterogeneous. Recipients of the Family
Tax Credit are therefore increasingly likely to change circumstances during
the income tax year and although the Inland Revenue Department can
automatically adjust entitlements during the year for many taxpayers, the
tight targeting of the Family Tax Credit reduces the effectiveness with which
this assistance may respond to these fluctuations. Any responsiveness that
may occur will incur relatively high administrative and compliance costs, as
information on hours of work is relatively ditficult to collect and audit. Over-
payments and under-payments during the income tax year are thus relatively
likely to arise for recipients who take-up this programme during the income
tax year. Prior to Working for Families the erosion of the value of the
threshold at which abatement began for this programme meant that relatively
few families qualified for this programme and issues of over-payments and
under-payments impacted on only a concentrated group of recipients. With
the extension of this programme following Working for Families these
difficulties will, however, become more common.
In the design of the Family Support Tax Credit since 1986 greater
emphasis has been placed on targeting assistance by the numbers and ages
of children in families. Since 1986 assistance has increased with the ages of
children. However, the failure to index these programmes has led to credit
corrosion that reduces both the value of the unabated assistance and the real
income levels at which abatement applies. The failure to increase the levels
of entitlement of the Family Assistance programmes in line with inflation has
been documented by a number of commentators. There has been less
recognition of the long periods of little change in abatement thresholds and
abatement rates for the Family Assistance programmes. The top income
threshold for Family Support abatement, for example, remained unchanged
for the twelve years prior to 1 April 2000 and the two abatement rates of 18
and 30 percent have been in place since 1 April 1989. Failure to increase
abatement thresholds has meant that in real terms families have faced
additional abatement of their Fami[ Assistance entitlement.
The levels of assistance provided by the Family Support Tax Gredit
currently increase with the ages of children in the family. These age-related
scales are based on assumptions that children become more expensive as
they age. However the strength of this assumption has been questioned,
particularly by research in the United Kingdom that found that age-related
scales in tax-benefit programmes in this country overestimated the extra
costs of older children. There is a paucity of research on families' spending
on children by age of child in New Zealand against which to judge the age-
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related scales in the Family Assistance programmes. Yet spending on
younger children is often less discretionary than spending on older children
and families with younger children often face particular costs that do not have
as great an impact on families with older children (such funding the
withdrawal of a caregiver from the labour market (in New Zealand caregivers
tend to re-enter the labour market when children are older)). Providing
greater assistance to families with younger children would recognise the
greater difficulties that these families face in allowing both caregivers to work
in the labour market. Subsidising the withdrawal from the labour market of a
caregiver with young children would also accord with child development
objectives.
Application for the Family Assistance programmes is relatively
straightforward. However, application for assistance requires the family to file
a tax return and Family Assistance application form with the Inland Revenue
Department. Assessment of entitlement is largely based on voluntary
compliance and is only audited as part of the general process of auditing
income tax returns. Increasing the role that the Family Assistance
programmes play in the tax-benefit system is likely to place increasing
pressure on these application, assessment, and auditing processes.
Increasing the role of the Family Assistance programmes in the tax-benefit
system will also place increasing pressure on the joint administration of these
programmes by the Inland Revenue Department and the Ministry of Social
Development.
11.4 Evaluating the Working for Families Reforms
The Working for Families package represents a significant increase in the
generosity of family and employment tax credits in New Zealand. The
Working for Families reforms will make a significant reduction in the
headcount rate of child poverty in New Zealand. The financial incentives for
sole-parents to work will be improved. Secondary earners will face increased
financial disincentives for labour supply, which is significant given the
increasing proportion of Fami[ Assistance expenditure going to partnered
families (increasing from approximately one third to one half of Family
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Assistance recipients) following Working for Families [Johnson, 2005, p. vii].
There will be an increase in the compliance and administration costs of the
tax-benefit system, particularly due to the use of an hours-based eligibility
criterion. Further, the likely greater receipt of supplementary assistance by
families in work may lead to greater demand for increased efforts to combine
the administration of assistance of tax-based and welfare-based social
assistance programmes. lssues of take-up and fraud will become more
prominent. Working for Families will also increase the proportions of social
assistance expenditure for which the Family Assistance programmes
account, which in 2004-05 had a combined total greater than expenditure on
the Unemployment Benefit.
An important feature of the Working for Families reforms is the
extension of the hours-based work test for the Family Tax Credit to the In-
Work Payment (formerly the Child Tax Gredit). An hours-based work test
creates notches in budget constraints, which could be likely to lead to
changes in the distribution of hours of work. Basing assistance on a
prescribed numbers of hours of work would be inconsistent with the market-
based setting of employment conditions, as the flexibility in setting hours of
work in employment contracts would be reduced. A feature of many
employment contracts is that an employee's hours of work may vary with
seasonal or economic conditions, The use of an hours-based threshold
requires determlning how these fluctuations in hours of work should be
treated in the assessment of entitlement. Having thresholds based on work
hours (in addition to abatement based on income) would also increase the
complexity of a programme's administration and may lead to greater
uncertainty regarding the level of assistance available when making the
transition from benefit to work and when people's hours of work and earned
incomes fluctuate. Such a test would also be vulnerable to fraud as the
income tax system is not able to easily monitor recipients' hours of work and
compliance would not be audited independently of the general taxpayer audit
process. Monitoring compliance with this test would not be a high priority
under the Inland Revenue Department's strategy for auditing taxpayers
(which would be likely to emphasise more high-value tax avoidance
schemes) or an etficient use of their resources.
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Overall the Working for Families reforms represent significant income
redistribution towards families with children but, aside from the extension of
hours-based work tests, little change will be made to the overall design of the
Family Assistance programmes, some of which have remained largely
unchanged since 1986. Chapter 10 illustrated a number of possible changes
to the Working for Families reforms. This chapter illustrated that removing the
Family Tax Credit and the hours-based eligibility threshold would improve
financial incentives to supply labour facing low income families. The dollar-
for-dollar abatement of the Family Tax Credit creates significant poverty traps
for those recipients who take up this assistance. The majority of recipients of
the Family Tax Credit are likely to be sole-parent families and a small number
of these families would experience a small static reduction in the level of
assistance they would get from the Working for Families reforms following
the removal of this programme. These losses could be, however, offset by
changes in sole-parents' labour supply in response to this initiative.
Removing the hours-based work test would improve the financial incentives
to supply labour for a number of primary earners in partnered families. No
families would lose assistance from Working for Families as a result of this
change. Increasing the threshold at which the Family Assistance
programmes abate and lowering the rate of abatement would improve
financial incentives for low-wage secondary earners to supply labour, but
would come at an economic cost of shifting disincentives for labour supply
onto secondary earners at higher points in the income distribution.
As well as changes to the Family Assistance programmes, a key
feature of the Working for Families reforms is the shifting of the child
component of main benefits into the Family Support Tax Credit. This policy
change, along with the Single Benefit reforms, which are proposed for
implementation in 2007, represents a significant shift in the balance of the
tax-benefit system towards supplementary assistance. The balance of the
tax-benefit system has not been shifted to this degree since the 1991 benefit
cuts. The indexation of the Family Assistance Tax Credits will mean that,
however, unlike after the 1991 reforms the annual increase in main benefits
for inflation will not erode the relativities between main and supplementary
assistance. Given this shifl in the structure of the tax-benefit system issues
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relating to integrating the administration of supplementary assistance
(currently spread between the Inland Revenue Department and the Ministry
of Social Development) and take-up and fraud will become increasing central
to assessing the effectiveness with which the tax-benefit system achieves
desired policy outcomes.
11.5 Conclusion
Part one of this study developed the criteria and methodology for evaluating
tax-benefit programmes. Part two of this study discussed the changing policy
settings in New Zealand's tax-benefit system. Key changes in these policy
settings have been the shift from a universal Family Benefit, towards targeted
expenditure on assistance for families with dependent children, the reduction
in the progressivity of the personal income tax scale, and the tax system
taking a larger role in providing social assistance. In comparison to four other
Anglo-American countries, the levels of assistance provided to families with
children in New Zealand were both less generous and more heavily targeted
by income. The criteria and methodology developed in part one and the
policy context identified in part two were used to evaluate the tax-benefit
system in part three of this study.
In part three of the study it was identified that families with children have
relatively high rates of poverty and relatively low living standards. The
poverty traps in the tax-benefit system were also seen to most heavily impact
on families with children. In chapter 10 the Labour-led government's
response to these issues, the Working for Families reforms, was evaluated.
Overall the Working for Families reforms represent significant income
redistribution towards families with children but little change will be made to
the overall design of the Famif Assistance programmes, some of which have
remained largely unchanged since 1986. Working for Families does not fully
address the need to reform the Family Assistance programmes in the light of
important social and economic changes that have taken place over the last
two decades, such as the breakdown of the breadwinner model of social
arrangements and the liberalisation of the labour market.
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Reform to the tax-benefit system needs to strike a balance between
policy objectives such as reducing child poverly, improving financial
incentives for caregivers to work, compensating families with children for the
additional costs that they face, and supporting single-income partnered
families. Striking this balance requires trade-offs between policy objectives to
be made. For instance, a major outcome of the Working for Families reforms
will be the likely improvement in financial incentives for sole-parents' labour
supply but worsening of incentives for partnered caregivers' labour supply.
There was little apparent recognition of this trade-off between caregivers'
labour supply incentives in the development of these reforms, although such
a trade-otf had been associated with the use of family and employment tax
credits in several other countries and the targeting of these programmes by
income and numbers and ages of children [Nolan, 2004b, p. 7; OECD,
2005a, p. 41. In making tax-benefit reforms policy priorities reflecting trade-
otfs between different economic and social objectives need to be clearly
established and policy instruments' roles in the tax-benefit system need to
reflect their effectiveness at achieving these policy priorities. More clearly
established policy priorities and a greater understanding of the relative
etfectiveness of ditferent policy instruments are required if New Zealand is to
develop a tax-benefit system that achieves a desired level of redistribution to
families with children at least economic cost.
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Appendix Anglo-American Family and
Employment Tax Credits
Table A.1: New Zealand Family and Employment Tax Credits (1 April 2004)
Programme Features Design
Family Support Tax
Credit
Child Tax Credit
Family Tax Credit
Parental Tax Credit
Assistance to families with dependent
children
Payments vary between eldest and
additional children
No work test
Abates against joint income
Refundable tax rebate
Paid to primary caregiver
Assistance to working families with
dependent children
Abates against joint income
Refundable tax rebate
Paid to primary caregiver
Ensures a minimum net income for
working families with dependent
children
Abates against joint income
Refundable tax rebate
Paid to primary caregiver
Assistance to working families with a
newly bom dependent child
Abates against joint income
Retundable tax rebate
Paid to primary caregiver
Unabated payment per-child:
. eldest child under 13: $2,444
. eldest child 1 3 to 18: $3,380
. additional child under 13: $2,080
. additional child 13 to 18: $2,340
Gross abatement threshold one
$20,356
Gross abatement threshold two
$27,81
Abatement between thresholds one
and two 18 percent
Abatement above threshold two 30
percent
Unabated payment per-child $780
For abatement added to Family
Support (total amount abates as one)
Work test excludes recipients of
welfare benefits
Guaranteed minimum net family
income $15,080 ($18,367 gross)
Work test of 30 hours of work per-
week for a couple and 20 hours for a
sole-parent. Recipients of welfare
benefits excluded
Abates dollar-for-dollar against
increases in net family income above
$15,080
Unabated payment per-child $150
p€r-week
Paid for up to eight weeks
Work test excludes recipients of
welfare benefits
Note: Unless stated otherwise annualfigures in NZ$
263
Table A.2: Australlan Famif Tax Credits (1 July 2004 (NZ$))
Programme Features Design
Family Tax Benefit Assistance to families with dependent Unabated payment per-child:
Part A children . under 13: g3,7g7 (AU$9,4S2)
Base level of assistance abates only . 13 to 1S: g4,g03 (AU$4,417)
at high incomes 
' 16 to 17: $1,21g (AU$i,121)Abatement threshold for base rate
increases with number of children ' 18 to 24: $1,639 (AU$l,507)
Additional annual supplement paid at Unabated anlual yealen!year-end supplement$667 (AU$613) per-child
No work test Base rate child under 18 $1,886
Abates against joint income (AU$1'734)
Refundabre tax rebate Base rate child 18 to 24 $2'306(AU$2,121)
Paid to nominated caregiver Gross abatement threshold one (of
assistance excluding base rate)
$35,330 (AU$32,rt85)
Gross abatement threshold two (of
assistance including base rate)
$91,383 (AU$84,023)
Add-on to threshold two $3,652
(AU$3,358) Per additional child
Abatement rate between thresholds
one and two 20 Percent
Abatement rate above threshold two
30 percent
Family Tax Benefit Assistance to iamilies largety Unabated payment per-family:
Part B dependent on a single income r youngest chitd under five: g3,2S1
Sole-parents are not subject to (AU$2,989)
income test . youngest child over five: $2,267
In couples abates against lowest (AU$2,084)
income eame/s income only Gross abatement threshold $4,350
Retundable tax rebate (AU$4,000)
Paid to nominated caregiver Abatement rate 20 percent
Note: Unless stated othenrise annual figures in NZ$ (based on OECD 2004 purchasing
power parity rates (OECD, 2005b)) and rounded to nearest dollar
2U
Table A.3: Canadian Family and Employment Tax Credits (1 July 2004 (NZ$))
Programme Features Design
Canada Child Tax
Benefit: Basic
Benefit
Canada Child Tax
Benefit National
Child Benefit
Supplement
BC Family Bonus
BC Eamed Income
Benefit
Assistance to families with dependent
children
No work test
Abates against joint income (previous
year)
Refundable tax rebate
Paid to nominated caregiver
Assistance to families with dependent
children
No work test
Abates against joint income (previous
year)
Refundable tax rebate
Paid to nominated caregiver
Assistance to families with dependent
children
No work test
Abates against joint income (previous
year)
Refundable tax rebate
Paid to nominated caregiver
Assistance to families with dependent
children
Work tested
Abates against joint income (previous
year)
Refundable tax rebate
Paid to nominated caregiver
Unabated payment per-child $1,417
(c$1,208)
Add-on tor third and additional child
$e8.s5 (c$84)
Add-on for child under 7 $280
(c$23e)
Net abatement threshold $41,063
(c$3s,000)
Abatement rate one child family 2
percent
Abatement rate 2+ child family 4
percent
Unabated payment first child $1,773
(c$1,511)
Unabated payment second child
$1,519 (C$1,295)
Unabated payment additional children
$1,425 (C$1,21s)
Net abatement threshold S26,533
(c$22,615)
Abatement rate one child family 12.2
percent
Abatement rate two child family 22.7
percent
Abatement rate 3+ child family 32.5
percent
Unabated payment second child $168
(c$143)
Unabated payment third child $290
(c$247)
Net abatement threshold $24,051
(c$20,s00)
Abatement rate one child family 9
percent
Abatement rate2+ child family 18
p€rcent
Eligibility threshold C$3,750
Abat€ment threshold C$20,921
Maximum monthly assistance:
r 'l ChiH C$50.41
t I Children S84.16
r t Children C$111.66
. AdditionalchildrenC$27.50
Note: Unless stated othenrise annual tigures in NZ$ (based on OECD 2002+ purchasing
power parity rates (OECD, 2005b)) and rounded to nearest dollar
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Table A.4: United Kingdom Family and Employment Tax Credits (1 July 2004 (NZ$))
Programme Features Design
Working Tax Credit
Child Tax Credit
Child Benefit
Eligibility threshold 16 hours of work
by one worker
Full-time premium paid for 3O+ joint
hours of work
Paid to person working 16 hours
or more per week (couples with
two eligible workers may elect
who receives the payment)
Assistance to families with dependent
children
No work test
Abates against joint income
Refundable tax rebate
Paid to primary caregiver
Universal transfer to all families with
dependent children
Paid to primary caregiver
Unabated Basic Element $3,832
(€1,569)
Unabated Couple and Sole-Parent
Element $3,770 (e1,543)
Unabated Full-Time Premium $1,565
(e641)
Unabated Family Element (first child)
$1,334 (€546) per-annum
Unabated Family Element (baby)
$1,334 (8546) per-annum
Unabated Child Tax Credit (children
below 16) $3,965 (el,623) per-annum
Unabated Child Tax Credit (children
16+) $3,965 (e1,623) per-annum
Gross Abatement Threshold (lncl.
WTC) $12,384 (e5,070) per-annum
Gross Abatement Threshold (GTC
only) $32,815 (e13,434) per-annum
Abatement rate 37 percent
Gross Abatement Threshold (Family
Element) $121,797 (949,863) per-
annum
Abatement rate 0.067 percent
Eldest qualifying child $2,096
(e858.00) per-annum
Additional children $1,404 (S574.60)
per-annum
Note: Unless stated otheruise annual figures in NZ$ (based on OECD 2004 purchasing
power parity rates (OECD, 2005b)) and rounded to nearest dollar
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Table A.5: United States Family and Employment Tax Credits (1 July 2004 (NZ$))
Programme Features Design
Earned Income Tax
Credit
Child Tax Credit
Wisconsin Eamed
lncome Credit
Assistance to low-income working
families
Abates against joint income
Hefundable tax rebate
Paid to primary caregiver (if
appropriate)
Where caregiving responsibil ities
shared equally in separated
families paid to taxpayer with
highest adlusted gross income
(tie-breaker rule)
Assistance to families with dependent
children and income over a threshold
Partly refundable
Paid to primary caregiver (if
appropriate)
Where caregiving responsibilities
shared equally in separated
families paid to taxpayer with
highest adjusted gross income
(tie-breaker rule)
Assistance to low-income working
familles
Abates against joint income
Refundable tax rebate
Paid to primary caregiver (if
appropriate)
Where caregiving responsibilities
shared equally in separated
families paid to ta,rpayer with
highest adjusted gross income
(tie-breaker rule)
Subsidy Rate:
0 Children 8 percent
1 Child 34 percent
2+ Children 40 percent
Earnings Phase Threshold:
0 Children $7,599 (US$s,100)
1 Chird $11,413 (US$7,660)
2+ Children $16,018
(us$10,750)
Married Cap Phase Threshold:
0 Children $9,521 (US$6,390)
1 Chitd $20,920 (us$14,040)
2+ Children $20,920
(us$14,040)
Other Cap Phase Threshold:
0 Children $11,011
(us$7,390)
1 Chitd $22,410 (US$15,040)
2+ Children $22,410
(US$15,04,0)
Abatement Rate:
r QChildrenBpercent
r I Child 16 percent
. 2+ Children 21 percent
Entitlement Threshold $1 6,01 8
(us$10,750)
Credit above threshold 15 percent
Credit per-child (under 17) $1,490
(us$1,ooo)
Abatement Threshold (single)
$81,950 (Us$s,ooo)
Abatement Threshold (married, single
file) $1 11,750 (US$75,000)
Abatement Rate 5 percent
Subsidy rate:
r QChildren0percent
r iChild4percent
t I Children 14 percent
r 3+ Children 43 percent
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
a
I
Note: Unless stated ohenrise annualfigures in NZ$ (based on OECD 2004 purchasing power parity rates
(OECD, 2005b)) and rounded to nearest dollar
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